Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a party’s post-filing change in citizenship can cure a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction that existed at the time of filing in an action premised upon diversity of citizenship. See 28 U. S. C. § 1332.
I
Respondent Atlas Global Group, L. R, is a limited partnership created under Texas law. In November 1997, Atlas filed a state-law suit against petitioner Grupo Dataflux, a Mexican corporation, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The complaint contained claims for breach of contract and in quantum meruit, seeking over $1.3 million in damages. It alleged that “[fjederal jurisdiction is proper based upon diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1332(a), as this suit is between a Texas citizen [Atlas] and a citizen or subject of Mexico [Grupo Da-
On November 18, before entry of the judgment, Dataflux filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the parties were not diverse at the time the complaint was filed. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proe. 12(b)(1), (h)(3). The Magistrate Judge granted the motion. The dismissal was based upon the accepted rule that, as a partnership, Atlas is a citizen of each State or foreign country of which any of its partners is a citizen. See Carden v. Arkoma Associates,
On appeal, Atlas did not dispute the finding of no diversity at the time of filing. It urged the Court of Appeals to disregard this failure and reverse dismissal because the Mexican partners had left the partnership in a transaction consummated the month before trial began. Atlas argued that, since diversity existed when the jury rendered its verdict, dismissal was inappropriate. The Fifth Circuit agreed.
“(1) [A]n action is filed or removed when constitutional and/or statutory jurisdictional requirements are not met, (2) neither the parties nor the judge raise the error until after a jury verdict has been rendered, or a disposi-tive ruling has been made by the court, and (3) before the verdict is rendered, or ruling is issued, the jurisdictional defect is cured.”312 F. 3d, at 174 .
The opinion strictly limited the exception as follows: “If at any point prior to the verdict or ruling, the issue is raised, the court must apply the general rule and dismiss regardless of subsequent changes in citizenship.” Ibid.
The jurisdictional error in the present case not having been identified until after the jury returned its verdict; and the postfiling change in the composition of the partnership having (in the Court’s view) cured the jurisdictional defect; the Court reversed and remanded with instructions to the District Court to enter judgment in favor of Atlas. Ibid. We granted certiorari.
II
It has long been the case that “the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought.” Mollan v. Torrance,
We have adhered to the time-of-filing rule regardless of the costs it imposes. For example, in Anderson v. Watt,
It is uncontested that application of the time-of-filing rule to this case would require dismissal, but Atlas contends that this Court “should accept the very limited exception created by the Fifth Circuit to the time-of-filing principle.” Brief for Respondents 2. The Fifth Circuit and Atlas rely on our statement in Caterpillar, supra, at 75, that “[o]nce a diversity case has been tried in federal court . . . considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy become overwhelming.” This statement unquestionably provided the ratio decidendi in Caterpillar, but it did not augur a new approach to deciding whether a jurisdictional defect has been cured.
Caterpillar broke no new ground, because the jurisdictional defect it addressed had been cured by the dismissal of the party that had destroyed diversity. That method of curing a jurisdictional defect had long been an exception to the time-of-filing rule. “[T]he question always is, or should be, when objection is taken to the jurisdiction of the court by reason of the citizenship of some of the parties, whether ... they are indispensable parties, for if their interests are sev-erable and a decree without prejudice to their rights may be made, the jurisdiction of the court should be retained and the suit dismissed as to them.” Horn v. Lockhart,
Caterpillar involved an unremarkable application of this established exception. Complete diversity had been lacking at the time of removal to federal court, because one of the plaintiffs shared Kentucky citizenship with one of the defendants. Almost three years after the District Court denied a motion to remand, but before trial, the diversity-destroying defendant settled out of the case and was dismissed. The case proceeded to a 6-day jury trial, resulting in judgment for the defendant, Caterpillar, against Lewis. This Court unanimously held that the lack of complete diversity at the time of removal did not require dismissal of the case.
The sum of Caterpillar’s jurisdictional analysis was an approving acknowledgment of Lewis’s admission that there was “complete diversity, and therefore federal subject-matter jurisdiction, at the time of trial and judgment.”
While recognizing that Caterpillar is “technically” distinguishable because the defect was cured by the dismissal of a diversity-destroying party, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that
III
To our knowledge, the Court has never approved a deviation from the rule articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in 1829 that “[wjhere there is no change of party, a jurisdiction depending on the condition of the party is governed by that condition, as it was at the commencement of the suit.” Conolly, 2 Pet., at 565 (emphasis added). Unless the Court is to manufacture a brand-new exception to the time-of-filing rule,
Apart from breaking with our longstanding precedent, holding that “finality, efficiency, and judicial economy” can justify suspension of the time-of-filing rule would create an exception of indeterminate scope. The Court of Appeals sought to cabin the exception with the statement that “[i]f at any point prior to the verdict or ruling, the [absence of diversity at the time of filing] is raised, the court must apply the general rule and dismiss regardless of subsequent
It is unsound in principle because there is no basis in reason or logic to dismiss preverdict if in fact the change in citizenship has eliminated the jurisdictional defect. Either the court has jurisdiction at the time the defect is identified (because the parties are diverse at that time) or it does not (because the postfiling citizenship change is irrelevant). If the former, then dismissal is inappropriate; if the latter, then retention of jurisdiction postverdict is inappropriate.
Only two escapes from this dilemma come to mind, neither of which is satisfactory. First, one might say that it is not any change in party citizenship that cures the jurisdictional defect, but only a change that remains unnoticed until the end of trial. That is not so much a logical explanation as a restatement of the illogic that produces the dilemma. There is no conceivable reason why the jurisdictional deficiency which continues despite the citizenship change should suddenly disappear upon the rendering of a verdict. Second, one might say that there never was a cure, but that the party who failed to object before the end of trial forfeited his objection. This is logical enough, but comes up against the established principle, reaffirmed earlier this Term, that “a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be expanded to account for the parties’ litigation conduct.” Kontrick v. Ryan,
And principled or not, the Fifth Circuit’s artificial limitation is sure to be discarded in practice. Only 8% of diversity cases concluded in 2003 actually went to trial, and the median time from filing to trial disposition was nearly two years.
“[TJhere is no difference in efficiency terms between the jury verdict and, for example, the moment at which the jury retires. Nor, for that matter, is there a large difference between the verdict and mid-way through the trial... . Indeed, in complicated cases requiring a great deal of discovery, the parties and the court often expend tremendous resources long before the case goes to trial.”312 F. 3d, at 177 .
IV
The dissenting opinion rests on two principal propositions: (1) the jurisdictional defect in this case was cured by a change in the composition of the partnership; and (2) refusing to recognize an exception to the time-of-filing rule in this case wastes judicial resources, while creating an exception does not. We discuss each in turn.
A
Unlike the dissent, our opinion does not turn on whether the jurisdictional defect here contained at least “minimal diversity.”
This equation of a dropped partner with a dropped party is flatly inconsistent with Carden. The dissent in Carden sought to apply a “real party to the controversy” approach to determine which partners counted for purposes of jurisdictional analysis. The Carden majority rejected that ap
There was from the beginning of this action a single plaintiff (Atlas), which, under Carden, was not diverse from the sole defendant (Dataflux). Thus, this case fails to present “two adverse parties [who] are not co-citizens.” State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire,
The incompatibility with prior law of the dissent’s attempt to treat a change in partners like a change in parties is revealed by a curious anomaly: It would produce a case unlike every other ease in which dropping a party has cured a jurisdictional defect, in that no judicial action (such as granting a motion to dismiss) was necessary to get the jurisdictional spoilers out of the case. Indeed, judicial action to that end was not even possible: The court could hardly have “dismissed” the partners from the partnership to save jurisdiction.
B
We now turn from consideration of the conceptual difficulties with the dissent’s disposition to consideration of its practical consequences. The time-of-filing rule is what it is precisely because the facts determining jurisdiction are subject to change, and because constant litigation in response to that change would be wasteful. The dissent would have it that the time-of-filing rule applies to establish that a court has jurisdiction (and to protect that jurisdiction from later destruction), but does not apply to establish that a court lacks jurisdiction (and to prevent postfiling changes that perfect jurisdiction). Post, at 583-584. But whether destruction or perfection of jurisdiction is at issue, the policy goal
The dissent argues that it is essential to uphold jurisdiction in this and similar cases because dismissal followed by refiling condemns the parties to “an almost certain replay of the case, with, in all likelihood, the same ultimate outcome.” Post, at 595. But if the parties expect “the same ultimate outcome,” they will not waste time and resources slogging through a new trial. They will settle, with the jury’s prior verdict supplying a range for the award. Indeed, settlement instead of retrial will probably occur even if the parties do not expect the same ultimate outcome. When the stakes remain the same and the players have been shown each other’s cards, they will not likely play the hand all the way through just for the sake of the game. And finally, even if the parties run the case through complete “relitigation in the very same District Court in which it was first filed in 1997,” post, at 598, the “waste” will not be great. Having been through three years of discovery and pretrial motions in the current case, the parties would most likely proceed promptly to trial.
Looked at in its overall effect, and not merely in its application to the sunk costs of the present case, it is the dissent’s proposed rule that is wasteful. Absent uncertainty about jurisdiction (which the dissent’s readiness to change settled law would preserve for the future), the obvious course, for a litigant whose suit was dismissed as Atlas’s was, would have been immediately to file a new action. That is in fact what
Atlas and Dataflux have thus far litigated this case for more than 6V2 years, including BV2 years over a conceded jurisdictional defect. Compared with the one month it took the Magistrate Judge to apply the time-of-filing rule and Carden when the jurisdictional problem was brought to her attention, this waste counsels strongly against any course that would impair the certainty of our jurisdictional rules and thereby encourage similar jurisdictional litigation.
We decline to endorse a new exception to a time-of-filing rule that has a pedigree of almost two centuries. Uncertainty regarding the question of jurisdiction is particularly undesirable, and collateral litigation on the point particularly wasteful. The stability provided by our time-tested rule weighs heavily against the approval of any new deviation. The judgment of the Fifth Circuit is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Notes
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1332(a)(2) provides:
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between ...
“citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state.”
See, e. g., J. Friedenthal, M. Kane, & A. Miller, Civil Procedure 27 (3d ed. 1999); C. Wright & M. Kane, Law of Federal Courts 173 (6th ed. 2002). See also 13B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3608, p. 452 (1984).
The dissent asserts that Anderson is “not altogether in tune with Caterpillar and Newman-Green,” post, at 591, n. 7 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.), but the cases can easily be harmonized. Anderson did not, as the dissent suggests, refuse to give diversity-perfecting effect to the dismissal of an independent severable party; it refused to give that effect to the alteration of a coexecutorship into a lone executorship — much as we decline to give diversity-perfecting effect to the alteration of a partnership with diversity-destroying partners into a partnership without diversity-destroying partners.
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1441(a) provides, in relevant part:
“Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.”
The dissent acknowledges that “[t]he Court has long applied [Chief Justice] Marshall’s time-of-filing rule categorically to postfiling changes that otherwise would destroy diversity jurisdiction,” post, at 583-584, but asserts that “[i]n contrast, the Court has not adhered to a similarly steady rule for postfiling changes in the party lineup, alterations that perfect previously defective statutory subject-matter jurisdiction,” post, at 584. The authorities relied upon by the dissent do not call into question the particular aspect of the time-of-filing rule that is at issue in this case— the principle (quoted in text) that “[w]here there is no change of party, a jurisdiction depending on the condition of the party is governed by that condition, as it was at the commencement of the suit.” Conolly,
The answer to the “minimal diversity” question is not as straightforward as the dissent’s analysis suggests. We understand “minimal diversity” to mean the existence of at least one party who is diverse in citizenship from one party on the other side of the case, even though the extraconstitutional “complete diversity” required by our cases is lacking. It is possible, though far from clear, that one can have opposing parties in a two-party case who are cocitizens, and yet have minimal Article III jurisdiction because of the multiple citizenship of one of the parties. Although the Court has previously said that minimal diversity requires “two
The dissent contends that the existence of minimal diversity was clear because the rule of Carden v. Arkoma Associates,
The dissent appears to leave open the possibility that this line could be crossed in a future case, contrasting Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis,
These statements from Carden rebut the dissent’s assertion that “an association whose citizenship, for diversity purposes, is determined by aggregating the citizenships of each of its members” could “[w]ith equal plausibility ... be characterized as an ‘aggregation’ composed of its members, or an ‘entity’ comprising its members.” Post, at 590, n. 6. We think it evident that Carden decisively adopted an understanding of the limited partnership as an “entity,” rather than an “aggregation,” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See
An additional anomaly, under the particular facts of the present ease, is that the two individual Mexican partners, whom the dissent treats like parties for purposes of enabling their withdrawal to perfect jurisdiction, were brought into the litigation personally by the court’s granting of Dataflux’s motion to add them as parties for purposes of Dataflux’s counterclaim. The motion was made and granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(h), which applies only to “[plersons other than those made parties to the original action.” (Emphasis added.)
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
When this lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas in 1997, diversity of citizenship was incomplete among the adverse parties: The plaintiff partnership, Atlas Global Group (Atlas), had five members, including a general partner of Delaware citizenship and two limited partners of Mexican citizenship, App.
I
Chief Justice Marshall, in a pathmarking 1824 opinion, Mollan v. Torrance,
The Court has long applied Marshall’s time-of-filing rule categorically to postfiling changes that otherwise would de
In contrast, the Court has not adhered to a similarly steady rule for postfiling party lineup alterations that perfect previously defective statutory subject-matter jurisdiction. Compare Keene Corp. v. United States,
II
A
To state the background of this case in fuller detail, in November 1997, respondent Atlas, a limited partnership,
In September 2000, several weeks before trial, and unrelated to the claims in suit, Atlas completed a transaction in which all Mexican-citizen partners withdrew from the partnership. App. 14a, 122a-123a, 126a-128a; Brief for Appellants in No. 01-20245 (CA5), p. 7. After that reorganization, it is not disputed, complete diversity existed between the adverse parties. Brief for Petitioner 2; Brief for Respondents 2.
Prevailing at a six-day trial, Atlas gained a jury verdict of $750,000.
The case proceeded to a jury trial, which yielded a verdict and corresponding judgment for Caterpillar. Id., at 66-67. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Lewis prevailed. Id., at 67. Observing that, at the time of removal, diversity was incomplete, the appellate court accepted Lewis’ argument that dismissal of the case for want of subject-matter jurisdiction was obligatory. Ibid. In turn, this Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment: “[A] district court’s error in failing to remand a case improperly removed,” this Court held unanimously, “is not fatal to the ensuing adjudication if federal jurisdictional requirements are met at the time judgment is entered.” Id., at 64.
Newman-Green concerned a state-law action filed in Federal District Court by an Illinois corporation against a Venezuelan corporation, four Venezuelan citizens, and a United States citizen domiciled in Venezuela.
As in Caterpillar and Newman-Green, minimal diversity within Article Ill’s compass existed in this case from the start. See U. S. Const., Art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases .. . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
It bears clarification why this case, in common with Caterpillar and Newman-Green, met the constitutional requirement of minimal diversity at the onset of the litigation. True, Atlas’ case involves a partnership, while the diversity spoiler in Caterpillar was a corporation and in Newman-Green, an individual. See supra, at 587-588 and this page. In Carden v. Arkoma Associates, this Court held that, in determining a partnership’s qualification to sue or be sued under §1332, the citizenship of each partner, whether general or limited, must be attributed to the partnership. See
Notably, however, the Court did not suggest in Carden that minimal diversity, which is adequate for Article III purposes, would be absent when some, but not all, partners composing the “single artificial entity,” id., at 188, n. 1, share the opposing party’s citizenship. To the contrary, the Court emphasized in Carden that Congress could, “by legislation,” determine which of the “wide assortment of artificial entities possessing different powers and characteristics... is entitled to be considered a ‘citizen’ for diversity purposes, and which of their members’ citizenship is to be consulted.” Id., at 197. Congress would be disarmed from making such determinations — for example, from legislating that only the citizenship of general partners counts for § 1332 purposes — if Article III itself commanded that each partner’s citizenship, limited and general partner’s alike, inescapably adheres to the partnership entity. See ibid.; cf. Steelworkers v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc.,
B
Petitioner Dataflux maintains, and the Court agrees, see ante, at 573-574, that this case is not properly bracketed with Caterpillar, where the subtraction of a party yielded complete diversity; instead, according to Dataflux, this case should be aligned with those in which an individual plaintiff initially shared citizenship with a defendant, and then, post-commencement of the litigation, moved to another State. See Brief for Petitioner 12-14, and n. 9, 23-24; Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-11. In my view, this case ranks with Caterpillar and is not equivalent to the case of a plaintiff who moves to another State to create diversity not even minimally present when the complaint was filed.
It has long been clear that “if a citizen sue[d] a citizen of the same state, he [could not] give jurisdiction by removing himself, and becoming a citizen of a different state.” Conolly, 2 Pet., at 565.
The same holds true for Atlas. No partner moved. Instead, those that spoiled statutory diversity dropped out of the case as did the nondiverse parties in Caterpillar and Newman-Green. See supra, at 587-589. In essence, then, this case seems to me indistinguishable from one in which there is “a change in the parties to the action.” Ante, at 575.
C
Petitioner Dataflux sees Caterpillar as a ruling limited to removal cases, and Newman-Green as limited to court-ordered dismissals of nondiverse parties. See
Moreover, by whatever route a case arrives in federal court, it is the obligation of both district court and counsel to be alert to jurisdictional requirements. See, e. g., Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist.,
In short, the Fifth Circuit correctly comprehended the essential teaching of Caterpillar and Newman-Green: The generally applicable time-of-filing rule is displaced when (1) a “jurisdictional requirement] [is] not met, (2) neither the parties nor the judge raise the error until after a jury verdict has been rendered, or a dispositive ruling [typically, a grant of summary judgment] has been made by the court, and (3) before the verdict is rendered, or [the dispositive] ruling
D
The “considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy” the Court found “overwhelming” in Caterpillar and Newman-Green have undiluted application here. Caterpillar,
The Court hypothesizes that Atlas and Dataflux will now settle to avoid fresh litigation costs. Ante, at 581. The majority’s forecast, however, ignores the procedural history of
In two respects, there is stronger cause for departure from the time-of-filing rule in Atlas’ case than there was in Caterpillar. See supra, at 587 (discussing Caterpillar). First, the Caterpillar plaintiff, judgment loser in the federal trial court, had timely but fruitlessly objected to the defendant’s improper removal.
Nor would affirmance of the Fifth Circuit judgment entail a significant risk of manipulation in other cases. Rarely, if ever, will a plaintiff bring suit in federal district court, invoking diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a), with the knowledge that complete diversity does not exist, but in the hope of a postfiling jurisdiction-perfecting event. Such a plaintiff’s anticipation is likely to be thwarted by the court’s or the defendant’s swift detection of the jurisdictional impediment. Furthermore, a plaintiff who ignores threshold jurisdictional requirements risks sanctions and “the displeasure of a district court whose authority has been improperly invoked.” Caterpillar,
Also distinguishing the two cases, in Caterpillar, the removing defendant “satisfied with only a day to spare the statutory requirement that a diversity-based removal take place within one year of a lawsuit’s commencement.”
In sum, the Court’s judgment effectively returns this case for relitigation in the very same District Court in which it was first filed in 1997. Having lost once, Datafiux now gets an unmerited second chance, never mind “just how much time will be lost along the way.” Newman-Green,
The Court invokes “175 years” of precedent, ante, at 575, endorsing a time-of-filing rule that, generally, is altogether sound. On that point, the Court is united. See supra, at 583-584. For the class of cases over which we divide — cases involving a postfiling change in the composition of a multi-member association such as a partnership — the Court presents no authority impelling the waste today’s judgment approves. Even if precedent could provide a basis for the Court’s disposition, rules fashioned by this Court for “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination [of cases],” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1, should not become immutable at the instant of their initial articulation. Rather, they should remain adjustable in light of experience courts constantly gain in handling the cases that troop before them. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson,
At the time of filing, Atlas comprised (1) general partner Bahia Management, L. L. C., a Texas limited liability company (LLC), which included Mexican-citizen members; (2) general partner Capital Financial Partner, Inc., a Delaware corporation; (3) limited partner HIL Financial Holdings, L. R, a limited partnership with Texas and Delaware citizenship; (4) limited partner Francisco Llamosa, a Mexican citizen; and (5) limited partner Oscar Robles, another Mexican citizen. Brief for Petitioner 3; App. 98a. At least arguably, the general partner Bahia Management, like the two limited partners of Mexican citizenship, initially spoiled diversity. Although the Court has never ruled on the issue, Courts of Appeals have held the citizenship of each member of an LLC counts for diversity purposes. See, e. g., GMAC Commercial Credit LLC v. Dillard Dept. Stores,
Section 1332(a) provides:
“(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between—
“(1) citizens of different States;
“(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
“(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and
“(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
“For the purposes of this section, section 1335, and section 1441, an alien admitted to the United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is domiciled.”
A United States citizen with no domicil in any State ranks as a stateless person for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 1332(a)(3), providing for suits between “citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties,” and § 1332(a)(2), authorizing federal suit when “citizens of a State” sue “citizens or subjects of a foreign state.” See Newman-Green,
Rule 21, governing proceedings in district courts, provides in relevant part: “Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.”
After our decision, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the nondiverse defendant and remanded the case to the District Court. Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain,
In Conolly, a party “was struck out of the bill before the cause was brought before the court.”
Anderson v. Watt,
While a partnership may be characterized as a “single artificial entity,” Carden v. Arkoma Associates,
According to the majority, it would be “unsound in principle and certain to be ignored in practice” to decline to apply the time-of-filing rule only in those cases where the flaw is drawn to a court’s attention after a full adjudication of the case, whether through trial or by a dispositive court ruling. Ante, at 575-576. Declining to apply the time-of-filing rule only in those cases, the Court suggests, can be justified only on the theory that “the party who failed to object before the end of trial [or dispositive court ruling] forfeited his objection.” Ante, at 576 (citing Kontrick v. Ryan,
In stark contrast to today’s decision, see ante, at 580-582, the Newman-Green Court said: “If the entire suit were dismissed, Newman-Green would simply refile in the District Court... and submit the discovery materials already in hand____Newman-Green should not be compelled to jump through [such] judicial hoops merely for the sake of hypertechnical jurisdictional purity.”
The statute of limitations is unlikely to bar the repeat performance given the representation of counsel for both Atlas and Dataflux that “a [Texas] savings statute, assuming Texas law applies, . . . would allow Atlas to refile suit.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 22; see id., at 31. See also App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a (District Court order staying “the statute of limitations for the claims alleged in this case”); supra, at 586. Although counsel did not provide a citation to the Texas saving statute, I note a provision of that State’s law, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.064 (1997), covering cases originally filed in the wrong forum: “The period between the date of filing an action in a trial court and the date of a second filing of the same action in a different court suspends the running of the applicable statute of limitations for the period if” the first action is dismissed for “lack of jurisdiction.” This prescription, described as “remedial in nature,” has been “liberally construed.” Vale v. Ryan,
At oral argument, counsel for Atlas and Datafiux indicated that either New York or Texas law would supply the governing limitations period. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 22,31. The Texas limitations period for contract and quantum meruit actions is four years. See W. W. Laubach Trust/The Georgetown Corp. v. The Georgetown Corp./W. W. Laubach Trust,