MCCAMEY v. MEDICAL CENTERS OF OKLAHOMA, LLC
2016 OK CIV APP 5
| Okla. Civ. App. | 2015Background
- Thomas McCamey filed a medical negligence action arising from a 1996 surgery; the case spawned multiple filings and appeals between 2000 and 2011 and the Tulsa Regional Medical Center remained the sole defendant.
- The case endured repeated dismissals and refilings (including a dismissal tied to an affidavit requirement later declared unconstitutional in Zeier), summary judgment rulings, and a long appellate stay that prevented district-court proceedings for years.
- McCamey died August 29, 2011; his daughter Jaime was substituted as personal representative on January 28, 2013 (the opinion sometimes cites 2018/2013 dates due to transcription errors in the opinion text).
- The Medical Center moved in November 2012 to dismiss for failure to prosecute under District Court Rule 9(b); no timely response was filed; after Jaime’s substitution the district court ordered her to respond and ultimately dismissed the case for failure to prosecute (order entered January 8, 2014) and Jaime appealed.
- The appellate court reviewed dismissal under the district court’s inherent authority (Rule 9 had been stricken in Cornett) and considered: delays attributable to appeals and defendant litigation strategy, the suspension of district-court proceedings during McCamey’s death/substitution period, and whether the delay prejudiced the Medical Center.
- The Court concluded the Medical Center failed to show sufficient prejudice from the delay and that Jaime had not abandoned prosecution after substitution; the dismissal was reversed and the case remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether dismissal for failure to prosecute was proper | Jaime: she was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to litigate after substitution; many delays were not her responsibility | Medical Center: long pendency, missed pretrial deadlines, and cancelled depositions justify dismissal | Reversed — dismissal inappropriate; many delays not imputable to Jaime and defendant failed to show inequitable prejudice |
| Effect of striking District Court Rule 9 on dismissal authority | Jaime: Rule 9 no longer controls; dismissal must be evaluated under court’s inherent power | Medical Center: relied on Rule 9(b) to seek dismissal | Court: Rule 9 was stricken (Cornett); but inherent common-law authority permits dismissal and Boston’s standards govern review |
| Prejudice from delay and loss of evidence/witnesses | Jaime: defendant has access to records and did not show inability to preserve testimony; much delay resulted from appeals and defendant strategy | Medical Center: lost witnesses/employees and lost opportunity to depose decedent; unfair to proceed | Held: defendant did not demonstrate sufficient prejudice or inability to defend; delay largely caused by appeals and defendant’s own litigation choices |
| Effect of plaintiff’s death and substitution on deadlines | Jaime: after decedent’s death district court lacked authority until substitution; scheduling orders and deadlines during suspension are ineffective | Medical Center: relied on pre-substitution scheduling to show failure to prosecute | Held: court’s authority was suspended by death; deadlines before substitution could not be enforced against Jaime |
Key Cases Cited
- Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 152 P.3d 861 (Okla. 2006) (invalidated statutory affidavit requirement that had prompted dismissal)
- Boston v. Buchanan, 89 P.3d 1034 (Okla. 2003) (discusses dismissal for failure to prosecute and the court’s inherent docket-control power)
- Cornett v. Carr, 302 P.3d 769 (Okla. 2013) (struck District Court Rule 9; addressed conflict with statutory service time limits)
- Daniel v. Daniel, 42 P.3d 863 (Okla. 2001) (while an appeal is pending, the district court lacks authority to affect rights materially)
- Campbell v. Campbell, 878 P.2d 1037 (Okla. 1994) (death of a party suspends district-court proceedings until substitution)
- Baker v. Deichman, 94 P.2d 246 (Okla. 1939) (dismissal for want of prosecution is discretionary; long dormancy may justify dismissal)
