Manuel Ortega Melendres v. Joseph Arpaio
784 F.3d 1254
| 9th Cir. | 2015Background
- Plaintiffs allege MCSO racially profiles Latinos and stops them pretextually to enforce immigration-related laws, with unconstitutional practices extending beyond saturation patrols.
- District court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting race-based stops and detentions and ordered monitoring; a supplemental injunction added training, data collection, and a Monitor.
- MCSO is a non-jural entity; the court substituted Maricopa County as the defendant; an official-capacity claim against Sheriff Arpaio may be dismissed as against the County.
- Evidence showed the unconstitutional policy applied across all stops, not only during saturation patrols, and plaintiffs’ named plaintiffs include Ortega Melendres and Rodriguezes.
- Rodriguezes were the only named plaintiffs stopped outside saturation patrols; the district court certified a class and found standing to represent absent class members.
- The panel affirmed in part and vacated/remanded in part, vacating parts of the Monitor’s scope and tailoring provisions to address only the constitutional violations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of injunction beyond saturation patrols | Melendres argues injuries extend beyond saturation patrols. | Arpaio/MCSO contend violations limited to saturation context. | Injunction valid across patrol types; violations extend beyond saturation patrols. |
| Standing and class certification for non-saturation stops | Rodriguezes represent absent class members; classwide relief warranted. | Standing/class certification separate; named plaintiffs limited to their claims. | Class certification appropriate; named plaintiffs can represent absent members for non-saturation stops. |
| Overbreadth of injunctive provisions | Some provisions beyond necessary remedies. | Remedies tailored to cure constitutional violations. | Most provisions upheld; Monitor scope narrowed to address only constitutional violations. |
| Monitors and data collection provisions | Data collection and monitoring necessary to ensure compliance. | Overbroad or unnecessary oversight. | Data collection/recording upheld; certain internal-misconduct assessment provisions vacated and tailored. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) (official-capacity suits treated as against the entity; dismissal considerations)
- Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982) (standing or adequacy in class actions depends on common questions and typicality)
- Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (injunctions must cure constitutional violations without creating more than necessary)
- Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2000) (district court has broad discretion in tailoring remedies for constitutional violations)
- Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding comprehensive injunctions to cure constitutional violations)
- Nicacio v. INS, 797 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding data collection to monitor compliance with immigration enforcement)
- Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (body-worn cameras and related oversight considerations)
- Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (standing and class representative adequacy principles in class actions)
- Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (distinguishing standing from sua sponte class representation when injuries differ)
- Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (similarities in injuries can support class representation if concerns are not significantly different)
- Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001) (consideration of typicality and adequacy in class actions)
- Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 548 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2008) (standing prerequisites precede class-eligibility analysis)