Mark Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Incorporated
907 F.3d 323
| 5th Cir. | 2018Background
- CSL Plasma operates plasma collection centers that pay members of the public to undergo medical screening and have plasma extracted; extracted plasma is retained and sold by CSL.
- Mark Silguero (uses a cane; had prior donations) and Amy Wolfe (anxiety; uses a service animal) were deferred from donating under CSL policies that the plaintiffs say implicate their disabilities.
- Plaintiffs sued under Title III of the ADA and Chapter 121 of the Texas Human Resources Code (THRC); district court granted summary judgment to CSL, finding CSL not a "public accommodation" (ADA) or a "public facility" (THRC).
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed as to the ADA: it construed the statutory term "service establishment" and concluded plasma centers do not provide a "service" that benefits the donor, but instead pay donors for their labor and retain the plasma.
- The court declined to resolve the state-law issue and certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Texas about whether such centers are "public facilities" under the THRC and, if so, what legal standard governs medically based rejections of disabled persons.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a plasma collection center is a "service establishment" (and thus a "public accommodation") under 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) | Plasma collection centers perform medical extraction and related activities that assist or benefit donors and thus qualify as "service establishments." | CSL pays donors and retains the plasma; the act benefits CSL commercially, not the donor, so the center does not provide a "service" to customers. | Held: Not a "service establishment." Donation benefits the center, not donors; payment to donors indicates an employment/compensation relationship relevant to ADA structure. |
| Whether the ADA catchall term "other service establishment" should be read broadly to include plasma centers | Catchall is broad; statutory purpose favors liberal construction to cover such places. | Ejusdem generis and textual reading limit the catchall to establishments that perform acts that clearly benefit the individual customer; plasma centers do not fit. | Held: Apply ejusdem generis; list of examples indicates services that benefit customers, so plasma centers are outside the catchall. |
| Whether the direction of payment is relevant to "service" status | Irrelevant; a service can exist even if the establishment pays the individual (payment does not negate benefit). | Payment to donors shows donors are providing labor for the center, resembling employment/contract work, not customers receiving a service. | Held: Direction of payment is highly relevant; payment to donors supports conclusion that the center is not providing a service to the donor. |
| Applicability of Texas Human Resources Code § 121.003(a) to plasma centers (Certified to Texas Supreme Court) | (Implicit) THRC may cover similar discrimination even if ADA does not. | State-law definition differs from ADA; federal court should seek state guidance. | Held: Question certified to the Supreme Court of Texas: (1) Is such a plasma center a "public facility" under THRC? (2) If so, what standard governs rejection based on health concerns tied to disability? |
Key Cases Cited
- Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., 828 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2016) (definition of "service establishment" and treatment of plasma centers under Title III)
- PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (interpretation of "public accommodation" and liberal construction doctrine)
- Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers’ Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117 (1991) (use of ejusdem generis canon)
- Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142 (2007) (textual limits on "liberal" statutory construction)
- Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (distinguishing employment coverage under ADA Title I)
- Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (limits on deference to agency litigation positions)
- Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (respectful weight to agency interpretations based on persuasiveness)
- Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617 (2018) (statutory ambiguity and use of legislative history)
- Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2017) (standard of review for summary judgment on appeal)