905 F.3d 711
3rd Cir.2018Background
- On May 12, 2014, Nesquehoning police officer Stephen Homanko observed a minor traffic offense by a northbound driver, radioed ahead to the neighboring jurisdiction, then pursued the car at speeds exceeding 100 mph on a two-way undivided road.
- During the high-speed pursuit Homanko lost control, crossed the center line, and collided with Michael Sauers's southbound vehicle, seriously injuring Sauers and killing his wife.
- Homanko pled guilty in state court to vehicular homicide and reckless endangerment; Sauers then sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (state-created danger / substantive due process) and under state tort law.
- At the motion-to-dismiss stage the District Court found Sauers stated a plausible state-created danger Fourteenth Amendment claim and denied Homanko qualified immunity; Homanko appealed only the qualified-immunity ruling.
- The Third Circuit panel agreed the complaint plausibly alleged a constitutional violation under the state-created danger doctrine but held qualified immunity should have been granted because, as of May 2014, the applicable constitutional right was not "clearly established."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sauers plausibly alleged a state-created danger Fourteenth Amendment violation | Sauers: Homanko's reckless, high-speed pursuit of a nonfleeing, non-emergency traffic suspect created foreseeable danger, shocks the conscience, and satisfies the four-element state-created danger test | Homanko did not contest pleading sufficiency on appeal (only qualified immunity) | Court: Complaint plausibly pleaded state-created danger (District Court ruling not appealed) |
| Whether Homanko's conduct "shocks the conscience" (culpability level) | Sauers: Officer had time to deliberate (called ahead), so mid-level standard (conscious disregard of great risk) applies and is satisfied | Homanko argued conduct was not conscience-shocking for constitutional purposes | Court: Under Lewis sliding-scale and Third Circuit precedent, mid-level standard applies and alleged conduct meets it |
| Whether the constitutional right was "clearly established" in May 2014 so qualified immunity is unavailable | Sauers: Reasonable officer would have fair notice that reckless non-emergency pursuit could give rise to constitutional liability | Homanko: Precedent (esp. Lewis) left room for officers to believe only intent-to-harm sufficed in many chase cases; thus no fair warning | Court: Not clearly established in May 2014; qualified immunity granted on federal § 1983 claim |
| Whether Third Circuit should clarify law going forward | Sauers: N/A | Homanko: N/A | Court: Clarified that going forward officers have fair warning — in non-emergency, high-speed pursuits with time to deliberate, reckless conduct demonstrating conscious disregard of great risk can violate substantive due process (but Lewis intent-to-harm rule still controls in exigent, split-second/emergency pursuits) |
Key Cases Cited
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (Supreme Court adopted sliding-scale culpability framework for high-speed pursuit cases and emphasized intent-to-harm in exigent, instantaneous situations)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity framework and courts' discretion to address either prong first)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (clearly established law requires precedent placing the constitutional question "beyond debate")
- Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (courts must avoid defining clearly established law at a high level of generality)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (qualified immunity inquiry requires attention to the specific context of the case)
- Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2018) (elements of the state-created danger doctrine articulated)
- Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 2017) (application of clearly established right analysis; emphasis on fact-specific fair-warning inquiry)
- Green v. Post, 574 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2009) (in a non-emergency pursuit of a nonfleeing suspect, applied a mid-level deliberate-indifference standard and held law was unsettled for qualified immunity)
- Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2008) (applied Lewis intent-to-harm standard to high-speed chases and refused to distinguish emergency vs non-emergency situations)
- Helseth v. Burch, 258 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (applied intent-to-harm standard to high-speed pursuit cases)
- Sitzes v. City of West Memphis, 606 F.3d 461 (8th Cir. 2010) (applied intent-to-harm standard where officer subjectively believed he was responding to an emergency)
- Kane v. Barger, 902 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2018) (discussed when conduct resembling criminal wrongdoing may make a right "obvious" for qualified-immunity purposes)