McClintock v. State
538 S.W.3d 542
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2017Background
- Appellant Bradley McClintock challenged admission of evidence obtained via a search warrant for his apartment's rear landing after a canine sniff by police at night.
- This Court previously held no probable cause supported the warrant under a correct application of law; the majority on rehearing created a factual-good-faith exception and declined to suppress evidence.
- Justice Alcala dissented and sought rehearing, arguing Article 38.23(b)’s good-faith exception requires a warrant be based on probable cause under correct law, so evidence should be suppressed when no such probable cause exists.
- McClintock argued the majority ignored key Texas precedent and the particular facts showing the rear landing was private curtilage (not open to the public), making warrantless intrusion unlawful even before Florida v. Jardines.
- He further argued the Court’s new “close enough” good-faith standard is overly broad and inconsistent with Davis, and alternatively asked for remand to consider whether the affidavit contained knowingly or recklessly false statements (Franks/Leon).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the rear landing was within apartment curtilage and thus required a warrant | McClintock: landing inaccessible to public, used for domestic activity, at night — clearly curtilage | State: majority treated curtilage boundary as close/contested; relied on broader curtilage analysis | Majority found good-faith exception applicable; Alcala dissented that facts and Texas precedent support curtilage and suppression |
| Whether Article 38.23(b) good-faith exception applies when officers reasonably but incorrectly rely on existing law | McClintock: statutory text requires probable cause under correct law; exception inapplicable if no valid probable cause | State: majority adopted a "close enough" reasonableness standard excusing searches when law was not "crystal clear" | Majority created a broad good-faith standard; Alcala would apply plain statutory requirement and exclude evidence absent probable cause under correct law |
| Whether the new standard improperly broadens the good-faith exception compared to Davis | McClintock: majority’s standard departs from Davis which excuses conduct consistent with binding precedent | State: majority treated reasonable reliance on magistrate and affiant as excusing suppression when law unclear | Alcala dissent: standard is unduly broad and leaves courts and police without workable guidance |
| Whether the affidavit contained knowing/reckless falsehoods requiring remand for Franks/Leon review | McClintock: affiant mischaracterized rear as public parking and staircase open to public — possibly false/reckless | State: relied on warrant and magistrate’s issuance to invoke good-faith exception | Alcala would remand to court of appeals to consider alleged material falsehoods/omissions that could defeat good-faith exception |
Key Cases Cited
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (approach to home with drug-detection dog implicates Fourth Amendment protected curtilage boundaries)
- Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) (good-faith exception applies where officers act in strict compliance with binding precedent)
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (warrant affidavit containing deliberate or reckless falsehoods must be excised; probable cause reassessed)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good-faith exception inapplicable where officers are dishonest or reckless in preparing affidavit)
- Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (officer’s implied license to approach a residence door is limited and ends when officer deviates from that purpose)
- Curry v. State, 808 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (Article 38.23(b) requires an initial determination of probable cause)
- Dunn v. State, 951 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (good-faith exception applies to technical warrant defects, not to warrants lacking valid probable cause)
- People v. Frederick, 895 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. 2017) (no general implied license to knock at someone’s door in the middle of the night)