Melvin Amaya v. Merrick Garland
15 F.4th 976
| 9th Cir. | 2021Background:
- Melvin Amaya, a Salvadoran LPR, was convicted in Washington of first-degree assault (Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.011) after shooting a drug dealer; he received a prison term >1 year.
- DHS charged Amaya as removable for committing an "aggravated felony"—a "crime of violence" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16 and incorporated into 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).
- Washington’s first-degree assault statute includes a subsection criminalizing administering/exposing another to poison or HIV and requires intent to inflict great bodily harm.
- Amaya argued the statute is categorically overbroad (because it covers HIV/exposure and because Washington accomplice liability requires only general intent); he also alleged IJ bias (due process) and sought CAT relief.
- The IJ and BIA found Amaya removable, denied asylum/withholding/CAT relief; Amaya petitioned the Ninth Circuit challenging removability, alleging IJ bias, and contesting the CAT denial.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether WA § 9A.36.011 is a categorical "crime of violence" (aggravated felony) under §16/INA | § 9A.36.011(b) criminalizes exposing others to HIV/poison and thus can be committed without the "use of physical force" required by §16; Washington accomplice liability uses only general intent, making convictions overbroad | § 9A.36.011 requires intent to inflict great bodily harm (specific/knowing), indirect force (poison/HIV) qualifies as physical force under §16, and Door controls so accomplice mens rea differences do not defeat a force-clause match | The statute is categorically a crime of violence under §16/INA; Amaya is removable for an aggravated felony |
| Whether IJ bias (due process) denied Amaya a fair hearing | Amaya contends the IJ was biased | Government: claim was not exhausted before the BIA | Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction—claim unexhausted before the BIA |
| Whether substantial evidence supports denial of deferral under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) | Amaya fears torture by gangs and government acquiescence if removed | IJ considered record and country conditions; found no past government harm and insufficient evidence government would acquiesce | Substantial evidence supports denial of CAT relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (describing and applying the categorical approach)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) ("use" of force implies active employment and requires more than negligence)
- Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021) (§16-like force language covers purposeful and knowing acts but excludes reckless conduct)
- Castleman v. United States, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (physical force includes indirect applications such as poisoning)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defining "physical force" as force exerted by and through concrete bodies)
- United States v. De La Fuente, 353 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 2003) (exposure to anthrax counts as physical force)
- United States v. Melchor-Meceno, 620 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2010) (poisoning/exposure as force)
- Arellano Hernandez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2016) (poison as indirect force under §16)
- United States v. Werle, 877 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 2017) (knowledge/general intent suffices for §16 inquiry)
- United States v. Valdivia-Flores, 876 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2017) (comparing Washington mens rea to federal analogue in enumerated-offense context)
- United States v. Door, 917 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2019) (distinguishing force-clause analysis from enumerated-offense comparisons; force clause controls here)