Luis Fernando Puente v. the State of Texas, 13-20-00014-CR

Background

Appellant Luis Fernando Puente was convicted of four counts of possession of child pornography and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child under 14; sentencing included 60 years for continuous abuse and concurrent 10-year terms for each pornography count.
At trial, the State’s expert, Sonja Eddleman (a sexual assault nurse examiner and supervisor), reviewed and read statements from medical records prepared by hospital personnel documenting what the child complainants told examiners. The complainants also testified at trial.
Puente objected at trial generally on bolstering grounds and to Eddleman’s role, but did not specifically object on Confrontation Clause grounds to the challenged statements. He also moved to suppress evidence taken from his cell phone.
The phone was located at a brother‑in‑law’s residence, retrieved by a relative who gave it to a Ranger; officers obtained a search warrant before viewing the phone. The trial court denied suppression, finding Puente lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy (standing).
On appeal Puente argued (1) admission of Eddleman’s testimony violated his Confrontation Clause right, (2) Eddleman’s testimony improperly bolstered complainants, and (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He raised a new suppression theory on appeal (lack of exigent circumstances) that was not the basis for the trial court’s ruling.
The Court of Appeals affirmed: Confrontation claim was not preserved and, in any event, the records/statements were non‑testimonial medical records and the complainants testified; bolstering complaints were inadequately developed; suppression ruling was supported by an unchallenged ground (lack of standing) and appellant forfeited other theories.

Issues

Issue	Puente's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Confrontation Clause — admission of Eddleman reading medical reports	Eddleman "regurgitated" testimonial hearsay from non‑testifying nurses; admission violated Sixth Amendment	No specific Confrontation objection at trial; statements were made for medical diagnosis/treatment (non‑testimonial); complainants testified and were cross‑examined	Not preserved for review; alternatively, records/statements were non‑testimonial medical statements and admission did not violate Confrontation Clause — issue overruled
Bolstering — expert testimony reading others’ reports	Eddleman was used solely to bolster complainants by repeating other examiners’ reports	Objections were general and not tied to specific testimony; corroborative evidence is not per se impermissible bolstering	Overruled — appellant failed to show how testimony was improper bolstering or preserve specific error
Motion to suppress — phone evidence	Officers lacked exigent circumstances to seize/view phone; evidence should be suppressed as fruit of poisonous tree	Trial court relied on lack of appellant’s expectation of privacy (standing); officers obtained a warrant before viewing contents; exigency was argued at trial but standing was main basis	Overruled — appellant did not challenge all independent grounds relied on by trial court (standing); alternative appellate theory forfeited

Key Cases Cited

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial out‑of‑court statements unless declarant unavailable and prior opportunity for cross‑examination)
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011) (primary‑purpose test for deciding whether statements are testimonial)
Melendez‑Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (medical/treatment records are generally non‑testimonial)
De La Paz v. State, 273 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (whether out‑of‑court statement is testimonial is a legal question)
Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (defining testimonial statements for Confrontation analysis)
Ramos v. State, 245 S.W.3d 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (abuse of discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (defining impermissible bolstering versus permissible corroboration)
Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (non‑overnight guests lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in a residence)
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (bifurcated standard of review for suppression hearings)
Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (deference to trial court’s factual findings on suppression that turn on credibility)
Kelly v. State, 204 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (view evidence in light most favorable to trial court’s ruling on suppression)