Matthew W. Pitts v. Amanda M. Moore
90 A.3d 1169
| Me. | 2014Background
- Moore gave birth in Nov. 2009 after an on‑again/off‑again relationship with Pitts; Pitts was listed as father on the birth certificate and the child took his surname.
- Pitts lived with Moore and the child from Nov. 2009 to Nov. 2010 (about 11 months); Moore was primary caregiver; Pitts was primary wage earner early on and participated in some caretaking and frequent contact after separation.
- Paternity testing established Hague as the biological father; Hague has had minimal contact and wants to assume a parenting role; Moore opposes Pitts’s continued contact.
- Pitts sued for parental rights as a de facto parent; the District Court found (on substantial evidence) Pitts had made an unequivocal permanent commitment and awarded continued contact (not full decisionmaking or support obligations).
- The Supreme Judicial Court vacated and remanded, announcing a clarified two‑part standard for de facto parenthood and procedural safeguards, and requiring reconsideration under that standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Pitts) | Defendant's Argument (Moore) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard to establish de facto parenthood | Pitts: he undertook a parental role warranting de facto status | Moore: his role was limited, inconsistent, not daily caretaking | Court: two‑part test — (1) permanent, unequivocal, committed, responsible parental role (per E.N.O./Mass. elements); (2) exceptional circumstances (harm to child if removed) proven by clear and convincing evidence |
| Required showing to override fit parent's rights | Pitts: no separate showing of harm should be required beyond parental‑role proof | Moore: must show substantial harm or trauma to child if relationship severed | Court: constitutional strict scrutiny requires exceptional circumstances; petitioner must show harm to the child if de facto status is not recognized (though plurality frames harm as substantial negative effect rather than Title 22 "jeopardy") |
| Burden/quantum of proof | Pitts: contended existing record sufficed | Moore: high burden protects parental liberty | Court: standing prima facie showing to litigate; ultimate de facto status must be proved by clear and convincing evidence; if declared de facto parent, allocation of parental rights/responsibilities follows ordinary 19‑A process by preponderance |
| Consequences/remedy if de facto parent is found | Pitts: sought parental rights/contact equal to parent | Moore: objected; feared intrusion on her parental autonomy and Hague’s role | Court: de facto parent stands on legal parity with parents — court must then allocate rights/responsibilities under 19‑A (including potential child support); because remedy is lifelong, courts must proceed cautiously and apply the announced procedure |
Key Cases Cited
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (plurality) (parents have fundamental liberty interest; best‑interest standard alone insufficient to override parental objections)
- Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000) (discussing limits on state intrusion and recognition of de facto/parent‑like third‑party relationships)
- Philbrook v. Theriault, 957 A.2d 74 (Me. 2008) (de facto parent doctrine of limited application; must have undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, responsible parental role)
- C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146 (Me. 2004) (discussed de facto parenthood and characterized parent‑like role as permanent, unequivocal, committed, responsible)
- Stitham v. Henderson, 768 A.2d 598 (Me. 2001) (recognition that a parental relationship can develop over time and support third‑party rights)
- In re Jazmine L., 861 A.2d 1277 (Me. 2004) (harm to the child can justify state interference, as in child protection contexts)
- Merchant v. Bussell, 27 A.2d 816 (Me. 1942) (parental custody is a fundamental right to be limited only for "urgent reasons")