Charlotte E. DIETZ, Respondent, v. DODGE COUNTY, et al., Petitioners, Appellants.
No. C9-91-73
Supreme Court of Minnesota
July 31, 1992
487 N.W.2d 237
SO ORDERED.
Thomas P. Kelly, Brown & Bins, Rochester, for appellants.
Charles F. Angel, O‘Brien, Ehrick, Wolf, Deaner & Moss, Rochester, for respondent.
COYNE, Justice.
On petition of Dodge County and its board of commissioners, we consider only the question of whether, consistent with the policies announced in our decision in Dokmo v. Independent School District No. 11, 459 N.W.2d 671 (Minn.1990), a petition for a writ of certiorari provides the exclusive means by which an employee can secure judicial review of the county‘s employment termination decision. The court of appeals held that the employee was not limited to the review afforded on certiorari, allowing thereby the maintenance by Charlotte Dietz of her action for wrongful termination. Dietz v. Dodge County, 472 N.W.2d 683 (Minn.App.1991). We reverse and reinstate the judgment of dismissal entered in the trial court.
Upon completion of the interview process, Dietz was informed in writing that she had been selected as the nursing home administrator to commence work in January 1980 and was provided a copy of the home‘s personnel policies. In addition, there existed nursing home by-laws which purported to address specifically the terms of the administrator‘s employment as follows: “The Dodge County Fairview Nursing Home Board appoints the Administrator who serves an indefinite term. The Administrator may be terminated upon a 30 day written notice by either the Board of Directors or the Administrator.” Dietz was aware of both documents early in her employment.
As demonstrated in summarized accounts of county board meetings, dissatisfaction with Dietz‘s performance began to surface in August 1983. On the occasion of the August 30, 1983 county board meeting, eight nursing home employees appeared and voiced dissatisfaction with Dietz. The following day two county commissioners presented Dietz with a letter, requesting that she tender her resignation within seven days and informing her that, failing that, the board would terminate her employment. The letter indicated that the board had identified managerial problems and low employee morale as the basis for its action. Thereafter, Dietz personally and by counsel, unsuccessfully requested information and an opportunity to respond. At a September 8, 1983 county board meeting, the board voted unanimously to terminate Dietz‘s employment effective September 30, 1983. No hearing was held.
On March 27, 1984 Dietz commenced an action for wrongful discharge against the county and each commissioner serving on the board during the fall of 1983. Because she did not seek review by certiorari within 60 days of notice of her termination, the county moved the district court to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion was denied at that time. Dietz later amended her complaint, alleging unlawful discrimination and seeking compensatory damages, reinstatement, and damages for mental anguish. After Dietz deposed the chairperson of the county board, the district court granted the county‘s motion to limit discovery in accordance with the administrative nature of the dismissal action.1 On January 9, 1990 the district court denied the county‘s motion for summary judgment on the wrongful termination claim. It did, however, grant the county‘s motion for summary judgment on the unlawful discrimination claim; no appeal was taken from this judgment. Soon thereafter the county made three additional motions: (1) a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute; (2) a motion in limine to prevent Dietz from introducing certain evidence; and (3) a renewal of its earlier motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. At this time, the district court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Dietz‘s failure to obtain review by writ of certiorari within 60 days of notice of her dismissal was fatal. It did not rule on the other pending motions, concluding that they were rendered moot by operation of the jurisdictional dismissal.
We reiterated these principles most recently in Dokmo v. Independent School Dist. No. 11, 459 N.W.2d 671 (Minn.1990). In Dokmo, a teacher sought a judicial declaration that her termination was improper and that she was entitled to reinstatement. We held that a declaratory judgment action to judicially review the school board‘s adverse determination was inappropriate because such potentially searching review would unconstitutionally invade the school board‘s decision-making processes and impermissibly upset efficiency concerns. Id. at 674-77. We concluded that judicial review, if available, had to be obtained by petition for a writ of certiorari. There was nothing particularly novel in this analysis and, historically, it has never inhered in school board cases alone.3 Rather, the holding in Dokmo arose from a judicial recognition of separation of power concerns and a deference accorded a school board by virtue of the fact that such a body is a derivative of the executive branch of government. Thus, while the disposition of this matter is informed by and consistent with Dokmo, it does not depend on it.
For several reasons we conclude that writ of certiorari was the only mechanism by which Dietz could obtain judicial review of the county‘s decision to terminate her employment. First, Dietz was not entitled by statute to appeal the decision by traditional means. The county, not having statewide jurisdiction, is not subject to the
Second, because of the nature of the board‘s action upon which this dispute centers, the standard of review on certiorari is more appropriate to a review of the exercise of the board‘s discretion than would be the standard of review of an independent
Third, whether she entered into a “for cause” or “at will” employment contract is a question of law that is appropriate for review on certiorari.4 While the record in this case plainly falls short of a record generated in formal judicial proceedings, it is certainly adequate to ascertain the type of employment contract to which Dietz was a party.
Finally, in terms of practicality and cost, this case vividly illustrates the inappropriateness of permitting Dietz to obtain judicial review of the county‘s termination decision by way of a wrongful termination claim. A six-year statute of limitations, extensive discovery procedures, and a panoply of rules attend her cause of action. As a direct consequence, her wrongful termination claim remains unresolved and largely unexamined by the courts almost nine years after the termination of her employment. In stark contrast, the writ of certiorari must issue within 60 days of notice of the adverse determination, contemplates none of the procedural rules that accompany a civil action, and affords direct review by the court of appeals. Dokmo, 459 N.W.2d at 677. Thus, certiorari ensures expedient review of a fresh record.5 The record of this case is anything but fresh: evidence has grown stale, witnesses have moved, and one of the named county commissioners has died. This delay in the assessment of the merits of the case is particularly troublesome in light of the fact that Dietz seeks compensatory damages, reinstatement, and damages for mental anguish. At this late date, we think it both unnecessary and improper to expose an executive body to such potentially extensive liability for exercising a discretionary administrative decision.
Our conclusion that Dietz was obliged to seek judicial review of the county‘s termination decision by writ of certiorari stems not from slavish adherence to hypertechni-
Reversed.
GARDEBRING, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Although I agree that administrative decisions made by the executive branch of government are entitled to deference, I believe the decision in this case exalts form over substance and effectively denies persons in appellant‘s position any meaningful appellate review. Contrary to the majority‘s position, efficiency is not served by the harsh 60-day deadline to petition for certiorari, especially on the apparent facts1 of this case.
Historically, review by writ of certiorari is limited to looking at the legal import of the facts in the record and determining whether there was a reasonable basis for the lower tribunal‘s decision. Riesenfeld, Bauman, and Maxwell, Judicial Control of Administrative Action by Means of the Extraordinary Remedies in Minnesota, 33 Minn.L.Rev. 685, 707-10 (1952). What that means is that in reviewing the quasi-judicial decisions of government agencies, courts will defer to decisions that are based on evidence in the record. But there are some serious problems with application of that principle to this case. The appellant has alleged that she had an employment contract which could be terminated only for cause. Had appellant appealed her discharge by petitioning for a writ of certiorari, our job would have been to look at the legal import of the facts in the record and determine whether there was a reasonable basis for the lower tribunal‘s decision that appellant‘s discharge was not contrary to terms of any contract she had. But we would not have been able to perform that task because the record is inadequately developed.
To engage in a proper review, this court would have needed to evaluate the facts underlying the county‘s action and determine whether appellant had a contract and whether it was breached. There is no reason why our duty of deference to a co-equal branch of government precludes us from deciding such questions. It is not our role to second-guess the county‘s decision, so long as there is evidence in the record to support it. But at the same time, it is entirely inappropriate for us to approve of contracts being breached, whether by a government agency or anyone else.
The majority‘s analysis takes deference to an unreasonable extreme. In effect, the county has been able to shield its action from meaningful review by failing to make an adequate record. We are forced to take the county‘s word that there was a reasonable legal basis for its action. This abdication of our responsibility to deferentially but meaningfully review government action against an individual means we are blindly deferring to an agency that acted both as prosecutor and judge, and leaving the potentially injured individual with no remedy against the tyranny of that agency.
Under the majority‘s reasoning, even if appellant had met the strict deadline for review by certiorari, we would be forced to reach the same result and uphold her discharge. That is because there would have been virtually no record for us to review, deferentially or otherwise. With the trial court record wiped out for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the county board record consists of some letters and some abbreviated minutes of board meetings.
In a sense, appellant did this court‘s job for us by instituting her action in district court so that some kind of record would be
While the majority says its holding does not depend on Dokmo v. Independent School Dist. No. 11, 459 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. 1990), that case is our most recent iteration of the notion that we will be deferential to quasi-judicial decision making of executive bodies. Dokmo rejected the notion that a hearing is necessary to create an adequate record, but said “it is the [executive body‘s] obligation to make a sufficient record to prove its actions were justified.” Id. at 676 (emphasis in original). This standard of sufficiency has simply not been met here where the county/nursing home board minutes tell us about as much as would a soliloquy by Marcel Marceau.
Under today‘s decision, a public body is rewarded for failing to keep detailed records of its actions. I would hold that where a public body fails to maintain detailed records of how and why it discharged an employee, the employee may elect to pursue her remedy with an action in district court. In this case, with no meaningful record available, appellant acted quite reasonably in commencing her action in district court, even if she then delayed prosecuting it. Because I also agree with the court of appeals that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding appellant‘s contract claim, I would remand the case for trial.
WAHL, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Gardebring.