Maria Medina Tovar v. Laura Zuchowski, 982 F.3d 631

Maria Medina Tovar (Mexican national) filed Form I-918 (U‑visa) in June 2013 based on being a rape victim and cooperating with law enforcement.
She married Adrian Martinez on September 21, 2015 while her U‑visa application was pending.
USCIS granted Medina Tovar a U‑visa effective October 1, 2015.
On March 29, 2016 Medina Tovar filed Form I‑918, Supplement A, seeking derivative U‑status for Martinez; USCIS denied the Supplement A because the regulation requires the spousal relationship to exist when the original I‑918 was filed.
Plaintiffs sued; district court granted summary judgment to defendants. On de novo review the Ninth Circuit (en banc) reversed, holding the regulation inconsistent with the statute to the extent it requires marriage at filing rather than at grant.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 8 C.F.R. §214.14(f)(4) may require spouses to be married when the principal’s Form I‑918 is filed (vs. when the principal is granted U status).	The statute’s phrase "accompanying, or following to join" and text/structure show timing is measured at the moment the principal is granted U status; Congress’s express filing-date rule for under‑21 siblings demonstrates it knew how to impose a filing-date rule when desired.	The statute is ambiguous; the agency reasonably read the statute to require the relationship at time of filing (to prevent after‑acquired marriages intended to game the system), so Chevron deference supports the regulation.	The court held the statute unambiguous at Chevron step one: derivative spouse need only be married when the principal is granted U status; the regulation is invalid insofar as it demands marriage at filing.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (U.S. 1984) (establishes two‑step framework for reviewing agency statutory interpretation)
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (U.S. 2019) (courts must exhaust traditional tools of construction before deferring to agency on rule interpretation)
Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (U.S. 2018) (Chevron step‑one analysis principles regarding statutory clarity)
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (U.S. 2005) (courts may not let agencies rewrite statutes by assigning different meanings to identical statutory language)
Landin‑Molina v. Holder, 580 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2009) (discusses "accompanying or following to join" temporal element in related immigration context)
Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975) (historical treatment of derivative beneficiaries and accompanying/following language)
Schneider v. Chertoff, 450 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2006) (agency may not add new statutory requirements when Congress specified criteria)
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (U.S. 2009) (interpretive canon on inclusion/omission of language within same statute)
Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795 (U.S. 2019) (when statutory language is transplanted, it brings its established meaning)