McElhaney v. Moab City
2017 UT 65
| Utah | 2017Background
- Jillian Scott (Wife) and Bradley Scott (Husband) divorced in 2006; decree provided alimony terminating on remarriage or cohabitation.
- Wife received $6,000/month alimony for 25 years; Husband moved in 2011 to terminate payments alleging Wife had cohabited with an ex-boyfriend (J.O.) beginning earlier that year.
- Wife and J.O. had ended their relationship months before Husband filed his motion.
- Utah Code § 30-3-5(10) terminates alimony “upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person.”
- District court found cohabitation and ordered Wife to repay alimony back to December 22, 2010; the court of appeals affirmed (finding cohabitation beginning Feb 17, 2011) after construing the statute to permit past cohabitation to terminate alimony.
- The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the statute requires present (ongoing) cohabitation at the time the paying spouse files to terminate alimony.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wife) | Defendant's Argument (Husband) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 30-3-5(10) requires that cohabitation be ongoing at the time the paying spouse files to terminate alimony | “Is cohabitating” is present continuous — alimony terminates only if cohabitation exists at time of filing | The statute may be read to allow proof of past or earlier cohabitation to terminate alimony; court of appeals said practical harmony with remarriage clause supports that reading | Court holds plain language requires present (ongoing) cohabitation at time of filing to terminate alimony |
| Whether the court of appeals erred in deciding an arguably unpreserved statutory issue | Wife argued statutory meaning on appeal; urged plain-text reading | Husband argued the issue was not preserved in district court and should not have been reached | Supreme Court explained appellate courts may reach unpreserved issues but appellants/ appellees should develop preservation arguments; declined to affirm on preservation ground because Husband did not adequately press it |
| Whether the absurdity doctrine or statutory purpose permits reading “is” to mean past cohabitation | Wife contended plain language controls; no absurdity shown | Court of appeals invoked policy reasons (avoid reinstatement incentives) to read statute more broadly | Supreme Court rejected an absurdity-based rewrite; held legislature’s plain use of present tense governs |
| Whether Wife is entitled to attorney fees defending the termination motion under Utah Code § 30-3-3 | Wife sought fees for defending termination | Husband argued statute awards fees for actions to establish or enforce alimony, not to defend termination petitions | Court held § 30-3-3 does not authorize fees for defending a motion to terminate alimony |
Key Cases Cited
- Bagley v. Bagley, 387 P.3d 1000 (Utah 2016) (statutory interpretation: start with plain language and presume each word is used advisedly)
- Nichols v. Jacobsen Constr. Co., 374 P.3d 3 (Utah 2016) (standard of review for court of appeals decisions on certiorari)
- Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438 (2010) (choice of verb tense informs statute's temporal reach)
- Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (Congress’ choice of tense demonstrates temporal scope)
- Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567 (2004) (time-of-filing rule measures certain legal challenges by facts at filing)