33 F.4th 331
6th Cir.2022Background
- In 2011 Portis and Thompson were indicted for Hobbs Act robberies, Hobbs Act conspiracy, and two § 924(c) firearm counts; each pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act conspiracy (count 1) and one § 924(c) count in exchange for dropped counts.
- Their written plea agreements expressly and voluntarily waived appeals and collateral attacks (including § 2255), but reserved the right to appeal sentences that exceeded "the statutory maximum" and to raise ineffective-assistance or prosecutorial-misconduct claims.
- In 2019 the Supreme Court decided United States v. Davis, invalidating § 924(c)’s residual clause; the Sixth Circuit held Davis retroactive and later held Hobbs Act conspiracy is not a § 924(c) predicate (Ledbetter).
- Portis and Thompson filed § 2255 motions arguing their § 924(c) convictions rested on conspiracy (now not a crime of violence) and should be vacated; the government invoked their § 2255 waivers and argued the predicate was the robberies.
- The district court denied relief on the merits and did not enforce the waivers; the government appealed; the Sixth Circuit majority enforced the plea waivers and dismissed the appeals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enforceability of § 2255 waiver after a later change in law (Davis) | Portis/Thompson: Davis frees them to collaterally attack § 924(c) convictions despite waiver because the underlying offense no longer qualifies as a crime of violence. | Government: Waivers of collateral attacks are enforceable if knowing and voluntary even after later adverse changes in law. | Waiver enforced; subsequent changes in law do not automatically void a knowing, voluntary collateral-attack waiver. |
| Meaning of the plea carve-out for sentences exceeding "the statutory maximum" | Portis/Thompson: Davis means they were convicted of conduct that cannot sustain a § 924(c) conviction, so their sentences exceed the statutory maximum. | Government: "Statutory maximum" carve-out refers to the law as it existed at sentencing, not to future changes. | Carve-out limited to the statutory maximum at the time of sentencing; does not cover later changes in law. |
| Effect of certificate of appealability (COA) language on scope of appellate review | Portis/Thompson: COA did not reference the waiver, limiting appellate review to merits. | Government: Court may affirm on any ground supported by the record; COA requirement is asymmetric and applies to petitioners. | COA does not prevent appellate court from enforcing the clear collateral-attack waiver. |
| Miscarriage-of-justice exception to waiver (i.e., void convictions/sentences) | Portis/Thompson / Dissent: A later change that renders a conviction unconstitutional or a sentence unauthorized should permit bypassing a waiver to avoid manifest injustice. | Majority: Circuit has not adopted a free-standing miscarriage-of-justice exception that overrides a knowing, voluntary waiver; defendants did not argue such an exception below. | Majority declines to apply a broad miscarriage-of-justice exception; dissent would reach the merits and consider it. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (invalidated § 924(c) residual clause; narrowed § 924(c) predicates)
- Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (guilty pleas/waivers valid if knowing and voluntary despite later changes in law)
- United States v. Bradley, 400 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2005) (future changes in law do not automatically void a valid plea waiver)
- United States v. Ledbetter, 929 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2019) (Hobbs Act conspiracy is not a § 924(c) crime-of-violence predicate)
- United States v. Luebbert, 411 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2005) ("statutory maximum" in waivers construed as of the time of sentencing)
- Vowell v. United States, 938 F.3d 260 (6th Cir. 2019) (defendant may challenge sentence as statutorily excessive notwithstanding a knowing waiver when a change in law renders the sentence unauthorized)
- Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (guilty plea may be invalid if defendant did not understand the true nature of the charge; actual-innocence gateway to overcome procedural default)
- In re Franklin, 950 F.3d 909 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (Davis held to apply retroactively)