Lucas v. Office of the Colorado State Public Defender, 705 F. App'x 700

Background

Roger J. Lucas, a Filipino‑American deputy public defender, repeatedly made unwanted non‑work communications (texts, Facebook messages, gifts, bar confrontation, office intrusions) to a younger female colleague, Catherine Peterson.
Supervisors warned Lucas and then issued a formal corrective action forbidding any contact with Peterson and requiring work communications be routed through another attorney; it warned dismissal for violations.
Lucas violated the no‑contact directive multiple times, insisted the directive was discriminatory, threatened to contact the EEOC, and directly emailed Peterson about a work matter after the corrective action.
The regional head, Carrie Thompson, recommended termination to the State Public Defender, Douglas Wilson; Wilson terminated Lucas the next day.
Lucas later applied for a contract position with the Office of Alternative Defense Counsel (OADC) but was not hired. He sued under Title VII (race, reverse‑sex discrimination, retaliation), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Equal Protection), and Colorado tortious‑interference law against the Defender’s Office, Wilson, and Thompson.
On cross‑motions for summary judgment, the magistrate judge granted defendants’ motion and denied Lucas’s; the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the corrective action was an adverse employment action for discrimination claims	Lucas: corrective action humiliated him, harmed reputation and future prospects; thus adverse	Defs: disciplinary corrective action without change in status/benefits is not an adverse action	Court: corrective action was not an adverse action (no significant change in employment status)
Whether employer must prove proffered nondiscriminatory reason is true before burden shifts	Lucas: employers should be required to prove their stated reason is true	Defs: under McDonnell Douglas/Burdine, employer need only produce a legitimate, non‑discriminatory reason (burden of production, not persuasion)	Court: adhered to binding precedent — employer’s burden is production only; no change
Whether Lucas engaged in protected activity supporting a Title VII retaliation claim	Lucas: his threats to contact the EEOC about the corrective action were protected opposition	Defs: Lucas never conveyed that the alleged misconduct was because of a protected class (race/gender)	Court: no protected activity shown — complaints were vague and not tied to discrimination, so retaliation claim fails
Whether Thompson/Wilson tortiously interfered with Lucas’s OADC contract prospects	Lucas: circumstantial facts (friendship/communications) allow inference of interference	Defs: OADC director affidavit said decision based on lack of Defender Office references and she had no contact with Thompson/Wilson	Court: summary judgment for defendants — undisputed affidavit evidence defeats interference claim; speculation insufficient

Key Cases Cited

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden‑shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination claims)
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (employer’s burden is one of production, not persuasion)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (clarifying burdens at summary judgment under McDonnell Douglas)
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (discussing credibility and burden allocation in discrimination cases)
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (broader definition of adverse action for retaliation claims)
Piercy v. Maketa, 480 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2007) (adverse action for discrimination claims limited to actions affecting employment conditions)
Haynes v. Level 3 Commc’ns, LLC, 456 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2006) (disciplinary warning is not an adverse employment action absent effect on status/benefits)
DePaula v. Easter Seals El Mirador, 859 F.3d 957 (10th Cir. 2017) (defendant’s articulated reasons need only be legitimate and nondiscriminatory on their face)
Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2006) (reverse‑gender discrimination prima facie standards)
Hinds v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 523 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2008) (employee’s complaint must convey belief that employer engaged in Title VII‑prohibited conduct to be protected activity)
Petersen v. Utah Dep’t of Corrs., 301 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2002) (complaints must give adequate notice that Title VII is implicated)
Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1995) (elements of tortious interference with prospective business relations under Colorado law)