Loubriel v. Fondo del Seguro del Estado
694 F.3d 139
| 1st Cir. | 2012Background
- ADA Title I requires exhaustion and filing within 90 days of EEOC right-to-sue notice
- Plaintiff Loubriel worked for Puerto Rico Fund; had degenerative arthritis and part-time schedule
- In Jan 2008 plaintiff sought 45 days advanced non-occupational sick leave, denied
- EEOC right-to-sue notice mailed May 8, 2009, allegedly received Sept 10, 2009
- Plaintiff filed suit Sept 29, 2009, after 90-day window
- District court granted summary judgment for Fund; court of appeals affirms as time-barred
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of Title I ADA claim after right-to-sue notice | Loubriel contends receipt was Sept 10, 2009, so 90 days extended | Receipt presumed timely; 90-day period began May 8, 2009 | Time-barred under 90-day rule |
| Constructive receipt via attorney of record | Attorney Lugo's receipt triggers start of filing period | Notice to attorney equates to notice to claimant; constructive knowledge applies | Constructive notice established; suit untimely |
| Continuing violation tolling of the 90-day period | Ongoing discrimination tolls the filing window | Continued violation tolling not applicable to initial 90-day period | Continued violation tolling not available to extend filing window |
| Presumption of receipt for first-class mailed notices | Receipt date uncertain; presumption could delay accrual | There is a general presumption of timely mailing/receipt | Receipt presumed by mid-May; timely filing not shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990) (notice to attorney suffices to begin the 90-day period)
- Mercado v. Ritz-Carlton San Juan Hotel, Spa & Casino, 410 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2005) (constructive knowledge when represented by counsel)
- Me. Med. Ctr. v. United States, 675 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 2012) (presumption of mailing/receipt for agency notices)
- Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d 522 (2d Cir. 1996) (timing of receipt for mailed notices (3 days))
- Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 1999) (reasonable time for receipt after mailing (3–5 days))
- Banks v. Rockwell Int’l N. Am. Aircraft Ops’, 855 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1988) (receipt presumed within a few days after mailing)
- Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2002) (receipt dates after mailing discussed in tolling context)
- Abraham v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Inst., 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009) (assessing receipt time after mailing)
- Wade v. Knoxville Utils. Bd., 259 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2001) (continuing violation tolling considerations)
- Brown v. Hartshorne Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 926 F.2d 959 (10th Cir. 1991) (limits on continuing violation tolling)
- Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999) (purpose of continuing violation tolling)
- O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 2001) (continuing violation tolling discussed)