478 F.Supp.3d 699
M.D. Tenn.2020Background
- Plaintiffs (Memphis A. Phillip Randolph Institute et al.) moved for a preliminary injunction to block enforcement of Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-6-202(c)(4) ahead of the November 3, 2020 general election, alleging First and Fourteenth Amendment violations related to absentee-voting assistance and speech.
- § 2-6-202(c)(4) criminalizes giving an unsolicited request for an application for an absentee ballot by non–election-commission employees; a separate provision, § 2-6-202(c)(3), criminalizes giving an application for an absentee ballot itself and carries different penalties and history.
- Plaintiffs repeatedly described their intended conduct as distributing absentee-ballot applications (the conduct prohibited by § 2-6-202(c)(3)), but their complaint and motion formally challenged only § 2-6-202(c)(4).
- The State defended § 2-6-202(c)(4) as narrowly targeted at misleading, unofficial “request” forms that had caused voter confusion and inadvertent disenfranchisement; it emphasized the statutory and historical distinctions between (c)(3) and (c)(4).
- The court denied the request for a preliminary injunction as to § 2-6-202(c)(4): plaintiffs failed to show irreparable injury from (c)(4) because the harm they actually complain of concerns conduct covered by (c)(3), which they did not challenge; the court previously denied injunctive relief prior to the State primary based on laches but left the November request ripe.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether to preliminarily enjoin Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-6-202(c)(4) | (Plaintiffs) § 2-6-202(c)(4) chills distribution of absentee-ballot requests/applications and burdens First Amendment rights and voting access | (Defendants) § 2-6-202(c)(4) bars only unsolicited "request-for-an-application" forms (not official applications); it was enacted to prevent confusion and protects voters | Denied: plaintiffs failed to show irreparable injury from (c)(4) because their asserted harm concerns distribution of applications governed by (c)(3), not (c)(4) |
| Whether enjoining (c)(4) would remedy the asserted chill on distributing absentee-ballot applications | (Plaintiffs) enjoining (c)(4) would remove chill and allow distribution | (Defendants) enjoining (c)(4) would not prevent prosecution under (c)(3); no spillover effect | Held for Defendants: injunction of (c)(4) would not prevent the alleged injury tied to (c)(3) |
| Adequacy of plaintiffs’ pleading—did they challenge the correct statute? | (Plaintiffs) framed claims as challenging prohibition on distributing absentee-ballot materials | (Defendants) plaintiffs repeatedly conflate "request" and "application" and did not challenge (c)(3) | Court: plaintiffs challenged only (c)(4) but seek relief from enforcement of (c)(3)-type prohibition; this disconnect is fatal to PI motion |
| Timing and preliminary relief before the primary (laches) and jurisdictional posture | (Plaintiffs) sought immediate relief for upcoming elections | (Defendants) asserted laches barred injunctive relief before the primary and also raised subject-matter jurisdiction/standing defenses | Court previously denied injunctive relief prior to the August primary due to laches; court may deny PI before resolving jurisdictional challenge and reserved jurisdictional ruling for later |
Key Cases Cited
- Clemons v. Board of Educ. of Hillsboro, Ohio, 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956) (describing preliminary injunctive relief as preventive/protective)
- Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Detroit Typographical Union No. 18, 471 F.2d 872 (6th Cir. 1972) (preliminary injunctions are extraordinary relief)
- Overstreet v. Lexington–Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't, 305 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff must carry burden to justify preliminary injunction)
- Nat'l Viatical, Inc. v. Universal Settlements Int'l, Inc., 716 F.3d 952 (6th Cir. 2013) (four-factor preliminary injunction framework)
- D.T. v. Sumner Cty. Sch., 942 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2019) (irreparable injury requirement is indispensable for preliminary injunction)
- Gonzalez v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 225 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2000) (lack of likelihood of success on the merits is usually fatal to PI)
- Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 2010) (injunction must relate to conduct asserted in complaint)
- Freeman v. Helldoerfer, 208 F.3d 213 (6th Cir. 2000) (district court may deny preliminary injunction before resolving subject-matter jurisdiction)