Mayuyo v. State
2017 Alas. App. LEXIS 96
| Alaska Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Mayuyo and co-defendant Balallo were tried jointly for first-degree sexual assault in Unalaska; Mayuyo appealed his conviction.
- Shortly after the alleged assault, Mayuyo told his roommate Rommel Viado words that Viado understood as referring to Balallo (reported as “We’re going to jail”).
- Prosecutor, citing Bruton concerns, obtained a court ruling allowing Viado to testify to an altered version — changing “We’re going to jail” to “I’m going to jail” — and the court barred defense cross-examination that would reveal the original meaning.
- The altered testimony was used by the prosecutor in closing to suggest Mayuyo knew he was culpable; Mayuyo was convicted and appealed based on (1) admission of the altered statement and cross-examination restriction, and (2) an alleged Rule 45 speedy-trial violation.
- The court reversed the conviction, finding the redaction materially misrepresented Mayuyo’s statement and prejudiced him; it held the speedy-trial claim failed because the trial court permissibly extended time to keep the trials joined.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mayuyo) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether allowing an altered out-of-court statement and forbidding cross-examination rendered the trial unfair | The alteration from “we’re” to “I’m” misstated Mayuyo’s words and made it appear he admitted personal guilt; barring cross-examination prevented correction of the misleading redaction | Redaction was necessary to protect Balallo’s Confrontation Clause rights under Bruton/Richardson; limiting cross-examination was required to preserve that protection | Reversed conviction: redaction materially misrepresented the original statement and prejudiced Mayuyo; error was not harmless |
| Whether trial occurred within Rule 45 speedy-trial limits after court delayed joint trial to keep co-defendants together | The 31-day continuance to September 10 pushed trial past Rule 45 expiration and requires dismissal with prejudice | The court properly considered severance, found a modest extension justified, and excluded the reasonable delay under Rule 45(d)(5) to preserve joint trial | Held against Mayuyo: court did not abuse discretion under Miller; trial occurred within Rule 45 time limits |
Key Cases Cited
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (admission of a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession that directly implicates defendant violates Confrontation Clause)
- Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) (permitting redaction of co-defendant’s statement if it no longer directly implicates others and limiting instruction is given)
- Pease v. State, 64 P.3d 316 (Alaska App. 2002) (discussing limits and risks of paraphrasing/redacting co-defendant statements under Bruton/Richardson)
- Miller v. State, 706 P.2d 336 (Alaska App. 1985) (test for tolling speedy-trial clock when co-defendants are joined: consider severance, modest extension, and importance of joint trial)
- Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998) (redaction can still violate Bruton if the alteration is obviously suggestive of a codefendant)