Lytle v. Mathew
2017 Ohio 1447
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs (Carol Lytle and the estate of Tracy Lytle) refiled a wrongful-death suit in Cuyahoga County alleging defendants’ negligent prescribing and dispensing caused Tracy’s 2010 death; the suit mirrors an earlier action filed in Summit County.
- Prior to her death, Tracy had been under investigation for BWC (Workers’ Compensation) fraud; Tracy admitted to investigators that she worked for and was paid by attorney Natalie Grubb while receiving BWC benefits.
- Defendants sought Grubb’s deposition and records about Tracy’s employment/payments; the trial court in the Summit action applied the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege and allowed discovery.
- After remand and additional proceedings, defendants moved to disqualify Grubb (and her firm) from representing plaintiffs in the refiled Cuyahoga County action, arguing she is a necessary witness and has a conflict under the professional conduct rules.
- The trial court disqualified Grubb and her firm under Prof.Cond.R. 3.7 and 1.7, finding her testimony necessary, not protected by privilege (crime-fraud exception), and that her personal interests posed a conflict imputed to the firm.
- The court of appeals affirmed, applying an abuse-of-discretion standard and concluding the disqualification was necessary and not unduly prejudicial to plaintiffs.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel (Grubb) must be disqualified as a likely necessary witness under Prof.Cond.R. 3.7 | Grubb is not a "necessary" witness; her testimony about BWC matters is not material to the wrongful-death suit and remains privileged; disqualification causes hardship | Grubb is the only witness who can explain payments, checks, and communications with Tracy; testimony is material and unobtainable elsewhere | Court: Disqualification proper — Grubb’s testimony is necessary and not protected by privilege (crime-fraud exception) |
| Whether attorney-client privilege bars testimony about communications relating to the BWC fraud investigation | Privilege protects Grubb’s communications with Tracy | Crime-fraud exception applies because there is factual basis (Tracy’s admission and Grubb’s conviction) showing communications were in furtherance of fraud | Court: Privilege does not apply; crime-fraud exception removes protection |
| Whether disqualification would cause substantial hardship under Prof.Cond.R. 3.7(3) | Disqualification would substantially prejudice plaintiffs; Grubb’s firm has special expertise and continuity | No proof of specialized expertise; case was refiled so new counsel can participate early | Court: Plaintiffs failed to show specialized expertise or substantial hardship; exception not met |
| Whether Grubb’s personal interests create a conflict imputed to her firm under Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 and 1.10 | Grubb’s prior criminal matter is concluded/expunged and disciplinary matters resolved, so no personal-interest conflict | Grubb’s personal interest in testifying truthfully (and potential adverse testimony about her role) poses a substantial risk of materially limiting her representation; conflict is imputed to the firm | Court: Conflict exists and is imputed; disqualification of entire firm appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- 155 N. High, Ltd. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 423 (Ohio 1995) (abuse-of-discretion standard for attorney-disqualification review)
- Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Ref. Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 1 (Ohio 1998) (disqualification interferes with client’s right to choose counsel; drastic remedy)
- Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 127 Ohio St.3d 161 (Ohio 2010) (crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege)
- Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (Ohio 1983) (definition of abuse of discretion)