Matthew Tarabochia v. Mickey Adkins
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17422
9th Cir.2014Background
- On March 23, 2007 WDFW officers (Cenci and Chadwick) stopped the Tarabochias’ pickup on a public highway while the truck carried a tote of recently caught salmon; officers had no reasonable suspicion the fish were illegally taken.
- Officers followed the truck from a nearby field-inspection area after a reporter observed the fish being loaded; officers chose to perform a roving highway stop rather than inspect at the dock or at a checkpoint.
- The Tarabochias initially refused to exit until local sheriff’s deputies arrived; officers inspected the salmon and found no violations; Matthew and Joseph were arrested and later charged, then state charges were dismissed as unlawful.
- Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Fourth Amendment (unreasonable search and seizure) and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violations; the district court granted qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim and later dismissed the due process claim as time-barred.
- The Ninth Circuit held the roving suspicionless stop and subsequent search of the truck violated the Fourth Amendment and that the right was clearly established by prior precedent, reversed qualified immunity for Cenci and Chadwick, affirmed dismissal of two other officers, and affirmed dismissal of the Fourteenth Amendment claim as untimely.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a suspicionless roving stop/search of commercial fishers on a public highway violates the Fourth Amendment | The stop/search was an unreasonable seizure because officers lacked individualized reasonable suspicion and no statutory authority justified a warrantless roving automobile inspection | WDFW officers argued commercial fishers are subject to administrative inspections and knowledge that plaintiffs had been fishing authorized a roving stop without suspicion | The stop/search violated the Fourth Amendment because officers had no reasonable suspicion and no statute or regulatory scheme authorized suspicionless roving automobile searches under the administrative-search exception |
| Whether Washington statutes cited by officers brought the stop within the administrative-search exception | Tarabochia argued statutes cited did not explicitly authorize automobile stops or limit officer discretion as required for administrative searches | Defendants relied on Wash. Rev. Code §§ 77.15.080(1) and 77.15.096 to justify the stop as an administrative inspection of a pervasively regulated industry | Court rejected defendants’ statutory justification: the statutes neither mention automobile stops nor provide the specific, limiting standards required to permit suspicionless roving stops |
| Whether the Tarabochias’ Fourth Amendment right was clearly established as of March 23, 2007 | Tarabochia argued binding precedent put officers on notice that suspicionless roving stops required reasonable suspicion | Defendants argued distinctions in facts (knowledge of recent fishing) made prior cases inapplicable and thus the right was not clearly established | Court held the right was clearly established by binding precedent (e.g., Munoz, Prouse, Brignoni-Ponce) and a reasonable officer would have known the stop was unlawful; qualified immunity reversed for Cenci and Chadwick |
| Whether the March 23, 2007 incident may support a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim and toll earlier incidents | Tarabochia sought to rely on continuing violations and other pre-2007 incidents to sustain a due process claim | Defendants argued the actionable event is a Fourth Amendment seizure and prior incidents are time-barred; district court treated the claim as untimely | Court held the March 23 stop is governed by the Fourth Amendment (seizure) not the Fourteenth substantive due process clause; the due process claim was properly dismissed as untimely |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Munoz, 701 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (roving stop by wildlife officers requires individualized suspicion)
- Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (random stops of motorists are unreasonable absent at least reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (roving stops require reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity)
- Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (administrative-search exception requires specific, limited statutory/regulatory standards)
- Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (warrantless administrative inspections permissible only in carefully defined circumstances)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (traffic stops constitute Fourth Amendment seizures)
- Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (statutory schemes lacking sufficient procedural limits do not satisfy administrative-search exception)
- United States v. Raub, 637 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1980) (examples and limits of administrative-search exception in fisheries context)