320 Conn. 448
Conn.2016Background
- Connecticut amended recording statutes in 2013 to charge "mortgage nominees" (defined to capture MERS) substantially higher recording fees ($116–$159 first-page fees vs. $10 for others) and reallocated proceeds to state and municipal funds.
- Plaintiffs MERSCORP Holdings, Inc. and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. sued state officials claiming the two-tier fee scheme violates equal protection, the dormant Commerce Clause, due process, takings, bills of attainder, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the trial court granted summary judgment for the state.
- MERS operates a national electronic registry and acts as nominee on recorded mortgages so subsequent assignments need not be recorded in local land records, yielding industry cost savings and fewer county/town recordings.
- The legislature stated the amendments were revenue-raising and targeted MERS specifically; parties agreed most increased fees are paid by borrowers at closing and that MERS membership/use continued after the amendments.
- The court applied rational-basis review for equal protection challenges to taxation/fees and considered dormant Commerce Clause doctrines applicable to taxes/user fees, assuming interstate commerce is implicated by MERS’ national role.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equal Protection: singling out MERS for higher fees | Statute irrationally discriminates against MERS; no record support for legislature's rationales | Legislature had legitimate revenue and cost-allocation rationales (recoup lost future recording fees; large entities can bear higher fees) | Affirmed: classification survives rational-basis review as plausibly related to legitimate government interests |
| Dormant Commerce Clause — facial discrimination | Targeting entities operating national databases discriminates against interstate commerce | Statute targets a distinct business model (MERS) and is not protectionist; practical effect is local/regulatory, not protectionist | Affirmed: not facially discriminatory; no evidence of protectionism |
| Dormant Commerce Clause — undue burden | Triple fees unduly burden interstate secondary mortgage market | Fees compensate for lower local recordings and are unlikely to impair interstate market; courts should defer where state performs traditional function | Affirmed: plaintiffs failed to show burdens clearly outweigh benefits; no undue burden |
| Other federal claims (due process, bills of attainder, § 1983) | Higher fees are arbitrary/punitive and violate other federal protections | Same rationales defend against these claims | Rejected: court found no merit for these collateral claims (disposition follows equal protection/commerce clause analysis) |
Key Cases Cited
- Keane v. Fischetti, 300 Conn. 395 (Conn. 2011) (standard for equal protection analysis under Connecticut law)
- Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (U.S. 1993) (legislative classifications need not be supported by trial evidence; rational-basis review allows speculation)
- Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1993) (courts may hypothesize plausible reasons for legislative classifications)
- Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450 (U.S. 1988) (user-fee equal protection principles)
- United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330 (U.S. 2007) (distinguishing permissible local regulation from discriminatory protectionism under dormant Commerce Clause)
- Department of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (U.S. 2008) (approach to dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state taxation; deference when state performs traditional functions)
- Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (U.S. 1977) (test for state taxation affecting interstate commerce)
- Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (U.S. 1970) (balancing test for incidental burdens on interstate commerce)
- Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1992) (rational-basis tolerance for tax classifications)
- Associated Industries v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641 (U.S. 1994) (hypothetical favoritism does not alone establish unconstitutional discrimination)
