Michael Gonzales v. National Board of Medical Examiners

620

reject finding the lower court’s

police did not have an suspicion. articulable GONZALES, Michael Plaintiff- Appellant,

I Thompson believe Officer had ev- ery right to ask James for identification inquire purpose coming into his exchanges, scene. Such entered into NATIONAL BOARD OF MEDICAL consent, person’s

with the do not even EXAMINERS, Defendant- present question. a Fourth Amendment Appellee. case, however, Thompson this Officer No. 99-1931. inquiry, did not make such as Officer Bohannon, Johnny Lee did of but rather Appeals, United States Court of upon chose to detain nothing James based Sixth Circuit. presence

more than James’ at a crime scene. It proxim- is well settled that mere Argued: Jan. ity activity to criminal adequate is not an Aug. Decided and Filed: police basis for the to make such an inves- Ybarra, tigatory stop. See at U.S. 338; Bell, see also U.S. v. (6th Cir.1985) (“[W]e

F.2d do not Terry requirement

believe that the of rea- suspicion circumstances,

sonable

has point been eroded to the that an indi- may upon

vidual be frisked nothing based

more than an unfortunate choice of associ-

ates.”) (internal omitted). citations There-

fore, I would hold Thompson’s that Officer James,

immediate detention upon based

nothing more than presence James’ mere

at a police investigat- location where were

ing drug activity, right violated James’

be free from unreasonable seizures under

the Fourth Amendment.

By affirming the reasonableness of Offi- Thompson’s James,

cer detention of

majority opinion creates the opportunity police stop and detain based

upon nothing person’s than a being more wrong place wrong at the time.

Surely, this type police conduct is pre-

cisely type of state action the Fourth designed protect

Amendment was Therefore,

against. I believe the

majority improperly extended the

holdings of Summers Fountain under case, presented by

the facts I respect- this

fully dissent.

SUHRHEINRICH, Judge. Circuit (“Gonzales” Plaintiff Michael Gonzales “Plaintiff’) appeals the district court’s request denial of preliminary in- junctive relief under the Americans with Act, § seq. 12101 et Disabilities U.S.C. (“ADA”). requested Plaintiff that Defen- dant National Board Medical Examiners (“NBME” “Defendant”) be ordered to allow him extended time to take the Unit- ed States Medical Licensing Examination Examination”) Step 1 (“Step 1 because of an alleged disability.

I. BACKGROUND In successfully after completing years two of medical school at the Univer- sity Michigan Medical School (“UMMS”), applied to take the Step 1 Examination a prerequisite pro- with ceeding year the third of medical school. The Step Examination is the first of three United States Li- Medical (“USMLE”) censing Examinations re- quired for medical licensure all states. The NBME administers the USMLE. Before taking Step 1 Examination 9-10, 1998, on June Gonzales asserted a learning disability requested and NBME time, him allow extended one and a time, half times the standard on the examination. supported He his request (which for test accommodations was en- UMMS) dorsed with psychological Richard (argued briefed), J. Landau and (“Ul- evaluation which Gordon Ulrey L. Jeffrey Silveri, Dykema Gossett, N. Ann Ph.D.,1 rey”), prepared in 1994 when Gon- Arbor, Michigan, Appellant. zales undergraduate was an student at the University (“UCD”). of California at Davis (briefed), Roy Hayes C. Roy Hayes, C. 1994, Ulrey In interviewed Gonzales and briefed), III (argued Firm, and Hayes Law reported that main concern Charlevoix, Michigan, for Appellee. tests,

low multiple-choice scores on espe- cially NELSON, SUHRHEINRICH, College Before: the Medical Aptitude Test (“MCAT”). GILMAN, interview, and addition to Circuit Judges.

Ulrey based his evaluation of Gonzales on SUHRHEINRICH, J., 1) delivered the a battery of tests: Wechsler In- Adult court, opinion NELSON, 2) in which telligence Revised; Range Wide Scale— J., joined. GILMAN, 632-37), (pp. 3) J. Revised, II; Achieve Level Test — delivered a separate dissenting opinion. Learning Test, 4) Efficiency Edition; 2nd Ulrey is an Associate Clinical Psychology Professor of at the UCD. request referred Gonzales’s Test, The NBME E. Ul- Form Reading Nelson-Denny time on for extended a learn- documentation having and rey diagnosed 1 Examination to Step Gon- Ulrey concluded the June 1998 disability.2 Ph.D., difficulty expert significant Flanagan, Dawn “showed zales of infor- processing Flanagan auditory sequential learning disabilities.4 field mation as seen not does have opined that Gonzales well as on test as digit span arithmetic memory tests auditory visual

both language is area of written data Ulrey Efficiency Exam.” Learning for the language a written diagnose insufficient to giv- be that Gonzales appropriate it found NBME denied Gonzales’s disorder. testing, for standardized more time en 50% time, im- stating his extended request for record that Gonzales suggested he a ma- significantly impair pairment did notes. lecture review written lectures and framework of activity jor Wechsler on the found that ADA. Ulrey also the Scale, and performance verbal Gonzales’s (Ronzales took the when June superior average to “from the ranged skills without accommoda- Step Examination IQ IQ performance verbal with range tions, the examination. he failed Ulrey con- 115.”3 IQ full scale 120 and “significant that Gonzales cluded practice, usual UMMS Following its ability conceptual in verbal strengths both third-year begin to his allowed Gonzales organization.” perceptual as as well re- he learned the before clinical rotations arranged accommodations had UCD Step 1 Examination. sults of his June years fourth third and during his Gonzales had failed learned When Gonzales Also on Ulrey’s report. study on of based examination, one completed he had the UMMS Ulrey’s report, of the basis surgical rotation. month of three-month basically the same with Gonzales provided a leave of absence to take Gonzales chose during his he received accommodations 1 Examina- Step retake the prepare to to extended at UCD: years third and fourth tion. note-taking, tests, with assistance time on for extend- submitting request Before lectures. tape classroom permission and Step Exami- ed time on the October time on double allowed Gonzales UMMS Bruno nation, Giordani consulted Gonzales examinations. test, he performance exhib- larities.” On pattern of errors on Ulrey wrote that 2. orga- strength perceptual "significant ited "strongly suggests an under- tests Gonzales’s design and disorder”; on both block seen Mi- nization as lying processing "[b]oth “ef- assembly,” he demonstrated object and process- sequential problems with the chael’s strategies both solving on problem auditorily as fective visually and information of assembly where he object design and cognitive block discrepancies between his as well de- abstract even the most reading able solve com- and rate level and his efficiency.” high On signs of learning with a level underlying suggest prehension an test, decoding "reading he had pro- language achievement to slowness related 114, equivalent to the 82nd cognitive standard pattern score cessing”; that "the and spelling language or percentile a written improve ability his well as his skills 102, equivalent to the 58th increasing score standard significantly with on the arithmetic percentile. learning Performance disabili- his document both time 50% in a time resulted standard calculation for the accommodation ty and the need percentile the 70th equivalent to score tests.” time for increased perfor- improved time more and with 50% 138, equivalent score to standard mance test Gon- reported on the verbal Ulrey percentile.” to the 98th . strength verbal "significant revealed zales compre- vocabulary, conceptual on the Psy- 4.Flanagan a member of American He tests.” verbal and similarities hension the National Asso- chological Association and abstract judgement "excellent showed Psychologists. ciation of and simi- School comprehension reasoning both (“Giordani”), Ph.D.5 diagnosed Giordani Step October 1998 1 Examination. The having a learning disability. Gonzales as NBME did not meet with or interview Giordani diagnosis based his on Gonzales’s Rather, Gonzales. it sent the documenta- history testing6 and on formal conclud- tion request Gonzales submitted with his ed that Gonzales met the criteria for Read- expert accommodations (315.00) ing Disorder and for Disorder of disabilities, field of George Litch- (315.2). Expression Written Giordani also ford, Ph.D.8, who reviewed the materials strengths found Gonzales’s abilities. a report. issued Again, the NBME Giordani reported that Gonzales “scored denied Gonzales’s request for accommoda- within superior ranges” on tions. In October took the intelligence “with test a marked differ- without examination accommodations and ence between Verbal and Performance failed. = (Verbal subscales of 21 points IQ = = IQ Performance IQ Full Scale applied to take Step 1 Ex- 109).”7 compared Giordani a third amination time and documented his reading scores year to^those of fourth col- request for accommodations. At the re- lege students college graduates. and to quest NBME, Litchford reviewed On comprehension tests where the material and report. issued a Gonzales’s scores were to those NBME denied request for accommoda- general of the population, Giordani report- tions. ed that Gonzales scored within the average Nonetheless, range. Giordani supported Before taking Step the 1 Examination a the medical grant school’s decision to Gon- accommodations, third time without Gon- zales extra time on exams and additional zales filed an action in court federal accommodations and recommended that ADA, the alleging that NBME illegally the “this accommodation be to extended other refused to disability by accommodate his settings.” failing provide him with additional time presented report Giordani’s take the Step USMLE 1. Gonzales alia, request his for extended time on inter sought, the injunctive requir- relief 5. Giordani is an Associate Psy- Professor of reported Giordani that Gonzales’s scores on chology Psychiatry, Neurop- Director of the the Wechsler subtests ranged from “border- sychology impaired Clinic superior.” and Associate line Director On academic tests, Division, Neuropsychology achievement University Gonzales scored of "within average the Michigan. superior range” above is not Giordani board certified “when solving mathematics basic written cal- neuropsychology by Psychologi- the American culations, though performance with word cal Association. problems and related fell tasks somewhat lower to above Neuropsychology 6. The Division administered skills, ranges.” cognitive Gonzales demon- following procedures assessment to Gon- performance strated "excellent concep- aon Intelligence zales: Wechsler Adult Scale— problem solving tual requiring general task (WAIS-III); Third Edition Woodcock-John- flexibility mental efficiently adapt- [sic] in (WJ-R); son Tests of Achievement—Revised responses one's based on feedback from Revised, Reading Mastery Woodcock Tests— Test).” (Category environment (WRMT-R/NU); Form G Nelson-Denny (N-D); Reading Test Halstead-Reitan Neu- 8. Litchford is a psychologist. clinical He is a ropsychological Battery Test and Allied Proce- diplomat psychology in clinical in the State of dures; Memory Wechsler Scale—Revised New York and is a psycholo- certified school (WMS-R); Test of Variables of Attention gist in the Sate of New Dr. Litchford York. (TOVA); (ACT); Capacity Attentional Tests approved neuropsychological an examin- Test; Digit Vigilance Multiphasic Minnesota performs er who certain certification reviews (MMPI-2); Personality Inventory Patient for the Office of at New —w Disabilities York History; Interview. The tests were adminis- State. He Directorship Psychologi- holds a of Provost, tered Lisa a Master's Level license cal Psychology Services in the Department at psychologist. University the State of New York. Blue court’s decision. See time on allow extended ing the NBME v. Blue Mut. Ohio & Shield Cross Blue 1 Examination. Step Ass’n, Blue Shield F.3d Cross and hearing, the evidentiary four-day After a (6th Cir.1997). dis- will reverse a We request court denied district injunctive only relief trict court’s denial relief, no finding that there was injunctive clearly upon relied if “the district court Gonzales would likelihood that substantial fact, ap- improperly findings erroneous Gon- ADA claim because on succeed law, or used errone- governing plied The under the ADA. is not disabled zales Id. legal ous standard.” claim rejected Gonzales’s court district major life activi- is disabled four factors District courts assess district writing. ties of injunction issue: analyzing preliminary who experts, NBME’s court credited (1) strong has a likeli plaintiff whether the have a “does not opined that Gonzales (2) merits; succeeding on the hood achieve- history of academic documented irreparable suffer plaintiff will whether the sup- that would expectations ment below (3) injunction; whether injury absent the disability.” diagnosis of port injunction will cause substantial issuing the testimony, the district their on Based (4) others; public harm to and whether in both “Plaintiffs found that furthered issuance interest will be tests fell within writing reading and no injunction. Although id. See range when superior average to finding that controlling, a one factor is court also The district people.” to most likelihood of success simply there is no disabled in the he was not held that Michigan usually fatal. See the merits is working.9 activity Miller, AFL-CIO State Cir.1997). (6th dis- appeals, arguing he has no holding erred trict court establishing B. Merits

likelihood of success ADA. disability has a prohibits the ADA discrimi- Title III of Second, claims that the district he disabilities persons with against nation disability. his writing to address failed such examinations as professional Third, court’s faults district Step 1: USMLE have a he does not holding that ... that offers examinations Any person activity work- major life that affects certifi- licensing, applications, related to ing. ... profes- for cation, credentialing or sional, shall offer such purposes or trade II. DISCUSSION and manner place ... in a examinations or disabilities persons accessible of Review A. Standard arrange- accessible offer alternative relief injunctive ADA includes The individuals. ments for such disability dis remedy in appropriate as an 1995). (West The 12188(a)(1) § 12189 42 U.S.C.A. § 42 See U.S.C.A. crimination. examina- regulations provide 1995) (West provisions DOJ (incorporating the be selected 1964, by this section tion covered Act of Rights the Civil VII of of Title accurately reflect 2000a-3). administered and a denial § We review 42 U.S.C. level, or achievement aptitude individual’s abuse injunction for preliminary aof impairment.10 rather than great deference and afford discretion regulation pro- implementing The request relevant court denied 9. After III states under Title mulgated by the DOJ relief, Step 1 took the injunctive that: accommo- a third time without Examination by this section covered examination [A]n again failed. dation (i) is se- examination The must assure 626

A entity 2139, 2145, covered against a 119 discriminates S.Ct. 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). disabled individual when it fails to make However, Department of Jus- “reasonable (“DOJ”), accommodations to known Congress tice which assigned to or mental limitations.” 42 physical U.S.C. regulations write the for Subchapter III of 12112(b)(5)(A). § regulations imple- ADA, The defines “physical or mental im- menting Title III of the ADA further clari- pairment” including “specific fy that such “may include accommodations § disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. 36.104 changes length permitted time The NBME appear dispute does not completion of the examination.” 28 C.F.R. that Gonzales has impairment. a mental 36.309(b)(2)(1999). § regulations The DOJ’s further de dispute NBME does not that it ais “major fine life activities” as including entity” “covered under Subsection III of “walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, the ADA. The NBME does not con- breathing, learning, Id., working.” its obligation provide test reasonable 36.104(2) § added). (emphasis The list is accommodations, including extra time to merely illustrative, exhaustive, howev 1, Step person take the if a disability. has a er, Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheim cf. fact, In procedures the NBME’s own Ctr., er’s Research 780-81 clearly contemplate the accommodation of (6th Cir.1998) (Title context); I and courts individuals with learning disabilities. have included reading and writing as ma Thus, only question in this case is jor See, life activities under the ADA. e.g., whether Gonzales is disabled within the Bartlett v. New York State Bd. Law meaning of the person ADA. A is disabled Examiners, F.Supp. aff'd, 156 meaning the ADA if (2d Cir.1998), vacated, F.3d 321 individual physical suffers from “a or men- S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 790 impairment tal substantially limits one (1999) (reading and writing)11; general see or more of the activities of life such ly Sch., Inc., Bercovitch v. Baldwin 12102(2)(A) § individual.” U.S.C.A. (1st Cir.1998) F.3d (learning). (West 1995). event, any the NBME does not dispute The ADA does not define the terms that reading writing are substantial “physical or mental impairment,” “substan- life activities. tially limits,” “major activities,” agency

no given authority Rather, been to this case turns on the regulations issue implementing the gener- key phrase “substantially limits.” “Sub ally applicable provisions of the ADA. stantially See limits” is in defined terms of a 12101-12102; §§ 42 U.S.C. general Sutton v. Unit- population. The regulation DOJ Lines, Inc., 471, 478-80, Air ed 527 U.S. states that an individual is substantially lected and so as to best Supreme administered ensure the Court’s recent decisions in Sut- that, when the is Lines, Inc., examination administered 1109, ton v. United Air 526 U.S. to an individual awith 1752, that im- (1999); 119 S.Ct. 143 L.Ed.2d 785 Mur- manual, pairs skills, sensory, speaking or Serv., Inc., phy 516, v. United Parcel 527 U.S. the accurately examination results reflect 2133, (1999); 119 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d the aptitude individual's or achievement Albertson’s, 555, Kirkingburg, Inc. v. 527 U.S. level or whatever other factor the examina- 2162, (1999). 119 S.Ct. Sig- L.Ed.2d 518 measure, purports tion to rather than re- nificantly, the Circuit Second had reversed flecting impaired sensory, individual's holding plaintiff's court’s manual, (except or speaking skills where ability to self-accommodate foreclosed a find- those skills are the factors that the examina- disability. of See Bartlett v. New York measure)!.] purports tion to Examiners, 321, State Bd. Law 36.309(b)(l)(i) (1999). § 28 C.F.R. (2d Cir.1998), vacated, 11. The opinion Second Circuit's in Bartlett 144 L.Ed.2d 790 This vacated, reversed, holding question the case was is called light into in sent back for light Supreme further authority. consideration cited Court Ulrey’s Dr. re- He notes that evidence. important individual’s “when the limited detailing information specific port to condi- contains as are restricted activities life they processing manner, which and other under tion, or duration most comparison deficits, diagnosis, as his based as well performed can be B; C.F.R., Furthermore, Giordani, see App. Dr. pt. those people.” deficits. (EEOC 1630.2(j) § defini- hearing, 29 C.F.R. concluded testified at who limits”; “substantially I of Title tion under criteria for met the DSM-TV that Gonzales substantially lim- as individual defining an a full conducting after Disorder Reading if he is ited, purposes, “[u]nable most evaluation of Gonzales. neuropsychological activity that the major life perform reading impair- Regarding Gonzales’s general population person in average ment, found that district court “[significantly restricted or perform” can [wjhen norms, pooled plain- compared condition, or duration manner as to squarely are tiff[’]s scores perform can which individual the more than range. Of superior compared major activity life particular by Dr. Giorda- tests administered twelve manner, un- condition, or duration to the significantly scored plaintiff ni in gener- average person der which one, Digit only below major that same perform can population al test adminis- Digit Span In the Span. Thus, compares the ADA activity”). life 1998, plaintiff by Dr. Giordani tered who al- an individual five, signifi- which is a score of received major activity life in a a restriction leges im- borderline average and cantly below people.”12 “most that of However, score on plaintiffs paired. impair- that his mental Gonzales claims clearly sus- Digit Span test the 1998 him in the substantially limit ments took another plaintiff pect. and work- reading, writing activities of Ulrey Dr. in which Span test with Digit ing. ten, aver- well he received and Dr. Flanagan age range.... Reading hearing at the testified Litchford that all the claims appeal Gonzales On between discrepancy the wide because read- established credible evidence scores, Span test is an the Digit the two to the when ing is restricted ability. plaintiffs indicator unreliable points to person. Gonzales “average” recognized Dr. Giordani The lower history of testimony regarding his own psy- accomplished” “competent clinical as a as well as the reading problems13 has trou- He also testified recently Supreme noted school. Court 12. The "considerable,” signs completing con- "substantially" suggest reading street ble a sub- large degree,” and "in of his "specified to a transactions sumer and that "substantial” manner” stantial problems. value, amount, "considerable means worth,” testi- Gonzales's The dissent credit large de- "being specified to a sign compelled to credit mony "he feels that main,” proceed- "relating to or gree or in the reading blindly them receipts because card essential,” thing; essence of a from the long it would make so that take him amount, quan- ample considerable "of or angry, that one of his Sutton, other customers 119 S.Ct. at tity or dimensions.” by line the read to line attorneys had to him Supreme review of these Court’s 2145. The they prepared on his complaint ADA behalf addresses definitions confirms individual, a not in understand it.” impairments that limit an that he present case so could manner, a in specifically even but trivial or moderate did not Although district court amount, or to way, to a considerable finding, Gonzales's verbal we think make standard, large degree. this Under impairment is inconsis- representation of his the ADA. clearly not disabled under SAT and MCAT. success on the tent with timed, took these are and Gonzales Both tests throughout his life that Gonzales testified 13. accommodation. without exams difficulty reading and out both in has had he chologist, ultimately found but the testimo- nine ability, subtests of verbal verbal ex- ny Flanagan of Drs. Litchford and “more pression, and comprehension verbal that persuasive,” agreed their conclu- performance “his was in average scores, IQ sion that based on Gonzales’s superior range variety across of those average fell within the to tasks.” She further testified that in pho- superior range when to most nological processing, his score was in the people. findings, Given these average range; auditory learning, visual court concluded that had not demonstrated performed he very superior range; from “an suffered ADA-defined task, and on an reading per- inductive he disability” substantially affects a ma- superior range. formed jor activity. Flanagan also addressed the one record, Upon review of the we can area, memory span, on which Gonzales say not that the district court’s findings or impaired scored in the range on Giorda credibility clearly assessments are errone ni’s evaluation. She noted that on Ul Flanagan, ous. expert Defendant’s wit rey’s evaluation Gonzales scored within ness, evidentiary hearing testified at the average range on the same test and Ulrey’s report diag did not support memory span another test having reading nosis of Plaintiff disorder. Giordani’s perfor evaluation Gonzales’s She stated that the data she reviewed in mance average. She stated that the cognitive terms processes discrepancies in his suggest scores “a reading provided achievement abso very pattern unusual of performance but lutely no impairment. evidence of an She explained quite one that is simply by pos presented cognitive processes a table of sibly unreliability or a chance occur closely associated with reading achieve rence.” She concluded that Gonzales ment as by Ulrey assessed and Giordani clearly average ability demonstrated and concluded that in “all areas that were memory span.15 assessed, all cognitive processes that were Litchford, expert Defendant’s other wit- assessed that are help found to underlie or ness, testified that: explain us reading understand achieve ment, performed he reading su test scores that were sub- Also, perior range.”14 she stated that in mitted were in to above Flanagan The dissent Dr. qualified criticizes for re- analyze she is Gonzales’s test re- lying on cogni- tests that measure Gonzales's express opinion sults and an toas how his skills, predict reading ability. tive skills which reading ability compares with that of the av- Flanagan It should be noted that Dr. also took erage person. Flanagan Dr. focused "on into account the results of tests that reflected whether Mr. Gonzales has a disorder Gonzales's actual achievement level. that rises to disability, the level of a represents impairment.” goes The dissent Flanagan 15. The dissent faults Dr. interpreting Flanagan’s too far in Dr. testimo- she did not examine Gonzales. The dissent ny second-guessing diagnoses the clinical also attacks her conclusions because her Ulrey of Drs. and Giordani. methodology assessing persons for whether Similarly, Flanagan the fact that Dr. relied have disabilities involved a theoreti on a theoretical model that had not been cal model that empirically had not been ana empirically analyzed purposes diagno- lyzed purposes diagnosis. of treatment and preclude sis and treatment The dissent therefore does not her intimates that Flana from gan’s testimony might satisfy addressing "gatek question. the substantial limitation eeper” requirements of Kumho Tire Flanagan purport Co. v. diag- did not to made a Carmichael, treatment; suggest only nosis or she deter- (1999), 143 L.Ed.2d 238 and Daubert v. Mer mined whether Gonzales’s test results were Pharmaceuticals, Inc., rell Dow impairment consistent with a substantial 125 L.Ed.2d 469 reading ability. qualified his This she was to reasoning Although The dissent's is flawed. gatekeeper requirements do under psychologist, as an Flanagan academic Kumho and Daubert. disorder, qualified diagnose reading not 1994), “some merit to the the court found Range range on the Wide average disparity between inher- Test, argument that a [sic] the Woodcock Achievement on a test capacity performance and the Wood- ent and Mastery Test Reading circumstances, permit Reading. may, Broad in some cock-Johnson learning has a that an individual inference Reading addition, the Woodcock In that individual’s disability, though even reading his placed ... Mastery Test the standard of the score, performance score has met reading skill reading total However, ordinary Id. at 287. person.” score comprehension rejected idea that were almost range. The scores the Pazer court average IQ. full scale conclusion compels to his that exactly equivalent disparity “such a law,” on that test performances stating his “to hold other- And all of a matter of as level, grade college graduate any compel at a the conclusion were wise nine. point sixteen be definition underachiever would Id. as a matter of law.” learning disabled “age explained Litchford expert to the defendant’s gave It credence test do on the Woodcock level norms” used plaintiffs “perfor- who concluded average person as approximate not was not con- level tests at issue mance on the Wood- norms do. On pooled well as disability.” Id. learning with a sistent Mastery, scored Reading cock these tests range though even case, Likewise, Defen- in the instant that of col- his compared whom the district expert, dant’s “a which is age peers, lege graduates, credited, disparity not find a between did of an statistically driven standard ability actual achievement. Plaintiffs Litchford ex- age at level.” person Flanagan “[o]ne testified norms,” used on the “pooled plained that every definition of just about indicators Test, “sample Nelson-Denny Reading disability significant is a eleventh, twelfth, ninth, tenth, from discrepancy” but Gon- achievement third, second, fourth college, freshman achieving “is commensurate zales approxi- better college” and thus year of IQ.”16In other given his expected what is average person. mate the words, are achievements Gonzales’s that, be noted consis- Finally, it should IQ with his scores. terribly inconsistent experts, Giordani the NBME’s tent with that Gonzales scored reported within Con- Plaintiff fit Neither does reading comprehension average range population. disabled gress’s vision of the tests, general popula- to the as ADA, introductory In section Thus, expert under- Gonzales’s own tion. Congress de- Purpose,” “Findings and despite “that assertion mines Gonzales’s it seeks population the disabled scribes prob- around his efforts to work his best as isolat- the disabled presents It protect. nearly as lem, to read he is still not able individuals; individu- segregated ed and (Dissenting average person.” as the well legal recourse have “no als who often 634.) short, impair- In atOp. discrimination”; and as those redress ... defi- not meet the DOJ’s simply ment does status an inferior group occupy who “as limits,” he “substantially nition severely disadvan- and are society in our average person. read as well as can economically, vocationally, socially, taged 42 U.S.C.A. educationally.” Bd. Law In Pazer v. New York State 12101(a). (S.D.N.Y. § Examiners, F.Supp. 284 Step 1 on the double time upon and seeks rely Doe urges Court to 16. Plaintiff this Doe, however, (ND the court NBME, Examination. WHO Ca Case No. C-99-3124 expert and the plaintiff's witnesses 1999), has a credited unpublished decision. Doe credited De- case in the instant its district court similarity instant case in that to the factual student, witnesses. alleges a fendant’s subject, a medical school, high In qualified Plaintiff for ad- correctly notes that the NBME placement graduated vanced classes and acknowledged that his “diagnosis of a writ- grade point average with a He 4.3/5.0. ing disorder supported by is the test data.” had no formal accommodations for learn- The NBME also stated that “writing is not during high disabilities school. Plain- a construct is measured 1050, score, tiff scored on the USMLE, performance so that weak in this SAT. He took the test without accommoda- area impact your would not access to the grade point tions. Plaintiff earned a aver- program.” USMLE Gonzales offered no age majored at Davis where he 3.15/4.0 event, evidence to any refute this. In in physiology. He had accommodations above, the reasons discussed Gonzales has during years his third and fourth at UCD. failed to substantially establish he is He took the MCAT twice without accom- by any alleged limited writing impairment modations, improving his score on his sec- compared when to the average person. attempt by using ond suggested by skills counselors at Davis. His second MCAT Working 3. high score was enough that the UMMS short, admitted him to program. its In Alternatively, Gonzales’s claim that he is Gonzales is not a member of severely disabled in the activity life of work- disadvantaged group Congress envisioned ing. alleges He further the district Bercovitch, when it enacted ADA. See court misunderstood that alleging he was (holding plain- at 155-56 an employment discrimination claim under tiff, ADHD, diagnosed who was ADA, Title I of the governs which employ- not “disabled” under the ADA because his ment, when fact he only alleging learning disability did not affect his aca- claim under Title III. success, demic which did not fall below the The district appears to have mis- age). student of his takenly analyzed argument Gonzales’s as a if Even self-accommodations enhanced claim under Title I. Notwithstanding, Gon- Plaintiffs peo to that of most claim, understood, properly zales’s still ple, he is not disabled under the ADA. precisely fails for the same reason that Recently, Supreme Court ruled that in Plaintiffs allegations that he learn- determining whether individuals are dis ing disability fails: when abled they under the ADA should be ex people,” impairments “most do not sub- amined in their corrected state. See Sut stantially ability limit his to work. See 28 ton, 2146; 119 S.Ct. at see Murphy (DOJ pt. App. C.F.R. B interpretative Serv., Inc., United Parcel III). guidelines, Title 521-22, 2133, 2137, 119 S.Ct. 144 L.Ed.2d (1999). addition, Albertson’s, In get problem, To around this Plain Supreme Court held that an individual tiff contends that we should look body whose mechanisms developed coping EEOC’s definition of “substantially limit was not disabled within the framework of ed” it “major relates to the activity Albertson’s, the ADA. See Kirking Inc. v. ”, working a definition that differs burg, U.S. sharply from the definition applicable L.Ed.2d every other context: short, there is record evidence to The term support substantially limits court’s conclusion that means significantly Gonzales does restricted in reading disability not have a purposes perform jobs the ADA. either a class of or a broad range jobs in various classes as com- Writing pared average person having com- skills, The district court did not separately parable training, ad- and abilities. dress alleged writing disability. inability perform single, partic-

631 in its own not addressed concept is constitute substantial job not ular does (2d F.3d Cir. aff'd, 156 321 regulations), activity of major life limitation the vacated, 1031, 1998), 119 S.Ct. 527 U.S. working. (1999). 2388, any L.Ed.2d 790 144 (1999) (emphasis 1630.2(j)(3)(i) § 29 C.F.R. noted, event, Congress did previously as added). that under this claims (or the authority confer on the EEOC not per- with other test, compared be he must matter) regulations to issue for DOJ year their completed second who have sons interpretation of the regarding proper the is school; that when he medical of Sutton, 119 at “disability.” See S.Ct. term group, his diffi- this reference to validity the of or (declining 2145 to decide writing unques- is reading and culty with regula is due the EEOC’s what deference tionably impairment. an the ADA defining “disability” under tions transplant this defi decline to We accepted regula parties because into the regulations I from the Title nition valid). as tions Like the EEOC regulations. III Title Moreover, to a Plaintiffs claim III I, in Title also included the DOJ Title activity working of is major life life activi “major of in its list “working” dictum, problematic.17 Albeit itself “substantially ties,” of its definition recently wheth- questioned Court Supreme to the limits,” identical is otherwise “major life working er can be deemed of definition “general population” EEOC’s ADA: activity” under the 1630.2(j)(l) § term in 29 C.F.R. the same may be some ... that there We note work other than major life activities for “major defining conceptual difficulty in if the Thus, presume we must ing. work, it for to include life activities” modify the definition of wanted DOJ that if say in a argue “to circle seems “major regarding “substantially limits” instance, excluded, by reason for one is ex working” it would have activity life of working with impairment, of from [an words, In other done pressly so. consti- ... then that exclusion others] See dispositive here. silence is DOJ’s question when the impairment, tutes Examin’rs, Med. v. National Bd. Price of is, exclusion you’re asking whether (S.D.W.Va.1997) 419, 425 F.Supp. 966 handicap.” byis reason of itself autho that, Congress (holding Sutton, Tr. (quoting 119 at 2151 S.Ct. regulations make issue rized the DOJ to County Bd. Nassau Arg. School Oral III, give must their courts Subchapter 1633, Arline, 90 106 S.Ct. arbi controlling weight unless decisions (1986), (argument 15 p. 179 L.Ed.2d contrary to the stat manifestly trary General)). noted that It further Solicitor Abbott, ute); Bragdon v. generally see about even the EEOC reservations L.Ed.2d U.S. activity major life working as a including Bartlett, F.Supp. see But working be suggested that and “has respect EEOC test with 1099 (adopting at activity, consid- life viewed as a residual working), and activity of major to the life resort, an individu- ered, only ‘[i]f a last (S.D.N.Y.1997) 389-91 F.Supp.2d respect substantially limited with al is not reconsideration; ex (denying motion ” activity.’ Id. any other activity major life plaining use 1630, App. pt. 29 CFR (quoting I consis from Title working standard 1630.2©). § ADA and letter of the spirit tent with legis- Finally, support is no there which interpretation” and DOJ “rule position. history for Gonzales’s lative from regulations sanctions use history suggests Rather, legislative interpreting title assist different ability to do impairments do not restrict is in claimed 17. The limitation read, ability reality on his doctor. a limitation of a the work that his he maintains to work—and simply that Congress intended “substan- him complaint they line line the pre- tially interpreted signifi- limits” to be as pared present his behalf in the case so cantly major activity in a in that he Assuming restricted life could understand it. (and person telling relation to the within the he was the truth there is suggestion no population. Report contrary), The Senate from the to the then I can- not why Committee understand he should on Labor and Human Re- not be con- sources, sidered “disabled” meaning of Kennedy, submitted Senator the ADA. states as follows: minor, impairments, Persons with trivial simple

such as a not I. finger infected are in impaired major activity. life A A primary for basis the district court’s person is considered individual with a conclusion that Gonzales does not have a disability purposes prong for of first reading disability is that he get was able to of the definition when the individual’s reasonably good grades through his first important life activities are restricted as years college, two of and achieve conditions, manner, to the or duration scores, standardized test without formal they performed which can be in disability accommodations. If Gonzales’s comparison people. to most claim was that “getting reasonably good (1989).18 101-116, S.Rep. *23 Given such grades in school” and “achieving average support scant proposed Gonzales’s defi- standardized test scores” major were life nition substantially major of limited in the ADA, activities within meaning activity life of working, we decline to adopt and that those activities were the ones in his view. which he substantially impaired, might The district court did not district court finding point. err have had a But claim, and, major event, Plaintiff is not that was not his in any disabled activity getting life working. reasonably good grades in school

and achieving average standardized test scores are not recognized “major as life III. CONCLUSION Instead, activities.” Gonzales claims that Because we conclude that Plaintiff has he is major disabled activity life merits, no likelihood of success on the we reading, which the NBME does not dis need not consider whether he would other- pute is a activity life under the injunc- wise be entitled to a preliminary See, ADA. e.g., Bartlett v. New York State tion. Examiners, Board Law 156 F.3d reasons, For the foregoing (2d Cir.1998), vacated on other court’s order denying injunctive relief is grounds, 1031, 119 2388, 144 S.Ct. AFFIRMED. (1999); L.Ed.2d 790 Sweet v. Electronic Inc., Systems, Data No. 95 Civ. GILMAN, Judge, Circuit dissenting. 3987(MBM), 1996 WL at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) Gonzales testified that great he has diffi- Apr.26, (“[Rjeading itself culty reading highway signs driving, while a major activity life independent of the that in compelled stores he sign major feels activity life of seeing.”); but see receipts blindly Dallas, credit-card because read- Hileman v. City (5th Cir.1997) ing them long would take him so that it 355 n. (expressing doubt would make other angry, customers and that reading “major is a activity” attorneys Act). one purposes had to read to of the Rehabilitation example, report 18. As an people states most are unable to walk eleven miles person continuously who can walk ten miles suffering without some discomfort. See S. experiences pain but on the mile is 101-116, eleventh Rep. *23 substantially walking not limited in though long it him three times as as takes reasonably good years required average person his first two to read school and high finding materials, foreclose a it make little sense college does course would Weis, disability. Andrew has a say disability that he does not have Cf. “Jumping to Conclusions Jumping might say that he is over- reading. One (1998) Queue,” 51 Stan. L. getting good as far coming his Rev. review) (book learning-dis- (observing that concerned, his method or grades is but in a caught often are abled students still be manner of substan- “if in in that we excel situation “Catch-22” tially limited as to the tasks, possess must not then we some person. areas, in then disability, if we fail other but Supreme in recognize I Court careless, inatten- just lazy, or we must be cases, Murphy of ADA trilogy its 1999 tive.”). Indeed, plausi- offered Gonzales Service, Inc., 516, 527 U.S. United Parcel get for how he was able to explanation ble (1999), 2133, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 S.Ct. without formal accommoda- good grades Lines, Inc., Air 527 U.S. Sutton v. United having reading a severe dis- despite tions 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 119 S.Ct. very that he received ability. He testified Albertson’s, (1999), Kirking Inc. v. accommodations informal significant 119 S.Ct. burg, U.S. (e.g., permitted his teachers high school (1999), broadly held that an L.Ed.2d 518 unsatisfactory assignments him to redo ability to individual’s self-accommodate projects). in untimed extra-credit and turn or treat through self-correct medication college that he also testified Gonzales into account in ascer ment must be taken without get fairly good grades was able person is “disabled” taining whether simply by employ- formal accommodations meaning of the ADA: The Su get by him to strategies that allowed ing hypertensive that a preme Court thus held reading; minimum of doing while the bare pressure was high mechanic whose blood lectures by tape-recording example, for disabled, was not controlled medication their lecture having his friends read 518-19, 119 527 U.S. at S.Ct. Murphy, see reasonably good If getting to him. I person. working do not that believe Flanagan Dr. conceded that she did not by a reading impairment pursuing around diagnose explained Gonzales. that She strategies school that minimize the ne- academician, psy- she is an not a clinical cessity type of for is the self- chologist competent diagnose learning Supreme accommodation the Court had Instead, specific disabilities in individuals. Sutton, in Murphy, Kirkingburg. mind or opinion solely her was based on second- guessing by the conclusions reached Drs.

II. Giordani, Ulrey and who had examined addition, In the district court’s conclu- Gonzales. sion that Gonzales had no substantial like- particular, Flanagan Dr. testified that seriously lihood of success on the merits is based on her review of data submitted finding flawed because it is based on the Giordani, by Ulrey to the NBME Drs. that Gonzales does not have a “absolutely she could find no evidence” of meaning I of the ADA. do not testified, impairment. She howev- that this finding supported by believe is er, that her methodology assessing the record before us. persons learning whether have disabilities the experts only

Of who testified or submit- was a “theoretical model that has not court, reports only subjected ted to the rigorous empirical analy- district been two who ever met Gonzales were Drs. the purposes diagnosis sis for and treat- Ulrey They question Giordani. both concluded ment.” This leads me to whether very significant reading testimony satisfy that he had a dis- “gatekeep- her ability. only expert opined requirements who that er” of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, disability, Gonzales did not a at have 526 119 U.S. S.Ct. (1999), had least not satisfied her that he had a L.Ed.2d 143 238 and Daubert v. Pharmaceuticals, Inc., disability, Flanagan. Dr. Dr. Yet Merrell Dow 509 579, 589, Flanagan never examined or even met U.S. 125 L.Ed.2d Gonzales, though Furthermore, even to the extent guidelines by Psy- set forth Flanagan the American Dr. concluded there was no chiatric Institute’s Diagnostic any learning and Statisti- indication that had (DSM-IV) cal Manual of Mental disability, Disorders that conclusion was not shared (4th ed.1994), Litchford, accepts which the NBME Dr. the NBME’s other ex- appropriate diagnosing pert criteria for witness. Dr. Litchford testified that disabilities, learning an interview or clini- the results the tests administered cal making supported finding examination is essential to a Dr. a of a writ- Giordani disorder, competent diagnosis of although disabili- Dr. Litchford though is true even district courts conduct perfor- did not believe opined by ing flexibility be affected bench trials have substantial the NBME would mance on admitting proffered expert testimony at writing disability. end, deciding the front and then them Dr. also never reviewed Gon- Flanagan during selves the course of trial whether applications for or third zales’s second requirements the evidence meets the appli- while those accommodations testing Kumho Tire Co. and Daubert and deserves actually pending before cations were credited. PRP to be See Ekotek Site NBME, subject of the though the even Self, v. 1 F.Supp.2d Committee ap- third present litigation was Gonzales’s (D.Utah.1998) (concluding n. district Rather, plication for accommodations. she presiding courts over bench trials can de only purpose for the reviewed them questions admissibility cide and reliabili NBME’s testifying on the behalf ty proffered present after the evidence is fact, attorney, present case. Gonzales’s trial); Brown, Bradley ed at in limine to limit Dr. Flana- made a motion (N.D.Ind.) F.Supp. (granting subject of her initial gan’s testimony to motion limine to exclude unreliable ex Ulrey’s in which she criticized report pert following completion evidence of a the mo- The district court denied report. (7th trial), aff'd, 42 F.3d 434 Cir. bench tion, merely a hear- stating “[t]his 1994). By failing conduct Daubert ... ing, not a trial.” analysis Flanagan’s testimony as to Dr. in- “preliminary” Actually, because (the eonclusory court’s district statement junctive relief that the district court de- testimony it found the Dr. Flana that of the relief Gon- nied was the lion’s share persuasive” than Dr. gan “more that of action, in this I believe seeking zales was analy Giordani does not constitute such court should have consid- that the district sis), effectively the district court terminat carefully what evidence would ered more case on the merits without ed Gonzales’s and ad- competent have been considered evidentiary safeguards that employing trial. 11A Chaeles missible at See Alan apply when required district courts are Mary Kay R. Miller & Weight, Arthur of material fact are dis genuine issues Kane: Federal Practice Procedure hearing at a or trial. pute i.e.,— 2000) (2d 2950, p. Supp. § Cir. 1995 & 241 event, Dr. any Flanagan’s In exclusive (noting that when the district court consol- injunc- reports on the test results and preliminary reliance idates the motion for merits, Ulrey “in is troublesome. trial on the Drs. Giordani tive relief with the per- that because Gonzales evidentiary applicable rules to She reasoned general formed well on tests that measured govern during a consolidated trial should skills, cognitive a and because individuals’ hearing “really is hearing” because merits”). “the cognitive processes pre- are best trial on the achievement,” reading Gon- dictors pri- that Although appears it doubtful “ought zales’s achievement be Title III of the plaintiffs suing vate range of abili- within the or better trial, jury ADA are entitled to a see reasoning. ty.” accept I am unable to this authorizing § (apparently U.S.C. two attorney’s probability Correlation is the only injunctive relief and fees factors, ability and read- cognitive such as brought by private plain- III suits Title A tiffs); accompany will each other. Bragdon, F.Supp. ing ability, Abbott v. (D.Me.1995) cogni- correlation between (suggesting strong positive that there is mean reading ability ability tive by jury private plain- to a trial right no that, peo- III), large enough sample a given suits under Title the district tiffs’ ability, predict- a strong cognitive with required rely only ple on ad- court is still would also have testimony, ably large percentage expert and reliable missible ability. is a strong reading But Gonzales conducting a trial. This even while bench statute) (“After all, Flanagan’s by fail- a person, sample. Dr. not covered not a finding person protected by even meet with Gonzales that a ure to examine or relying argu- on the only question leaves her stuck with ADA leads to the central ability ought improperly [defendant] ment that Gonzales’s whether individual.”). good people cogni- against most with to be discriminated strong as ability by tive Gonzales’s view of the concession Dr. Litchford (whose good reading ability. reasoning testimony This credit- have ed) with, unexplained, conflicts and leaves that the results of the tests adminis- (as testimony that of Dr. supported finding well as tered Dr. Giordani Giordani) disorder, is a writing to the effect Gonzales of a the district court’s minority any member of the of individuals conclusion that Gonzales did not have very strong cognitive disability but with weak ADA purposes for the reading ability. appears untenable.

Furthermore, testimony might There well have other rea- Dr. Litchford’s been support why likely did little the NBME’s claim sons was not to suc- Indeed, a learning might that Gonzales does not have ceed on the merits. there Rather, disability. weighing against grant- Dr. Litchford testified have been reasons injunctive that the results of the tests administered relief even if had finding supported Giordani established a likelihood of success on the writing although he doubted merits. But the district court’s decision to disorder — deny injunctive hin- having writing disorder would relief was based on its Step finding any der one’s on the exam. that Gonzales did not have forthrightly meaning Dr. Litchford nevertheless of the ADA (and he conceded that neither nor the NBME thus had no chance of success on the merits), any finding, had empirical ever conducted sort of on the basis of us, study writing appears to determine whether dis- the record before to me to any per- clearly abilities have effect on how one have been erroneous. on the NBME’s examinations. forms III. question of whether a certain form majority’s I also with the disagree state- time) (i.e., testing of accommodation more ment that Gonzales does not “fit within required appropriate given is for a dis Congress’s popula- vision of the disabled entirely question separate is a from Maj. Op. Although tion.” at 629. it is “disability”

whether the individual has a indisputable “[pjersons that with minor Shepler the first v. place. See Northwest impairments, trivial in- simple such as a Ctr., 99-3079, Developmental Ohio No. finger impaired are not in a fected (6th 191496, 9, 2000 WL at *7 Cir. Feb. 632, activity,” Maj. Op. at I do not 2000) (Gilman, J., (unpublished) dissenting) reading impairment understand how the (observing question of that whether described Gonzales and Giordani plaintiff in an ADA case has a disabili reasonably can be infected ty kept analytically separate should be finger. questions, from other such as whether cer Finally, I proposed disagree majority’s tain accommodations are re with the ADA); quired by recognizing v. that Davidson Midel assertion serious (7th Clinic, Ltd., impairments 508 of the sort Gon- described fort Cir.1998) (same); Diller, Matthew Judicial zales as “disabilities” would stretch the Backlash, ADA, ADA Rights beyond purpose. and the Civil well its intended Berkeley Emp. Model, Lab. Congress anticipated 21 J. & L. that its definition of (2000) 21-29, judicial disability” ap- “an a (criticizing opin 49 individual with would 43,000,000 deny that the ADA after 42 ply ions relief under “some Americans.” 12101(a)(1). § bending plaintiffs Forty-three over backwards to find million U.S.C. (E.D.Mich. ers, F.Supp.2d include all of the a number to is too small 1999). require who in the United States people to see normal- contact lenses eyeglasses or I would therefore vacate the order of the Sutton, at

ly, see district court and remand this case for (observing counting persons who proceedings. further The district court normally with corrective lenses as can see or, briefing supplemental could allow of “dis- drive the total “disabled” would discretion, the taking the exercise of its of mil- well over one hundred persons abled” subject additional evidence on the lion, greater Congress number than far likely whether is to succeed on ADA), by the but intended be covered merits, then, if necessary, address very still, large million is forty-three the other factors that are relevant in de- think, majority larger, I than the number — injunctive termining whether relief should recognize. willing granted. be IV. delving into

I must confess before case, skeptical I have been

this reading disability with a as seri- person insists he has

ous as the one Gonzales rigors

would be able to survive capable practicing school and be medical America, UNITED STATES Never- successfully medicine afterward. Plaintiff-Appellee, theless, apparently satisfied Gonzales has country’s faculty preemi- of one of this MOORE, III, Daniel Owen nent medical schools that he would make Defendant-Appellant. very physician, and I have little good faculty University doubt No. 99-6294. judges are Michigan Medical School better Appeals, United States Court ought I of to be allowed to than who Sixth Circuit. practice medicine. above, 2,May Argued: the reasons set forth I be

For finding lieve that the district court’s Aug. and Filed: Decided not have a within Gonzales does supported ADA meaning is not it presently the record as exists. The only finding consistent with Gonzales’s

testimony the conclusions of the two

experts who have met and examined

him is that he has a rather severe

disability. Although district obviously required to credit Gon Giordani, testimony Dr.

zales’s or that of to credit

the district court’s decision

testimony Flanagan Litchford of Drs.

(particularly Flanagan) seems to me

irreconcilable with the district court’s rec “competent as a

ognition of Dr. Giordani accomplished psychologist.” Gon v. Nat’l Bd. Medical Examin-

zale[z] notes prospective line, severely myopic and that then I would grades were the bottom glasses with pilots eyesight is not disabled. Gon- airline whose agree that Gonzales disabled, zales, all, substantially clearly not also not see after was normal were 488-89, average person Sutton, when it off than the at worse reasonably good grades. getting comes to Supreme Court also held Notably, ability get good grades person’s But a un amblyopia, an that a truck-driver with were, If it then a the bottom line. is not essentially left correctable condition reasonably high ability to achieve student’s eye, might not sight only him one means) without formal (by marks whatever ADA of the purposes “disabled” for be would, mat- practical as a accommodations suffi body adapted if had his brain ter, finding that he has a read- foreclose was not ciently ability that his to see so I disability conclusion that believe —a comparison substantially impaired one, example, would is incorrect. No Kirkingburg, 527 average person. See able to that a blind student who is argue 565-66, The ma at 119 S.Ct. 2162. U.S. college help with the get good grades relies analysis present case jority’s configured appropriately friends and an reasoning that Gonzales Kirkingbwrg, any without for- personal computer —but in a simi to self-accommodate has learned from the school— mal accommodation disagree. I respectfully lar fashion. for the not be considered “disabled” admittedly unscientific plain although Similarly, ADA. if a stu- purposes terms, part claim is can Gonzales’s dent with severe difficulties decoding written responsible his brain reasonably high marks in school even get (“The as, DSM-IV, ty. language p. specific is not wired same See xxiii than, substantially diagnostic functions worse that of criteria included in DSM-IV are in- average person, though guidelines even other meant serve as to be judgment formed clinical respects signifi- his mental faculties are and are not fashion”). If, cantly average. despite than meant to be used in a cookbook better contexts, In other we accord substantial faulty “wiring,” this Gonzales had been opinions to read deference to the medical of treat- adapt able to so See, substantially ing physicians. e.g., than that of Walker v. no worse Secre- Svcs., average person, tary then would not Health & Human (6th Cir.1992) (social disability security be considered to have a case). Kirkingburg’s rationale. But that benefits The same should Rather, opinion examining is not claim. be true for the of an psychologist diagnosed who despite has asserted that his best efforts disorder reliably that cannot be problem, through work around his he is still not detected test scores nearly able to read as well as the alone.

Case Details

Case Name: Michael Gonzales v. National Board of Medical Examiners

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: Aug 22, 2000

Citation: 225 F.3d 620

Docket Number: 99-1931

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.