995 F.3d 635
8th Cir.2021Background
- In Sept. 2017 St. Louis protests following a police acquittal, police deployed crowd-control tactics (macing/tear gas), made mass arrests, seized/inspected phones, and some officers acted abusively (including assault of an undercover detective).
- Plaintiffs (a protester allegedly maced, a person whose phone was seized while filming, and an observer allegedly exposed to chemical agents and arrested) sued under § 1983 for First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations and sought injunctive relief restricting how the City handles protests.
- The district court held a three-day evidentiary hearing and entered a substantive preliminary injunction (Nov. 2017) limiting when officers may declare unlawful assemblies, use chemical agents, and issue dispersal orders; the City did not timely appeal that injunction.
- The case lingered in mediation and additional proceedings for years; the district court later certified a Rule 23(b)(2) class (May 2019) and denied the City’s motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction; the City timely appealed those orders.
- The Eighth Circuit (majority) affirmed denial of the motion to dissolve but concluded the preliminary injunction (a mandatory-style decree) could not remain open-ended: it conditioned maintenance of the injunction on completing a trial on the merits within six months and ordered the injunction dissolved by Oct. 31, 2021 if no final merits ruling issued; it vacated class certification without prejudice as premature.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiffs' Argument | City’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the City’s motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction (Rule 60(b)/changed circumstances). | Injunction was necessary to prevent ongoing constitutional violations and preserve parties’ positions pending trial. | Changed circumstances (passage of time, new counsel, mediation delays) and Rule 60(b) relief justify dissolution/modification. | Majority affirmed denial but found passage of time and prolonged delay warranted requiring a prompt trial; injunction must be replaced by a final merits order within six months or be dissolved by Oct. 31, 2021. |
| Whether a Rule 23(b)(2) class may be certified for the sought prospective relief. | Classwide injunctive relief is appropriate because City policies/practices affected protestors and observers generally. | Claims are individualized (different facts, remedies); (b)(2) requires cohesiveness and uniform relief. | Vacated class certification without prejudice as premature—claims require individualized inquiries and (b)(2) cohesion lacking. |
| Standard for permanent municipal injunctive relief based on custom/practice or failure to train. | Plaintiffs rely on Sept. 2017 incidents to show municipal custom/practice and inadequate training/supervision. | Isolated incidents and officer misconduct do not establish municipal policy, deliberate indifference, or a pattern justifying broad equitable relief. | Court emphasized rigorous § 1983 standards: a few incidents are insufficient; more proof of widespread/persistent misconduct or deliberate indifference is required for permanent injunctive relief. |
| Whether mere passage of time (delay) alone suffices as a changed circumstance to modify/dissolve a preliminary injunction (dissenting view). | Delay and prolonged federal control over local policing justify reconsideration/modification. | Passage of time alone is insufficient; City failed to identify new facts or law; lack of timely appeal limits review (dissent). | Majority treated extended delay as a significant changed circumstance warranting conditioning the injunction on an expedited merits trial; a concurrence/dissent argued the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. |
Key Cases Cited
- Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 443 (Rule 60(b)(5) permits modification where significant change in facts or law renders continued enforcement inequitable)
- Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (standards for modifying institutional reform decrees)
- Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. 95 (limits on equitable relief absent showing of likelihood of future harm)
- Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (municipal liability requires rigorous causation/culpability showing)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (standards for failure-to-train municipal liability)
- Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (Rule 23(b)(2) requires that a single injunction provide relief to each class member)
- Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (purpose of preliminary injunction is to preserve positions pending a merits decision)
- Able v. United States, 44 F.3d 128 (conditioning maintenance of injunction on expedited trial where discovery largely complete)
- Chicago United Inds., Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 445 F.3d 940 (rebuttable presumption that governmental misconduct will not recur; caution against federal micromanagement)
- Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (equitable relief must be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury)
