Mark R. Zweber v. Credit River Township
882 N.W.2d 605
Minn.2016Background
- Mark Zweber owned undeveloped land in Credit River Township (Scott County) and sought plat approvals (2006 and a 2008 re-subdivision).
- County imposed conditions (including a barricade) and later denied the re-subdivision; the Minnesota Court of Appeals granted certiorari in 2010 and ordered approval, but County did not act for years.
- Zweber sued in Scott County District Court in 2013 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a regulatory taking (seeking damages and mandamus to start inverse-condemnation) and Equal Protection violations based on disparate treatment.
- The district court held it had jurisdiction over the § 1983 claims; the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, ruling certiorari review was the exclusive remedy because the County’s actions were quasi‑judicial and the constitutional claims were not “separate and distinct.”
- The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review and reversed the court of appeals, holding district courts may hear § 1983 takings and equal protection claims so long as adjudication does not require inquiry into the validity of the quasi‑judicial decision.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court has subject‑matter jurisdiction over § 1983 takings and equal‑protection claims arising from local quasi‑judicial decisions | Zweber: § 1983 provides an independent statutory remedy in district court for constitutional violations (damages and mandamus); claims do not seek to undo the County’s decisions | County: Exclusive remedy is certiorari to Court of Appeals because County’s plat decisions were quasi‑judicial and constitutional claims are not separate from those decisions | Court: District court has jurisdiction when resolution of the claim does not require inquiry into the validity (reasonableness/arbitrariness) of the quasi‑judicial decision; reversed court of appeals |
| Whether the appellate “separate and distinct” test (Meldahl) governs jurisdiction over derivative constitutional claims | Zweber: Not required; focus should be whether adjudication requires reviewing validity of the decision | County: Constitutional claims are intertwined with the quasi‑judicial decisions and thus must be raised via certiorari | Court: Declines to adopt Meldahl test; instead applies County of Washington rule: certiorari exclusive only when claim requires review of validity of quasi‑judicial decision |
Key Cases Cited
- County of Washington v. City of Oak Park Heights, 818 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 2012) (certiorari is exclusive when a claim requires inquiry into the validity of a municipality’s quasi‑judicial decision)
- Dokmo v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 459 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. 1990) (certiorari is the proper route for review of certain school board quasi‑judicial decisions; declaratory judgment may be unavailable)
- Willis v. County of Sherburne, 555 N.W.2d 277 (Minn. 1996) (distinguishing claims that require review of termination decision from defamation claim that did not; statutory remedies affect forum)
- Williams v. Smith, 820 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. 2012) (tort claims ‘‘separate and distinct’’ from an employment decision and not implicating the discretionary decision are not subject to certiorari)
- Dietz v. Dodge County, 487 N.W.2d 237 (Minn. 1992) (claims seeking reinstatement required certiorari because adjudication would depend on propriety of the county’s termination decision)
- Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles County Bd. of Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566 (Minn. 2000) (defines quasi‑judicial decisions as affecting a limited number of individuals analogous to court proceedings)
- Nelson v. Schlener, 859 N.W.2d 288 (Minn. 2015) (explaining limits of certiorari review and that appellate courts do not weigh evidence as a finder of fact)
- Moberg v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 281, 336 N.W.2d 510 (Minn. 1983) (certiorari rather than declaratory judgment is proper to challenge certain school board decisions)
- Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, 708 N.W.2d 162 (Minn. 2006) (district court review via declaratory judgment generally proper for zoning matters when statutory review exists)
- Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (U.S. 1985) (ripeness principle for § 1983 takings claims requiring exhaustion of state procedures)