237 F. Supp. 3d 528
E.D. Ky.2017Background
- M.L. Johnson Family Properties (Johnson) owns surface rights to land in Kentucky above coal leased by Premier Elkhorn; a dispute over mining led to agency proceedings and an ALJ decision favoring Elkhorn.
- OSMRE (Department of the Interior) inspected, issued a cessation order, later terminated that cessation order; an Interior ALJ affirmed termination and Johnson appealed to the Interior Appeals Board and petitioned for a stay.
- The Appeals Board took no action on Johnson’s stay petition within 45 days; Johnson filed this federal suit seeking vacatur of the ALJ’s ruling and reinstatement of the cessation order while its agency appeal was pending.
- After filing, Johnson voluntarily dismissed its agency appeal; the Board then said its jurisdiction had not ended merely because it failed to act, and the Secretary moved for judgment on the pleadings arguing lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for failure to exhaust.
- The central legal dispute is whether SMCRA’s exhaustion requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional (barring court review until final agency action), and if so, whether Johnson obtained a “final” agency action under agency regulations (43 C.F.R. § 4.21) when the Board failed to act within 45 days.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether SMCRA exhaustion is mandatory or prudential | Johnson: SMCRA doesn’t explicitly mandate exhaustion; ergo it should be prudential/nonmandatory | Secretary: Sixth Circuit precedent treats SMCRA exhaustion as mandatory | Court: Bound by Sixth Circuit—SMCRA exhaustion is mandatory |
| Whether mandatory exhaustion is jurisdictional or a claims-processing rule | Johnson: Under modern clear-statement rules, SMCRA does not clearly make exhaustion jurisdictional; thus it should be nonjurisdictional | Secretary: Sixth Circuit precedent treats SMCRA exhaustion as jurisdictional | Court: Bound by Sixth Circuit holdings; SMCRA exhaustion is jurisdictional |
| Whether Johnson received a final agency action allowing judicial review | Johnson: 43 C.F.R. § 4.21(c) makes an ALJ decision "final" (and reviewable) if the Appeals Board fails to act on a stay petition within 45 days | Secretary: "Effective" under the regulation is not the same as final; the agency process was not consummated, so action is non-final and unreviewable | Court: Agency regulation and precedent (Weinberger, Sackett) permit agency-defined finality; Board’s inaction produced a final, reviewable action — Johnson exhausted to the extent required |
| Timeliness under SMCRA’s 30-day filing rule | Secretary/Elkhorn: Johnson’s filing was untimely relative to triggers argued by defendants | Johnson: Complaint was filed within 30 days of the agency action becoming final under § 4.21(b)(4) | Court: Johnson filed within 30 days of the point the regulation renders the ALJ decision final; claim is timely |
Key Cases Cited
- Shawnee Coal Co. v. Andrus, 661 F.2d 1083 (6th Cir. 1981) (held SMCRA requires exhaustion before judicial relief)
- Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, 20 F.3d 1418 (6th Cir. 1994) (affirmed SMCRA exhaustion rule as barring federal jurisdiction when not met)
- Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (Sup. Ct.) (agencies may define what counts as a final decision when statute leaves room)
- Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (Sup. Ct.) (two-part test for final agency action)
- Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120 (Sup. Ct.) (agency inaction or opportunity for informal reconsideration does not necessarily defeat finality)
- Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (Sup. Ct.) (distinguishing jurisdictional rules from procedural requirements)