Marcelo Martinez-Cedillo v. Jefferson Sessions, 896 F.3d 979

Martinez-Cedillo, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in 2008 to DUI with two priors and felony child endangerment under Cal. Penal Code § 273a(a) for having an unbelted child in the car.
DHS initiated removal under INA § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) as a conviction for “a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment.”
The BIA, relying on its precedents (Velazquez-Herrera and Matter of Soram), held that the statutory phrase covers criminally negligent conduct and child-endangerment offenses that may not require actual injury.
Martinez-Cedillo challenged (1) Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation, (2) whether § 273a(a) categorically matches the federal offense, (3) retroactive application of Soram to his 2008 conviction, and (4) the denial of his continuance based on a family visa petition.
The Ninth Circuit deferred to the BIA’s interpretation, held § 273a(a) is categorically a removable “crime of child abuse, neglect, or abandonment” under that interpretation, applied Soram retroactively, and affirmed the denial of the continuance.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Chevron deference to BIA interpretation of § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)	BIA’s definition is unreasonable—overbroad, relies on civil law, and changed positions	BIA’s Velazquez/Soram interpretation is reasonable given statutory ambiguity, civil-state definitions, and need for broad coverage	Court applies Chevron and defers to the BIA as reasonable
Whether Cal. Penal Code § 273a(a) is categorically a removable offense	§ 273a(a) can punish negligent conduct that does not inflict actual injury, so not a categorical match (per plaintiff's alternative)	§ 273a(a) requires criminal negligence under circumstances likely to produce great bodily harm or death and thus fits BIA’s broad definition	Court holds § 273a(a) is categorically a crime of child abuse/neglect/abandonment under BIA interpretation
Retroactivity of BIA’s Soram decision to 2008 conviction	Soram should not apply retroactively because Martinez relied on earlier BIA position and plea consequences are severe	Soram clarified an open question rather than abruptly changed law; Montgomery Ward factors support retroactivity	Court applies Montgomery Ward factors and allows Soram to apply retroactively
Denial of continuance for pending family visa petition	Continuance was warranted to pursue adjustment of status	IJ properly denied continuance for untimeliness, remote priority date, and speculative outcome	Court reviews for abuse of discretion and affirms denial

Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (U.S. 1984) (framework for judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations)
Florez v. Holder, 779 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2015) (deferring to BIA’s broad definition of child-abuse ground)
Ibarra v. Holder, 736 F.3d 903 (10th Cir. 2013) (rejecting BIA’s interpretation as unreasonable after state-law survey)
Pacheco Fregozo v. Holder, 576 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2009) (interpreting BIA, initially read to require actual injury; context on § 273a distinctions)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (U.S. 2013) (categorical-approach principles)
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (U.S. 2005) (agency interpretation may control if reasonable even over prior judicial views)
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1982) (five-factor test for retroactivity of agency adjudicative changes)
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (U.S. 2018) (void-for-vagueness analysis on risk-based statutory language)
Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (U.S. 2017) (usefulness of multi‑jurisdictional state-law surveys in defining federal generic offenses)
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (U.S. 1990) (methodology for defining generic crimes via state-law consensus)
Ramirez v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2016) (interpretation of § 273a in related immigration context)