MacDonald v. Caruso, 467 Mass. 382

In 1999 Tracy MacDonald obtained c. 209A protection against Kevin Caruso after threats, stalking-like conduct (mail, credit-card fraud), and a public sighting; a temporary order was extended and ultimately a permanent order entered after hearings.
Caruso did not appeal the permanent order; in 2011 he moved to terminate it, attesting he moved to Utah, married in 2004, retired, had no violations, and suffered collateral consequences (travel scrutiny, gun-permit ineligibility).
The Probate & Family Court judge denied the motion, concluding Caruso failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence a significant change in circumstances making continuation inequitable.
The Appeals Court affirmed under the Mitchell standard; the Supreme Judicial Court granted further review to decide the proper standard for terminating a permanent c. 209A order.
The SJC held that a defendant seeking termination of a permanent c. 209A order must show by clear and convincing evidence a significant change in circumstances such that the protected party no longer has a reasonable fear of imminent serious physical harm; on the record here the denial was affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standard for terminating a permanent c. 209A order	Order should remain to protect plaintiff; burden on defendant high	Preponderance of evidence should suffice to show plaintiff no longer reasonably fears harm	Defendant must prove by clear and convincing evidence a significant change and no reasonable fear of imminent serious physical harm; denial affirmed
What constitutes a "significant change in circumstances"	Continued protection may be needed despite some changes	Long passage of time, relocation, marriage, compliance, retirement justify termination	Passage of time and compliance alone insufficient; relocation and stable remarriage may count but must be proved as part of totality of circumstances
Relevance of defendant’s collateral consequences	Not relevant to plaintiff safety	Collateral harms (e.g., inability to obtain firearm permit) warrant consideration	Collateral consequences are irrelevant; sole inquiry is plaintiff safety and reasonable fear
Weight of plaintiff’s silence at termination hearing	Silence does not equal consent or lack of fear	Plaintiff’s failure to appear should weigh in favor of termination	Court should not infer acquiescence from silence; plaintiff may rest on finality of order

Mitchell v. Mitchell, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 769 (establishing that vacatur/termination of c. 209A orders is permitted only in extraordinary circumstances)
Iamele v. Asselin, 444 Mass. 734 (describing standards for initial and extended c. 209A relief and evaluating reasonable fear at time relief is sought)
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (party seeking modification of decree bears burden to show significant changed circumstances)
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (discussing allocation of risk of error among standards of proof)
Moreno v. Naranjo, 465 Mass. 1001 (c. 209A’s protective purpose; judge must focus on plaintiff's need for protection)
Champagne v. Champagne, 429 Mass. 324 (noting Commonwealth policy against domestic abuse and caution about inferring consent from silence)
Birchall, petitioner, 454 Mass. 837 (use of clear and convincing standard in civil contempt context)