McCarthy v. Taylor
155 N.E.3d 359
Ill.2020Background:
- Gerald McCarthy (plaintiff), a licensed attorney proceeding pro se, sued Marvin Gray (defendant), Reynolds’s attorney, alleging tortious interference and breach of fiduciary duty relating to amendments to a living trust.
- McCarthy previously lost related litigation contesting a handwritten amendment to the trust; that judgment was affirmed on appeal.
- In the 2014 action McCarthy filed a five-count complaint; the circuit court dismissed the tortious interference claim under res judicata and dismissed the fiduciary-duty claim for failure to state a claim; McCarthy amended but the amended fiduciary claim was again dismissed.
- Gray moved for sanctions under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137; the circuit court found the tortious-interference claim frivolous and awarded Rule 137 sanctions, including attorney fees, to Gray (who was representing himself).
- The appellate court affirmed dismissal and the Rule 137 violation but vacated the fee award, holding a pro se attorney cannot recover attorney fees under Rule 137; the Illinois Supreme Court granted review.
- The Illinois Supreme Court held Rule 137 authorizes awarding attorney fees as sanctions to a pro se attorney who defends against frivolous claims, reversed the appellate court on that point, and remanded to determine the proper fee amount; the remainder of the appellate judgment was affirmed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether Rule 137 allows awarding attorney fees to a pro se attorney defending a frivolous claim | McCarthy argued sanctions and fee award were improper (contested merits and procedural bases) | Gray argued Rule 137 permits sanctions including reasonable attorney fees to compensate a pro se attorney for time defending against frivolous litigation | Court: Rule 137(a) authorizes attorney-fee sanctions in favor of a pro se attorney defending frivolous claims; reversed appellate court on this point and remanded to calculate fees |
| 2. Whether the tortious-interference claim was properly dismissed | McCarthy contested dismissal (argued merits/that relitigation was not barred) | Gray argued claim was barred by res judicata and was frivolous | Court: Affirmed dismissal under res judicata and that the tortious-interference pleading was frivolous for Rule 137 purposes |
Key Cases Cited
- Hamer v. Lentz, 132 Ill. 2d 49 (1989) (held a pro se attorney could not recover attorney fees under FOIA fee-shifting provision; relied on in fee-shifting context)
- State ex rel. Schad, Diamond & Shedden, P.C. v. My Pillow, Inc., 2018 IL 122487 (2018) (reiterated that pro se attorneys do not incur compensable attorney fees under statutory fee-shifting provisions)
- Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991) (federal precedent denying fee awards to pro se attorneys under fee-shifting statutes)
- Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of Du Page, 195 Ill. 2d 257 (2001) (describes Rule 137’s purpose to curb frivolous pleadings)
- In re Estate of Wernick, 127 Ill. 2d 61 (1989) (predecessor authority on penalizing frivolous pleadings)
- Willard v. Bassett, 27 Ill. 37 (1861) (longstanding principle that an attorney cannot charge himself attorney fees for representing himself)
