936 F.3d 495
6th Cir.2019Background
- Michael L. Knight was indicted on multiple counts including § 2114(a) (assault/robbery of postal employee), § 1201(a) (kidnapping), three § 924(c) counts for using a firearm in relation to those violent offenses, and other related charges; a jury convicted him on all but one bank-fraud plea count.
- Knight was sentenced to a lengthy aggregate term and later filed a § 2255 motion; he sought to amend it to challenge his § 924(c) convictions under Johnson v. United States (Johnson II) vagueness reasoning.
- The district court denied the amendment and § 2255 relief based on Sixth Circuit precedent holding the § 924(c) residual clause valid; Knight appealed and obtained a certificate of appealability on the motion to amend.
- While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Davis, holding the § 924(c) residual clause (§ 924(c)(3)(B)) unconstitutionally vague.
- The government conceded that kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) is no longer a crime of violence after Davis, so the § 924(c) conviction tied to the kidnapping count was vacated; the dispute remained whether the § 924(c) conviction tied to § 2114(a) stands.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Knight can challenge § 924(c) convictions based on Johnson/Davis vagueness | Knight: residual clause invalid under Johnson/Davis, so his § 924(c) convictions that relied on that clause are invalid | Government: Davis requires vacatur where conviction depends on residual clause; concedes kidnapping-linked § 924(c) must be vacated but defends § 2114(a)-linked § 924(c) as falling under elements clause | Court: concede vacatur of § 924(c) tied to kidnapping; otherwise review proceeds and other § 924(c) conviction upheld |
| Whether aggravated § 2114(a) offense (putting life in jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon) is a "crime of violence" under the § 924(c)(3)(A) elements clause | Knight: assault/robbery can encompass minimal force or mere possession, so may not meet § 924(c)(3)(A)’s "physical force" requirement | Government: the aggravated § 2114(a) offense requires assault/robbery plus putting life in jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon, which supplies violent physical force under Johnson I and circuit precedent | Court: Aggravated § 2114(a) is a crime of violence under the elements clause; § 924(c) conviction tied to that count is affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (established vagueness challenge to ACCA residual clause; relevant to § 924(c) residual-clause analysis)
- United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (held § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause unconstitutionally vague)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (divisibility and elements analysis when statutory alternatives carry different punishments)
- United States v. Rafidi, 829 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2016) (categorical approach to crimes of violence under § 924(c))
- United States v. Verwiebe, 874 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2017) (use of dangerous weapon can elevate assault into a § 924(c) crime of violence)
- United States v. Rede-Mendez, 680 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2012) (deadly weapon can transform general force into violent physical force)
- United States v. Enoch, 865 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2017) (aggravated § 2114(a) offense meets elements-clause force requirement)
- In re Watt, 829 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2016) (same conclusion for § 2114(a) aggravated offense)