Matthew Richardson v. United States, 890 F.3d 616

In 2012 Matthew Richardson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and was sentenced to 180 months under the ACCA based on three prior Georgia burglary convictions.
Richardson later filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion arguing that, in light of Johnson and subsequent categorical-analysis decisions, his Georgia burglary convictions no longer qualify as ACCA "violent felonies."
The central legal question was whether the Georgia burglary statute is divisible as to the types/locations listed (e.g., dwelling, building, vehicle, aircraft), permitting the modified categorical approach, or indivisible (means), requiring the categorical approach.
Georgia law was ambiguous on whether the statute’s listed locations are separate elements or merely alternative means; thus the Sixth Circuit performed a limited Mathis "peek" at Richardson’s state indictments.
Each of Richardson’s indictments expressly charged burglary of either a "dwelling house" or a specific "building," and the court concluded those charging documents established the element needed for generic burglary.
The Sixth Circuit held Richardson’s prior Georgia burglary convictions qualify as generic burglary under Taylor/Mathis, so his ACCA designation and 180-month sentence were proper; the district court’s denial of § 2255 relief was affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Georgia burglary statute is divisible (elements vs. means)	Richardson: statute’s locational list is merely illustrative/means, so statute is indivisible	Government: statute’s disjunctive locational alternatives and Georgia practice of specifying location in indictments show divisibility	Court: Georgia law ambiguous; a Mathis "peek" at indictments shows prosecutors selected a single locational alternative, so statute is divisible
Whether Richardson’s prior convictions qualify as generic burglary under the ACCA	Richardson: convictions may be non-generic (e.g., vehicle/aircraft), so they should not count as ACCA predicates	Government: indictments charged dwelling/building specifically, matching generic burglary elements	Court: Indictments charged dwelling or building; under the modified categorical approach the convictions match Taylor’s generic burglary and qualify as ACCA predicates
Whether a Mathis "peek" impermissibly produces unlawful judicial factfinding	Richardson: the peek collapses the categorical/modified-categorical distinction and improperly relies on facts	Government: Mathis authorizes a limited peek when state law is unclear to determine elements vs means	Held: Mathis peek is permitted for the limited purpose here; using indictments to resolve divisibility/comparison was lawful

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (defining "generic burglary" for ACCA)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (elements vs. means framework; limited "peek" at conviction record)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (distinguishing categorical and modified categorical approaches)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (documents permissible for modified categorical inquiry)
United States v. Gundy, 842 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. decision finding Georgia statute divisible; analyzed by Sixth Circuit)
United States v. Ritchey, 840 F.3d 310 (discussing Mathis tools for elements/means determination)