McNeill v. United States
131 S. Ct. 2218
| SCOTUS | 2011Background
- McNeill was convicted in North Carolina of six drug offenses between 1991 and 1994, each with a 10-year maximum at the time.
- He was later federally charged with unlawful firearm possession by a felon and drug offenses, seeking ACCA enhancement based on prior convictions.
- District Court counted McNeill’s six drug convictions as serious drug offenses, applying ACCA’s 15-year minimum when combined with two violent felonies.
- North Carolina reduced the maximum penalties for those drug offenses after 1994, prompting McNeill to argue only the current lower maximums should count.
- The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding the current state-law maximums could be consulted for preexisting convictions that occurred before the reform.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the maximum term at the time of each state conviction or the present-day maximum governs ACCA serious-drug-offense determinations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What is the proper maximum term for a prior state drug offense under ACCA? | McNeill; use current state law reducing max terms. | United States; use the maximum that applied at the time of conviction. | Use the time-of-conviction maximum. |
| Does the present tense in the definition of serious drug offense imply considering current law? | McNeill; present tense means current law controls. | United States; present tense does not override historical fact of conviction. | Present tense does not override historical conviction law. |
| How should the adjacent definition of violent felony influence the interpretation of serious drug offenses? | McNeill; treat offenses by current law, leading to potential exclusions. | United States; rely on convictions and historical law consistent with Taylor/V. James. | Consistent with historical law for both definitions. |
| Would applying current state law to preexisting convictions produce absurd results? | McNeill; changes could erase prior convictions for ACCA purposes. | United States; avoid absurd results by using time-of-conviction law. | Avoid absurd results by using law at time of conviction. |
| Should a prior conviction ever be treated as nonexistent due to later statutory reforms? | McNeill; reforms could eliminate old offenses for ACCA. | United States; prior convictions remain convictions unless expunged or pardoned. | Prior convictions remain valid for ACCA if not expunged, etc. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377 (2008) (look to law applicable at time of state convictions for maximum terms)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (determine elements of offenses by former state statutes at conviction)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (look to statutes in effect at time of state conviction)
- Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994) (statutory provisions on expungement and restoration tied to conviction)
- Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (statutory interpretation in context of related provisions)
- Wilson v. United States, 503 U.S. 329 (1992) (absurd results avoidance in statutory construction)
- Darden v. United States, 539 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2008) (context of state-law maximums for prior offenses)
- Mallett v. United States, 334 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2003) (difficulty translating old convictions under revised state schemes)