Major v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., B260355

Background

Decedent William "Captain" Major smoked ~2 packs/day from 1961–1989, was diagnosed with small‑cell lung cancer in 1997 and died in 1998; wife Tajie Major sued cigarette and asbestos manufacturers.
Most defendants settled; plaintiff tried design‑defect and negligent design claims against Lorillard (maker of Kent/Newport).
Jury found Lorillard’s cigarette design defective and a substantial factor in Major’s death; fault allocated 50% to Major, 33% to other cigarette manufacturers, 17% to Lorillard; asbestos exposure was found not a substantial factor.
Judgment (after comparative fault and settlement credits) awarded plaintiff ~$3.78 million plus interest and costs; Lorillard appealed; plaintiff cross‑appealed on prejudgment interest.
Issues on appeal included federal preemption, requested jury instruction that cigarette sales are lawful, refusal to give a but‑for causation instruction, sufficiency of proof that Lorillard’s design caused the death, exclusion of certain asbestos‑related evidence, and whether prejudgment interest accrued during a dismissal period.

Issues

Issue	Major's Argument (Plaintiff)	Lorillard's Argument (Defendant)	Held
Federal preemption of state tort claims	No preemption; states retain police powers to impose tort liability on cigarette manufacturers.	Plaintiff’s design theory would functionally ban cigarettes and thus conflicts with congressional intent (per Brown & Williamson), so state tort law is preempted.	Rejected; presumption against preemption applies, Brown & Williamson addressed FDA authority only, and subsequent federal statute preserved state/local authority.
Instruction that cigarette sale is lawful	Not needed; jury must decide whether the particular product was defective.	Court should instruct jurors that manufacture/sale of cigarettes is lawful, so liability cannot rest solely on legality of sale.	Rejected; instruction unnecessary/misleading and harmless if given; liability concerns product defect, not mere sale.
But‑for causation instruction (CACI 430 optional sentence)	CACI but‑for sentence could apply; Lorillard sought it.	But‑for is inappropriate in multi‑cause settings where combinations of causes (more than two) are sufficient; substantial factor test governs.	Rejected giving but‑for language; court properly gave substantial‑factor instruction without the but‑for sentence because multiple sufficient causes (including partial combinations) can exist.
Sufficiency of causation proof & excluded asbestos evidence	Plaintiff met proof: experts tied design (higher tar) to increased carcinogen dose and thus causation; exclusion of certain complaint/interrogatory/trust items was not prejudicial.	Plaintiff failed to show Major would have used a non‑defective (no‑tar) product, so design defect causation fails; excluded documents would have shown asbestos causation.	Affirmed: plaintiff’s causation burden met (comparative fault addresses plaintiff’s choices); excluded items either were cumulative, procedural waivers occurred, or any error was harmless.

Key Cases Cited

Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (statutory construction re: FDA authority over tobacco; court addressed federal agency power, not state tort preemption)
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (state fraud claims not necessarily preempted in tobacco context)
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (express preemption limited to labeling/advertising mandates; common‑law damages actions differ)
Mitchell v. Gonzales, 54 Cal.3d 1041 (CA Supreme Court rejecting prior but‑for jury wording and endorsing substantial‑factor approach)
Rutherford v. Owens‑Illinois, Inc., 16 Cal.4th 953 (asbestos cases: proof that defendant’s product was a substantial factor in plaintiff’s increased risk suffices)
Viner v. Sweet, 30 Cal.4th 1232 (but‑for still relevant in some settings; explains multiple sufficient causes doctrine)
Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 857 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. en banc: Brown & Williamson does not resolve state‑law preemption; states retain police powers to regulate tobacco)
Whiteley v. Philip Morris, 117 Cal.App.4th 635 (discussed but distinguished on causation/comparative fault grounds)