MENDOTA GOLF, LLP, Respondent, v. CITY OF MENDOTA HEIGHTS, Appellant.
No. A04-206.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Jan. 10, 2006.
708 N.W.2d 162
S. Todd Rapp, Eagan, for respondent.
OPINION
ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice.
Appellant City of Mendota Heights appeals from a Minnesota Court of Appeals decision affirming a Dakota County District Court writ of mandamus, which compels the city to amend its comprehensive plan to allow respondent Mendota Golf, LLP, to turn its golf course property into a residential development. We reverse, concluding that the city did not have a clear duty to amend its comprehensive plan and the city had a rational basis to deny Mendota Golf‘s proposed amendment to the comprehensive plan. However, because we conclude that there is a conflict between the city‘s comprehensive plan and the city‘s zoning ordinance that has not been reconciled as required by
Mendota Golf, LLP, owns a 17.5-acre tract of real property located at the intersection of Dodd Road and Bachelor Avenue in the City of Mendota Heights. Since the early 1960s, the property has been used and operated as a nine-hole par 3 golf course. At present, the character of the neighborhood surrounding the property is residential.
When Mendota Golf acquired the property in January 1995, the city‘s zoning ordinance designated the property as Residential (R-1 One-Family Residential), while the city‘s comprehensive plan designated the property as “Golf Course” (GC). At that time, the Metropolitan Land Planning Act (MLPA) provided that a city‘s zoning designations took priority over conflicting comprehensive plan designations.
During the 1995 legislative session, the legislature amended the MLPA by adding a provision directing local government units to reconcile conflicts between comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances. Act of May 17, 1995, ch. 176, § 5, 1995 Minn. Laws 593, 594-95. The amended statute, which became effective on August 1, 1995, provides in relevant part:
If the comprehensive municipal plan is in conflict with the zoning ordinance, the zoning ordinance shall be brought into conformance with the plan by local government units in conjunction with the review, and, if necessary, amendment of its comprehensive plan required under
section 473.864, subdivision 2.1 After August 1, 1995, a local government unit shall not adopt any fiscal device or official control which is in conflict with its comprehensive plan, including any amendment to the plan, or which permits activity in conflict with metropolitan system plans * * *.
Mendota Heights asserts that it “has a long history and commitment to planning which has resulted in unique residential living environments and business centers.” The city adopted its first land use plan in 1960, even before the MLPA went into effect and required communities to do such planning. The 1960 plan focused on “high quality residential neighborhoods, open space and parks and well-planned commercial and industrial areas.”
In 1979, the city adopted a comprehensive plan that incorporated regional policies and guidelines under the MLPA. The 1979 comprehensive plan placed the subject property in the land use category “(GC) Golf Course” and “guided” the land on all sides of the property as Low-Density Residential. At the time, single-family residential development surrounded the property to the north, south, and west, but the land across Dodd Road to the east was undeveloped.
The city‘s 1979 comprehensive plan also set forth certain planning goals, which were reaffirmed in 2002. The goals from the 1979 plan that are most relevant to this case are: (1) maintaining the community character and identity; (2) resisting the deterioration of the environment; (3) maintaining the existing residential areas; (4) providing the optimum amount of active and passive open space for the enjoyment of all of the city‘s residents; (5) encouraging the preservation of open space in the community by private property owners in a manner consistent with the comprehensive plan; (6) encouraging planned usage of existing private recreational facilities in order to avoid duplication and promote maximum enjoyment of all citizens in the city; (7) providing each neighborhood in the city with open space; and (8) preserving and enhancing the natural beauty, uniqueness, and attractive appearance of the community.
The city adopted the 2002 comprehensive plan after engaging in a three-year review process during which several public hearings were held. When the city adopted the 2002 comprehensive plan, it reaffirmed that its goals and policies remain consistent with its original vision for development. Included among the 2002 goals and policies is the preservation of green spaces, open spaces, and recreational facilities.
Low-Density Residential (LR) is the most prevalent land use category in the 2002 comprehensive plan. Land designat
As part of its process of updating the comprehensive plan, the city “reviewed a number of parcels within the community for consistency between the Zoning Map and Comprehensive Land Use Plan.” The city apparently was anticipating the possibility that the character of some of these parcels would change. These parcels were designated as “Infill Sites” in the city‘s Technical Plan. Mendota Golf‘s property is one of the parcels designated as an infill site. The Technical Plan indicates that the zoning designation for the property is R-1 and states:
This site is currently a par-3 golf course and is guided as GC. This designation is proposed to remain. In the event that future redevelopment of this site is contemplated, careful consideration would need to be given to develop the site in a manner consistent with and sensitive to the existing low-density residential neighborhood.
Despite published notice of the city‘s plans to revise its comprehensive plan, Mendota Golf did not appear before the city to request alternate “guiding” of the property.
Under the 2002 comprehensive plan, all three golf courses in the city, including Mendota Golf‘s property, are designated as “Golf Course.” According to the comprehensive plan:
The Golf Course land use designation is intended to distinguish the commercial/recreation/open space characteristics associated with golf courses. The corresponding zoning district classifications are R-1, R-1A (One Family Residential) and R-2 (Medium Density Residential District).3
Under the city‘s zoning ordinance, golf courses are a conditional use within these residential districts. The city apparently has not taken any steps to create a special zoning district classification for golf courses that corresponds to the Golf Course land use designation in the comprehensive plan.4
After entering into the purchase agreement, the developer submitted to the city a concept plan for a residential subdivision on the property. According to the minutes of the city council meeting at which the concept plan was considered, the mayor and several council members indicated that they would not support a change in the city‘s comprehensive plan to allow residential development of the property. The city did not take any formal action on the concept plan.
Mendota Golf subsequently submitted an application to the city requesting that the city amend the comprehensive plan to change the designation of the property from “Golf Course” to “Low Density Residential.” In a letter attached to the application, Alan Spaulding, one of Mendota Golf‘s partners, indicated that Mendota Golf had failed to make the golf course “a profitable venture” and needed to “pursue alternative uses.” Spaulding stated that when Mendota Golf purchased the property in 1995, it understood that it had the opportunity to develop the property. However, due to a subsequent change in the MLPA, which Spaulding described as requiring developers to “meet the criteria of both Zoning and Comprehensive Plan” designations, Mendota Golf is “now subject to the confining designation of ‘Golf Course’ on the Comprehensive Plan.” Spaulding explained a “series of financial challenges and setbacks” that Mendota Golf had experienced and emphasized that Mendota Golf has been “a good neighbor” to the community. Spaulding asked the city to give it “more flexibility than the designation of ‘Golf Course’ allows” and to “restore the rights” Mendota Golf had when it acquired the property.
On June 11, 2003, the city advised Mendota Golf that its application to amend the comprehensive plan was complete. Shortly thereafter, the city‘s consulting planner prepared a planning report and recommended that “an alternative land use designation for the site is appropriate, subject to qualified review of the information provided by the applicant as to the viability of a golf course operation on the property.” On June 24, 2003, the city‘s planning commission held a public hearing, evaluated Mendota Golf‘s application, and unanimously (one commissioner abstained) recommended that the city council deny the proposed amendment to the comprehensive plan. The planning commission based its recommendation on a finding that “the golf course is the best use of the property consistent with the surrounding use of the neighborhood.”
Mendota Golf‘s application to amend the comprehensive plan came before the city council on July 1, 2003. The council acknowledged receiving various documents, including staff reports and the letter from Spaulding. According to the minutes of the council meeting, Spaulding told the council that the highest and best use for the property is not as a golf course, “the
A city attorney advised the council that after the legislature amended
The city council then voted unanimously to adopt Resolution 03-46, denying the proposed comprehensive plan amendment. In the resolution, the council stated that the amendment would have an “adverse impact on the health, safety, and general welfare of the citizens of the community and the surrounding land, and would be adverse to the general purpose and intent of the Zoning Ordinance.”
After the city council denied the comprehensive plan amendment, Mendota Golf brought a mandamus action in district court. Mendota Golf asserted that the city‘s zoning code provision applicable to its property expressly permits single-family residences; the “Golf Course” designation in the comprehensive plan has no direct corresponding zoning classification; and the comprehensive plan designation and the zoning classification for the property are incompatible. Mendota Golf further asserted that the city‘s “failure and refusal to approve Mendota Golf‘s application to amend the Comprehensive Plan Land Use designation of the property to ‘LR, Low-Density Residential’ from ‘GC, Golf Course,’ at such a time as the Property is and has been zoned ‘R-1 One-Family Residential,’ constitutes an arbitrary, irrational, capricious, illegal, and unconstitutional act.” Mendota Golf requested that the court issue a writ of mandamus commanding the city to approve Mendota Golf‘s application for an amendment to the city‘s comprehensive plan.
After a hearing, the district court concluded that the city‘s denial of Mendota Golf‘s proposed amendment to the city‘s comprehensive plan was arbitrary, capricious, and without a rational basis. The court found that: (1) the proposed Low-Density Residential designation corresponds to the existing R-1 zoning of the property; (2) single-family residential use is expressly made a permissible use under the existing R-1 zoning designation; and (3) the city had made no attempts to bring the property‘s zoning into conformity with the comprehensive plan “which in any way would prohibit the use of the subject property for R-1 zoning.” The court then entered judgment in favor of Mendota Golf and against the city and issued a writ of mandamus commanding the city to immediately “approve Petitioner‘s application for a Comprehensive Plan amendment changing the Land Use Guide Plan designation of the Property from ‘GC’ Golf Course to ‘LR’ Low-Density Residential,” and to further submit the Comprehensive
The city appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the district court. Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, No. A04-206, 2004 WL 2161422 (Minn.App. Sept. 28, 2004). The court of appeals determined that “[t]he city failed in its statutory duty to reconcile the designations for the golf course contained in the city‘s comprehensive plan and its zoning ordinance“; the city‘s “comprehensive plan contains a peculiar provision stating that the primary authority for development decisions is the zoning ordinance“; and there is a “logical inconsistency” in the city‘s refusal to allow Mendota Golf to use the land for a purpose that is expressly allowed under the zoning designation. Id. at *2, 4. Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that the district court did not err by “directing the city to satisfy its statutory obligation of reconciling the discrepancy between its comprehensive-plan designation of the land and its zoning-ordinance designation of the land by starting the process to amend the comprehensive plan.” Id. at *2. In reaching its decision, the court of appeals considered only the city council‘s stated reasons for its decision, not any “unarticulated possible reasons,” stating that “this is an appeal from the district court‘s mandamus decision, not a decision in a municipal zoning matter.” Id. at *3.
I.
“Mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy.” State v. Pero, 590 N.W.2d 319, 323 (Minn. 1999). “The authority to issue a writ of mandamus is statutory.” State v. Wilson, 632 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Minn. 2001); see
To determine whether mandamus is available here, we first address whether the city failed to perform a duty clearly imposed by law when it denied Mendota Golf‘s application for an amendment to the city‘s comprehensive plan. Mendota Golf‘s mandamus action is based on the city‘s duty under
If the comprehensive municipal plan is in conflict with the zoning ordinance, the zoning ordinance shall be brought into conformance with the plan by local government units in conjunction with the review and, if necessary, amendment of its comprehensive plan required under section 473.864, subdivision 2.
The MLPA provides little guidance in determining when a comprehensive municipal plan is in conflict with a zoning ordinance. The MLPA does provide that an official control “shall not be considered to be in conflict with a local government unit‘s comprehensive plan” if the official control “is adopted to ensure the planned, orderly, and staged development of urbanization or redevelopment areas designated in the comprehensive plan.”
As stated earlier, Mendota Golf‘s property is located in a “One-Family Residential District” under the city‘s zoning ordinance, but is designated “Golf Course” in the city‘s comprehensive plan. Mendota Golf argues that these designations conflict because single-family housing is a permitted use under the zoning ordinance, yet the comprehensive plan Golf Course designation “prevents implementation of the existing permitted low-density residential zoning use.” The city acknowledges that Mendota Golf‘s proposed use of the property conflicts with the comprehensive plan, but contends that the zoning ordinance and comprehensive plan designations are not inherently contradictory because golf courses are allowed in residential zones with a conditional use permit and Mendota Golf‘s property has been used as a golf course since the early 1960s.
As a preliminary matter, we note that “[a] zoning statute or ordinance is one which, by definition, regulates the building development and uses of property.” In re Denial of Eller Media Company‘s Applications, 664 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. 2003); see
In this case, Mendota Golf‘s property is located in a one-family residential district that specifically allows “[o]ne-family detached dwellings” as a permitted use. Mendota Heights, MN, City Code § 12-1E-3 (2005); see Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass‘n, 342 N.W.2d at 340 (explaining that subject to compliance with specific requirements, regulations, and standards, a city‘s approval of a permitted use generally follows as a matter of right). In contrast, the comprehensive plan designation allows the property to be used only as a golf course. While the use allowed by the comprehensive plan may be allowed as an exception under the zoning ordinance, the primary use allowed by the zoning ordinance is prohibited by the comprehensive plan. We view this as a conflict.
Mendota Golf does not dispute that under the MLPA, the comprehensive plan controls, and the property can be used only as a golf course.6 Consequently, Mendota Golf is subject to the most restrictive use of its property, and the zoning ordinance does not clearly express the restrictions imposed upon the property. In fact, it appears that the R-1 zoning designation for the property has no real significance if the property can be used only as a golf course and cannot be used for residential purposes. Further, the comprehensive plan designation creates a situation where Mendota Golf does not enjoy the same rights to use its property as other property owners within the city‘s R-1 zoning district. This disparity appears to offend the spirit of the uniformity requirement by denying Mendota Golf a use of its property that is expressly permitted as to other property owners in the zoning district. For these reasons, we conclude that there is a conflict between the city‘s comprehensive plan and the zoning ordinance, which the city was required to resolve under
II.
The writ of mandamus in this case requires the city to reconcile the foregoing conflict by amending the comprehensive plan from its “GC” Golf Course designation to “LR” Low-Density Residential. The city contends that the writ of mandamus “improperly divests the City Council of its constitutionally-based legislative authority to determine local land uses.” Therefore, we next consider whether the city had a clear duty to resolve the conflict by amending the comprehensive plan to permit the development of single-family housing on Mendota Golf‘s property. See
Under
The City could bring the zoning ordinance into conformity with the plan, it could bring the plan into conformity with the ordinance, or the City could choose to redesignate the property in a manner different from the property‘s current designation in either the plan or the ordinance.
Even Mendota Golf acknowledges that there is more than one way to resolve the conflict.
“The Minnesota legislature has delegated to municipalities the power to determine and plan the use of land within their boundaries.” VanLandschoot v. City of Mendota Heights, 336 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Minn. 1983); see
Here, the presence of alternative ways to reconcile the conflict between the comprehensive plan and the zoning ordinance indicates that the city did not have a clear duty to amend the comprehensive plan to conform to the zoning ordinance. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court exceeded the scope of its authority in this mandamus action by interfering with the exercise of legislative discretion and ordering the city to reconcile the conflict in a specific way—by amending the comprehensive plan. See State ex rel. Gresham v. Delaney, 213 Minn. 217, 219, 6 N.W.2d 97, 98 (1942) (explaining that mandamus may be used to compel public officers “to perform duties with respect to which they plainly have no discretion as to the precise manner of performance and where only one course of action is open“); Pohl, 214 Minn. at 227, 8 N.W.2d at 231 (stating that “courts do not undertake to control the manner in which official acts of a discretionary nature are to be performed“); cf. 3 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Arden H. Rathkopf & Daren A. Rathkopf, Rathkopf‘s The Law of Zoning and Planning § 56:2 (4th ed. 1997 & Supp. 11/2001) (stating that “since zoning is a legislative function, it is beyond the judicial power to rezone property from one classification to another“).
We also conclude that the district court‘s writ of mandamus commanding the city to bring its comprehensive plan into conformity with its zoning ordinance is inconsistent with the statutory priority of comprehensive plans over zoning ordinances. Under the MLPA, the comprehensive municipal plan guides land use in cities within the metropolitan area.
Since 1995, the MLPA has provided that the comprehensive plan constitutes the primary land use control for cities and supersedes all other municipal regulations when these regulations are in conflict with the plan. See
The Mendota Heights Zoning and Subdivision Ordinances will be the primary regulations governing future land use and development decisions.
The court of appeals interpreted this provision to provide that whenever there is a conflict between the comprehensive plan and the zoning ordinance, the zoning ordinance shall prevail. Mendota Golf, 2004 WL 2161422, at *2. But the provision also goes on to state that “as a means of implementing the stated land use goals for [the city], the City may implement the following Zoning Ordinance provisions.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the provision indicates that the comprehensive plan provides the planning element, or the “land use goals,” while the zoning ordinance provides the legislative means of carrying out those goals. We conclude that the latter interpretation of the provision is more consistent with the established relationship between comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances.
We further note that a city‘s comprehensive plan is part of a regional land use planning process. Because “local governmental units within the metropolitan area are interdependent,” the legislature has established “requirements and procedures to accomplish comprehensive local planning with land use controls consistent with planned, orderly, and staged development and the metropolitan system plans.”
Although Mendota Golf appears to accept that the city did not have a clear duty to amend the comprehensive plan, Mendota Golf argues that the writ of mandamus is appropriate because the city acted arbitrarily and capriciously “by failing to adopt a rational justification for denial” of the comprehensive plan amendment, which would have eliminated the “unlawful conflict” between the city‘s comprehensive plan and the zoning ordinance. The city emphasizes that land use policies and regulations are legislative matters, and the city‘s desire to retain open and recreational space and to reaffirm the recently enacted comprehensive plan provides a rational basis for the city‘s decision to deny Mendota Golf‘s proposed amendment to the comprehensive plan.
Neither party specifically addresses the court‘s role in reviewing the city‘s decision within the context of a mandamus action. Nonetheless, we believe that a discussion of the proper use of mandamus in municipal zoning cases is appropriate to clarify the law. In an early case explaining the proper use of mandamus, we commented on the tension that arises between “the well-settled rule that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to be granted only in case the petition shows a clear right thereto” and our decisions concluding that mandamus is appropriate when “discretion has been exercised in a clearly arbitrary and capricious manner.” Zion Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Detroit Lakes, 221 Minn. 55, 57, 21 N.W.2d 203, 205 (1945) (quotations and citations omitted). We then explained that it is only in “rare cases” that “the officials act in so clearly an arbitrary and capricious a manner that their action may be reviewed on mandamus.” Id. at 57, 21 N.W.2d at 205 (quotations omitted).
In Zion, the city council denied a church‘s application for a building permit for a new church “on the ground ‘that the construction of said church would increase the automobile traffic hazard.‘” Id. at 58, 21 N.W.2d at 205. In determining that the facts in Zion did not present “one of those rare cases where there is a clear right to the remedy of mandamus,” we stated:
It is well established that mandamus cannot be used for the purpose of reviewing the decision of a board or tribunal which has exercised its discretion within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by law. Here the council has acted; and, even though the reason given for its denial may appear erroneous, we cannot say that it has necessarily acted capriciously or arbitrarily. Absent arbitrariness and caprice, mandamus does not lie for mere error in the exercise of discretion. * * * [I]t is not for us in this proceeding to pass upon the merits of the ground for the denial. It would be a novelty if, after the council has determined that the granting of a permit and the erection of a building pursuant thereto would result in an increased traffic hazard, the court should upon application overrule its decision of denial. Once the council‘s discretion is exercised, there is no judicial remedy through mandamus. The court can compel a quasi-judicial body such as a city council to exercise discretion; but, once that discretion has been actually exercised, as here, the court is wholly without power through mandamus to compel such quasi-judicial body to reverse, reconsider, or repeat its action. This fundamental principle, repeatedly recognized by this court, is salutary and essential to the preservation of local government. The court must not substitute its judgment for that of the city council and thus usurp the function of local governing bodies.
Our land use cases following Zion, however, have not always been clear or consistent in defining the proper reach of mandamus. In Curry v. Young, 285 Minn. 387, 393-94, 173 N.W.2d 410, 413-14 (1969), we reviewed our decisions and commented that the “use of mandamus to obtain relief” in land use matters “has been denied in some cases and permitted in others.” Acknowledging that “[t]hese decisions are not always easy to reconcile,” we stated that “about the only rule we can glean from our cases is that mandamus ordinarily will not lie to control the exercise of discretion by administrative agencies, but it will lie if there is no other adequate and complete remedy.” Id. at 395, 173 N.W.2d at 414, 415 (emphasis added).
Later, in Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409, 413 (Minn.1981), we observed that litigants were using “a variety of remedies for a variety of zoning cases,” including “mandamus, certiorari, injunction, and the declaratory judgment action.” For example, we noted that “[m]andamus has been used to review denial of a special use permit” and “for denial of a variance.” Id. at 413 n. 3 (citing cases). In some of these cases, we strayed from our traditional view that mandamus is available only to compel a duty clearly required by law and cannot control the manner in which discretion is exercised. We also strayed from our traditional view that mandamus should be reserved for those “rare cases” involving egregious conduct where a city clearly acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. See Zion, 221 Minn. at 57, 21 N.W.2d at 205; see, e.g., C.R. Invs., Inc. v. Village of Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320, 328 (Minn. 1981) (concluding that “the village acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying [a] special use permit for reasons which either had no factual bases or were not legally sufficient“); Minnetonka Congregation of Jehovah‘s Witnesses, Inc. v. Svee, 303 Minn. 79, 83-84, 226 N.W.2d 306, 308 (1975) (concluding that mandamus would lie to enable a property owner to secure a conditional use permit from a city to construct a church where the evidence did not support the city‘s council‘s reasons for denying the permit).
In Honn, we sought to clarify the procedure for reviewing municipal zoning matters. We stated that review of a decision on “any zoning matter, whether legislative or quasi-judicial,” should be obtained by a declaratory judgment action in the district court. 313 N.W.2d at 416. After describing the proper procedure for review, we went on to state: “This is not to say that the form of the action by which the procedure is initiated need always be a declaratory judgment action. Mandamus has its place, and there may be a quasi-judicial proceeding presenting a legal question to which certiorari still lends itself.” Id.; see also White Bear Rod & Gun Club v. City of Hugo, 388 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Minn.1986) (explaining that “a declaratory judgment or injunction action is generally more appropriate, or sometimes mandamus” for reviewing municipal zoning matters, but certiorari is appropriate to review “a narrow legal procedural question“). However, we have not provided any specific guidance on the “place” of mandamus in the review of municipal zoning decisions.
Following Honn, parties have continued to seek review of routine municipal zoning matters through mandamus actions. Further, the court of appeals has interpreted our decisions as allowing courts to issue a writ of mandamus “even if the administrative body‘s act was a legislative decision if the body‘s failure to perform ‘was so arbi
At this point, we reiterate our guidance that the proper procedure for reviewing a city‘s decision in a zoning matter9 generally will be a declaratory judgment action, possibly including a request for injunctive relief. See Honn, 313 N.W.2d at 416; see also
While there are municipal zoning matters for which mandamus may be appropriate, these cases typically involve claims that a city failed to perform a clearly defined duty that is required by a statute or zoning ordinance. See, e.g., Glen Paul Court Neighborhood Ass‘n v. Paster, 437 N.W.2d 52, 57 (Minn.1989) (concluding that a city‘s failure to comply with a statutory requirement of mailed notice to property owners rendered an amendment to the city‘s zoning ordinance invalid); Advantage Capital Mgmt. v. City of Northfield, 664 N.W.2d 421, 427-28 (Minn.App.2003) (reviewing a writ of mandamus that required a city to issue a building permit where the petition was based on the claim that the city failed to grant or deny the building permit within the time limits prescribed by statute), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 24, 2003); cf. Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass‘n v. City of Chanhassen, 342 N.W.2d 335, 340-41 (Minn.1984) (directing a city to issue a building permit where the proposed facility was a permitted use under the city‘s zoning ordinance and the permit application complied with the specific requirements, regulations, and standards prescribed by the ordinance).10 “Courts generally agree that [a petitioner]
In contrast to cases involving a city‘s failure to perform a clearly defined duty, mandamus is not appropriate to review the exercise of legislative discretion in municipal zoning matters. As we stated in Zion, “mandamus does not lie for mere error in the exercise of discretion.” 221 Minn. at 58, 21 N.W.2d at 205; see also 4 Anderson‘s American Law of Zoning, supra, § 28.08 (“Mandamus is not available to compel the legislative authority of a municipality to amend a zoning ordinance.“); 8A McQuillan The Law of Municipal Corporations § 25.307 (3d ed.) (“Mandamus proceedings cannot be used to interfere with the discretion of zoning authorities.“); 4 Rathkopf‘s The Law of Zoning and Planning, supra, § 64:6 (explaining that “[t]he clear legal duty to act which evokes a right to mandamus” does not arise with respect to an act that “principally involves the exercise of judgment and discretion“). We discern no basis for treating municipal zoning decisions differently from other kinds of discretionary decisions for which mandamus is not appropriate. See 4 Rathkopf‘s The Law of Zoning and Planning, supra, § 64:1 n. 3 (stating “the application and restrictions upon the use of a writ of mandamus do not differ in cases involving land use and land use regulations“). The same concerns about respect for the legislative authority of local government bodies apply.
Accordingly, we reject Mendota Golf‘s suggestion that “the propriety” of the district court‘s issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is “clear.” Rather, we conclude that a mandamus action generally is not appropriate to review claims that a city acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying a proposed amendment to a comprehensive plan.
IV.
In this case, however, the city has not specifically challenged the appropriateness of mandamus to review the denial of Mendota Golf‘s proposed comprehensive plan amendment. The city‘s omission is understandable given the confusion that has persisted regarding the proper use of mandamus in municipal zoning cases. Although the city does argue that the district court exceeded its powers by issuing a writ of mandamus that directs the city to exercise its legislative authority in a specific manner, the city‘s primary argument in this appeal is that Mendota Golf is not entitled to relief because the city had a rational basis for its decision. Therefore, rather than requiring Mendota Golf to restate its claims in a declaratory judgment action, we will consider the substance of the parties’ arguments and determine whether the city abused its discretion by denying the proposed comprehensive plan amendment. Cf. Scherger v. N. Natural Gas Co., 575 N.W.2d 578, 579 n. 1 (Minn. 1998) (noting that “[the] essence of this action was [a] request for a judicial declaration as to the scope and validity of [an] agreement, and therefore was not appropriate for a writ of mandamus,” but stating that “we need not correct the procedure“).
When reviewing municipal land use decisions, we typically utilize a rational basis standard of review.11 Honn,
In this case, Mendota Golf, as well as the courts below, focused almost exclusively on the language in Resolution 03-46 stating that the proposed comprehensive plan amendment would have an “adverse impact on the health, safety, and general welfare of the citizens of the community and the surrounding land, and would be adverse to the general purpose and intent of the Zoning Ordinance.” We conclude that focusing solely on the language of the resolution is too narrow a focus. When a municipality renders a legislative decision, we can look beyond the city‘s resolution and review the minutes of relevant meetings and documents considered therein to determine whether the city had a rational basis for its decision. Cf. Crystal Beach Bay Ass‘n v. County of Koochiching, 309 Minn. 52, 55, 243 N.W.2d 40, 42 (1976) (concluding that even where findings are required a prima facie case of arbitrariness “may be rebutted if there is evidence in the recorded hearing testimony from which the reviewing court can ascertain a reasonable basis for the county board‘s action“).
When the municipal proceedings were fair and the record clear and complete, review is on the record. Swanson, 421 N.W.2d at 313. In this case, neither party disputes the district court‘s finding that the municipal proceedings were fair and there is “a clear record.”12
At the city council‘s meeting on Mendota Golf‘s proposed amendment, the mayor commented that Mendota Golf‘s property has been designated as golf course property in the city‘s comprehensive plan for over 25 years. In the 2002 comprehensive plan, which the city had adopted just one year before Mendota Golf‘s application to amend the comprehensive plan, the city specifically chose to retain the “Golf Course” land use designation for the property—a designation that “is intended to distinguish the commercial/recreation/open space characteristics associated with golf courses.” According to the minutes of the city council meeting, the city had recently updated its comprehensive plan, the planning process was very extensive, including many public hearings, and Mendota Golf did not participate in any of those hearings. Comments made during the planning commission and city council meetings conveyed the value that citizens of the city place on the open space and recreational opportunities that the golf course provides.
A municipality has legitimate interests in protecting open and recreational space, as well as reaffirming historical land use designations. See
The dissent suggests that our decision means that “the owners of the subject property are required, now and in the future, to operate a golf course because it preserves ‘open space’ and recreational opportunities for residents of the community.” Such a suggestion indicates that the dissent has misconstrued our decision by reading it too broadly. It is not our intent, and it is not necessarily the effect of our decision, to prescribe a permanent comprehensive plan designation for the property. Our decision does not foreclose discussion and negotiation between Mendota Golf and the city regarding the use of the property. In fact, in denying the proposed amendment to the comprehensive plan, the city expressed a willingness to work with Mendota Golf to explore other options for the property. Our decision also does not foreclose Mendota Golf from asserting a regulatory takings claim if the parties cannot resolve their dispute.14 Finally, our decision does not foreclose other actions based on the circumstances as they may develop as a part of or following the city‘s reconciliation of the comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance provisions for the property, which cannot be foreseen at this time. Our decision simply resolves the narrow issue that is properly before the court—whether the city had a rational basis to deny Mendota Golf‘s proposed amendment to the comprehensive plan.
V.
As stated above, we conclude that there is a conflict between the city‘s comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance with respect to Mendota Golf‘s property and the city failed to reconcile this conflict as required under
Reversed and remanded.
ANDERSON, G. BARRY, Justice (concurring and dissenting).
I join in the majority opinion with respect to the conclusion that a conflict exists between the comprehensive plan and the zoning ordinance adopted by the City of Mendota Heights and I also join in the remand to the district court requiring the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the city to reconcile the comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance provisions with respect to Mendota Golf‘s property as required by
I dissent, however, from that portion of the majority opinion that holds that the City of Mendota Heights had a “rational basis” for the city‘s denial of Mendota Golf‘s application for an amendment to the city‘s comprehensive plan.
I dissent for two reasons.
First, having concluded that a declaratory judgment action is the better vehicle for addressing the dispute between the City of Mendota Heights and Mendota Golf, I believe it is premature for this court to find a rational basis in the action taken by the City of Mendota Heights. An advantage of declaratory judgment proceedings are discovery procedures that may result in a better record than we have before this court today. Further, as a matter of judicial restraint in not deciding cases before those cases are ripe for decision, I believe the better course is to allow the City of Mendota Heights to address the conflict between the ordinance provisions because it is at least possible that the conflict will be addressed in a manner that resolves the dispute between the parties without further litigation. Further, we routinely defer to the exercise of municipal legislative authority and I see no good reason to rush in now and answer a question that may or may not be present after the ordinance conflict is resolved.
But second, I dissent from this portion of the majority opinion for substantive reasons as well.
One practical problem with the emphasis on “open space” as the basis for the city council‘s decision to deny the amendment request is that, as the court of appeals noted, the comprehensive plan uses separate designations for “golf course” and “open space.” Indeed, preservation of “open space” is not mentioned in the city council resolution denying Mendota Golf‘s application for a change in the comprehensive plan.
I find the argument that the City had “several public hearings” in connection with reviewing its comprehensive plan to
In short, it is not at all clear that there is, in fact, a rational basis for the city council‘s decision.
In addition to these practical difficulties complicating the majority opinion‘s rational basis argument, there are troubling, and important, implications to the city council‘s decision endorsed today by the majority opinion.
While the majority opinion eloquently supports communal open space as a worthy municipal goal, entirely absent from the opinion is a discussion of the severe restrictions on the rights of the property owner as a result of the present form of the City‘s comprehensive plan. Put most bluntly, under the majority reading of the comprehensive plan, the owners of the subject property are required, now and in the future, to operate a golf course because it preserves “open space” and recreational opportunities for residents of the community. I do not share the confidence of the majority that we have addressed only a “narrow” question of whether the City had a rational basis to deny the request for an amendment to the City‘s comprehensive plan. The effect of our decision is to tell Mendota Golf, and the owner of any other similar property, that the mere assertion by neighbors that they enjoy a property owner‘s “open space” is sufficient to prohibit any (i.e., non-golf course) use of the property as long as that preference appears somewhere in the municipal zoning ordinances.
While I acknowledge that Mendota Golf has not asserted a regulatory taking in this proceeding, municipalities cannot ignore that both the federal and Minnesota constitutions provide protection for private property rights, prohibiting the taking of public property for public use without just compensation.
Perhaps, as the majority suggests, I have an “overly broad” interpretation of the effect of the opinion we issue today. Perhaps I am premature in suggesting that there might be regulatory taking implications in the actions taken by the City. But given that property rights are implicated in this dispute centering around a conflict between municipal ordinances and given that we are also now instructing litigants to use declaratory judgment procedures rather than an extraordinary writ—a fairly dramatic change from past practice—and finally given that it is wholly unnecessary to resolve the issue of whether there is a rational basis for the City‘s actions, I would remand this matter to the City of Mendota Heights to resolve the ordinance conflict and to allow the property owner, if desired, to commence the ap
BLATZ, Chief Justice (concurring and dissenting).
I join in the concurrence and dissent of Justice G. Barry Anderson.
PAGE, Justice (concurring and dissenting).
I join in the concurrence and dissent of Justice G. Barry Anderson.
Notes
Up until passage of the amendments to the Metropolitan Land Planning Act in 1995, zoning took precedence over comprehensive planning when issues of inconsistencies occurred. However, the amended Act now provides that comprehensive plans shall take precedence over zoning when conflicts arise. The change presents challenges due to the fact that comprehensive plans have traditionally served as “guide” plans. Prior to establishing a land use plan and/or modifying existing land use designations, the City must fully understand potential ramifications of these actions. There is currently no case law to provide guidance in this matter. At issue is a lack of understanding of the implications of this law and the mechanisms available to the City to assure that the Mendota Heights Comprehensive Plan is consistent with the Zoning Ordinance.