Martin v. United States, 974 F.3d 124

Background

Jerrod Martin pleaded guilty (2005) to conspiracy to distribute ≥50g crack (21 U.S.C. §846/§841) and a §924(c) firearms offense; in 2007 he received 150 months (drug) + consecutive 60 months (gun).
While serving those terms Martin committed in‑prison offenses and later received two consecutive 12‑month sentences; by late 2018 BOP credited him with completing the 2007 terms.
After the First Step Act (2018) Martin moved (Mar 2019) under §404(b) to reduce his drug sentence (covered offense) to 60 months so the aggregate would yield immediate release; district court initially reduced to time served, then vacated that order after BOP explained the later 12‑month sentences kept him confined and denied relief as moot.
Martin sought reconsideration, arguing BOP aggregates consecutive sentences administratively and a reduced drug sentence would generate credit toward the later sentences and effectuate release; the district court rejected that view and affirmed denial.
On appeal the Second Circuit held Martin was eligible as to the covered‑offense question but rejected his request because the First Step Act does not authorize reducing a sentence that has already been served and administrative aggregation does not authorize retroactive relief; the motion was therefore moot.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Martin)	Defendant's Argument (United States)	Held
Eligibility under First Step Act (is the drug count a "covered offense"?)	Conviction statute (50g+ count) is a covered offense and thus Martin is eligible	Gov: Martin admitted responsibility for 1.5 kg, so Fair Sentencing Act would not change his penalty	Held: Eligible — statute under which convicted (not actual conduct quantity) controls (following Johnson)
May court reduce a sentence that has already been fully served under §404(b)?	Act contains no express temporal bar; court may impose a reduced sentence even if defendant already served it	Act permits imposing a reduced sentence only where it can meaningfully apply; cannot impose a reduced term for a sentence already completed	Held: No — §404(b) authorizes imposing a reduced sentence prospectively for a covered offense being served; it does not authorize retroactive modification of a sentence already fully served
Does BOP administrative aggregation (§3584(c)) allow courts to treat multiple judgments as one for resentencing/credit?	BOP treats consecutive terms as one aggregate for custody calculations; court should do likewise so a reduced covered sentence yields credit to later terms	Aggregation is administrative only and does not authorize courts to modify separate judgments or grant retroactive relief	Held: No — §3584(c) governs administrative treatment only and does not permit courts to modify already‑served components of separate judgments
Mootness / redressability — would a favorable First Step Act decision redress Martin's injury (continued incarceration)?	Reducing the covered sentence to time served would create "overserved" time that BOP would credit to the later sentences and produce immediate release	Because the covered‑offense sentence already was completed, court cannot grant relief under §404(b); Martin shows no collateral consequence from the covered sentence that a ruling would redress	Held: Motion is moot — no redressable injury under the First Step Act because the covered sentence has been fully served and no collateral consequences were shown

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Johnson, 961 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2020) (statute of conviction, not actual conduct quantity, determines a "covered offense" under First Step Act)
United States v. Holloway, 956 F.3d 660 (2d Cir. 2020) (First Step Act motions analyzed under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(B); such motions are not governed by §1B1.10 policy statements)
United States v. Llewlyn, 879 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) (reduction of an already‑served sentence is moot where defendant remains confined on later consecutive sentences)
Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (U.S. 2012) (Fair Sentencing Act effective‑date and nonretroactivity principles)
United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (U.S. 1992) (BOP administers federal sentences and credit rules)
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (U.S. 2010) (statutory exceptions to finality of judgments govern sentence modification)
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (U.S. 1969) (crediting time served when a conviction is vacated to avoid multiple punishment/double jeopardy problems)
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1998) (release from custody generally moots challenge absent collateral consequences)