Magdiel Mondragon-Gonzalez v. Attorney General United States
884 F.3d 155
| 3rd Cir. | 2018Background
- Magdiel Mondragon-Gonzalez, admitted to the U.S. in 2008, pled guilty in April 2015 under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6318(a)(5) for intentionally contacting a minor to engage in sexual abuse of children.
- State court sentenced him to 8–23 months; DHS initiated removal proceedings in December 2015.
- The Immigration Judge found the conviction was a "crime of child abuse" under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) and ordered removal.
- The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, applying its precedents (Velazquez‑Herrera, Soram, Mendoza Osorio) that define "crime of child abuse" broadly to include intentional or reckless acts that risk harm to a child.
- Mondragon‑Gonzalez appealed to the Third Circuit, arguing (1) the BIA’s definition is not entitled to Chevron deference and (2) the Pennsylvania statute is broader than the BIA’s definition and thus does not categorically match.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the BIA’s definition of "crime of child abuse" is entitled to Chevron deference | BIA's definition is unreasonable and should not get Chevron deference | BIA's definition is a permissible, reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute and merits Chevron deference | Court: Term is ambiguous; BIA’s interpretation is reasonable and entitled to Chevron deference |
| Whether conviction under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6318(a)(5) categorically matches BIA’s definition of "crime of child abuse" | § 6318(a)(5) criminalizes mere communication with minors (up to age 18) and is broader than the BIA definition; Esquivel‑Quintana supports a narrower age scope | § 6318(a)(5) requires intentional contact for the purpose of sexual abuse, creating a high risk of harm and thus matches the BIA definition; Esquivel‑Quintana is inapposite | Court: Pennsylvania statute requires intent to engage in sexual abuse and poses sufficient risk of harm; conviction categorically matches BIA’s definition; Esquivel‑Quintana does not limit "child" to under 16 in this context |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (two‑step framework for administrative deference)
- Florez v. Holder, 779 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2015) (treating "crime of child abuse" as ambiguous)
- Esquivel‑Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017) (statutory‑rape age‑of‑consent analysis; not controlling here)
- De Leon‑Ochoa v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 622 F.3d 341 (3d Cir. 2010) (Chevron application in immigration context)
- Cheruku v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 662 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2011) (de novo review subject to Chevron deference)
- Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2004) (review of agency interpretations under arbitrary and capricious standard)