56 F. Supp. 3d 535
S.D.N.Y.2014Background
- Martinez-Done, a 60s-year-old lawful permanent resident since 1983, was taken into ICE custody on March 26, 2014 while serving five years of probation for drug offenses.
- Martinez’s prior criminal history includes a 2003 conviction for criminal possession of cocaine (later modified) and a 2012 conviction for possession of cocaine, both grounds for removal.
- ICE determined Martinez fell within mandatory detention under INA §236(c) due to the offenses, and he has remained detained since March 2014.
- Martinez seeks an individualized bond hearing under INA §236(a) arguing that §236(c) either does not apply or must be limited by timeliness, and raises constitutional due process challenges.
- The court must address whether “release” and the timing of custody under §236(c) support mandatory detention or require an individualized bond determination under §236(a).
- The petition proceeds as a habeas corpus challenge to detention and requests a bond hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does §236(c)(1) apply if Martinez was never custodially sentenced? | Martinez contends no custodial release occurred, so §236(c) does not apply. | The government argues that “release” can include release after arrest, satisfying §236(c) regardless of custodial sentence. | Martinez is released under §236(c) but not taken into custody when released; §236(c) construction requires time-limiting analysis. |
| What is the proper meaning of “when” in §236(c)(1)—duty-triggering or time-limiting? | Martinez supports a time-limiting construction, requiring prompt detention after release. | The government advocates a duty-triggering construction, allowing indefinite detention once triggered. | Time-limiting construction adopted; delay nearly ten years is unreasonable. |
| Should Chevron deference apply to the BIA’s interpretation of “release”? | Chevron should apply if the BIA’s interpretation is ambiguous and reasonable. | Chevron deference applies to reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes. | Chevron deference not warranted here; BIA interpretation not controlling. |
| Does the delay in custody violate due process under Zadvydas/Demore, given pre-removal detention? | Prolonged pre-removal detention with no imminent removal risks violates due process. | Pre-removal detention is standard and need not be subject to six-month limits; Demore allows longer detention. | Detention beyond six months under §236(c) without timely review raises due process concerns; bond hearing granted. |
Key Cases Cited
- Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (U.S. 2003) (pre-removal detention and due process considerations)
- Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (U.S. 2001) (six-month post-removal detention limit; indefinite detention concerns)
- Straker v. Jones, 986 F. Supp. 2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discusses release timing and BIA deference in 236(c) context)
- Louisaire v. Muller, 758 F. Supp. 2d 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (discusses scope of §236(c) and timing issues)
- Araujo-Cortes v. Shanahan, 35 F. Supp. 3d 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ( Third-party district court addressing 236(c) interpretations)