Michael Tankersley v. James Almand
837 F.3d 390
4th Cir.2016Background
- Maryland requires all non-retired attorneys to pay an annual fee to the Client Protection Fund (the Fund) and to disclose their Social Security numbers (SSNs); Rule 16-811.5 (now Rule 19-605) mandated SSN disclosure and Rule 16-811.6 (now Rule 19-606) authorized suspension for noncompliance.
- Statutes cited to justify the requirement: Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. §§ 10-311, 10-313 (Fund must provide attorney list with tax ID or SSN to state tax authorities) and Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 10-119.3 (state licensing SSN collection to comply with 42 U.S.C. § 666).
- Tankersley, a long-licensed Maryland attorney who primarily lives and practices outside Maryland, refused to provide his SSN citing Privacy Act concerns and data-breach risk; the Court of Appeals suspended his license and he sued state judges, clerk, and Fund trustees in their official capacities seeking injunctive relief under the federal Privacy Act.
- District court dismissed the suit relying on Greidinger v. Almand, which held §§ 666 and 405 supersede the Privacy Act’s § 7(a)(1); Tankersley appealed.
- The Fourth Circuit majority affirmed dismissal, holding § 405(c)(2)(C)(i) (Tax Reform Act provision) permits states to require SSNs for tax administration and that the Court of Appeals/Fund act as state agents; the court rejected application of § 666 because “applicant” does not include already-licensed attorneys.
- Senior Judge Davis concurred in part and dissented in part: he agreed § 666 didn’t apply but would hold § 405 does not supersede the Privacy Act, and he would recognize a § 1983 remedy for Tankersley.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 42 U.S.C. § 666 (Welfare Reform Act) authorizes compelling SSNs from already-licensed attorneys | § 666 applies only to "applicants" and does not cover current licensees like Tankersley | § 666 permits states to record SSNs for professional licensing broadly | Held: § 666 does not apply — "applicant" does not encompass existing licensees |
| Whether 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(C)(i) (Tax Reform Act) authorizes requiring SSNs from Maryland attorneys to assist tax administration | SSN collection here is not "in the administration of any tax" and Tankersley is not "affected or appears to be" by Maryland tax laws | § 405 allows states (through agents) to require SSNs for tax administration; Fund/Court act as state agents and attorneys licensed in MD "appear to be" affected | Held: § 405 applies; disclosure may be required and Privacy Act §7(a)(1) is displaced in this context |
| Whether the Fund (or Court-appointed trustees) qualifies as a State entity/agency under § 405 | Fund is not an agency with administrative responsibility for tax laws and is not a direct stand-in for the State | State acts through agents; Court of Appeals and the Fund are state actors so § 405 covers them | Held: Court treats the Fund/Court of Appeals as state agents for purposes of § 405, so they may require SSNs |
| Whether Tankersley may enforce Privacy Act § 7(a)(1) via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 | Privacy Act §7(a)(1) creates an individual right enforceable under § 1983 for prospective relief | Defendants argued either federal statutes supersede the Privacy Act or that §1983 is not available (various defenses) | Held: Majority did not reach or adopt a §1983 holding; concurrence would have recognized a §1983 remedy (Davis J.) |
Key Cases Cited
- Greidinger v. Almand, 30 F. Supp. 3d 413 (D. Md. 2014) (district court holding §§ 666 and 405 supersede Privacy Act §7(a)(1))
- Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014) (interpretation of statutory terms in context; used by parties on textual-against-absurdity arguments)
- Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (state acts through its officers and agents)
- TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (statutory construction canon against rendering words superfluous)
- Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (requirements for a statute to create rights enforceable under § 1983)
- Schwier v. Cox, 340 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2003) (Privacy Act §7(a)(1) creates an individual right; §1983 remedy available)
- Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 1999) (Privacy Act §7(a)(1) creates a right but §1983 remedy arguably foreclosed)
- Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (official-capacity suits for injunctive relief are not suits against a State for Eleventh Amendment purposes)