Loren Shirk v. United States
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 23090
| 9th Cir. | 2014Background
- On Oct. 19, 2006, two Gila River Indian Community (GRIC) tribal police officers in a GRIC police vehicle chased Leshedriek Sanford off-reservation after observing erratic driving; Sanford crashed into Loren Shirk’s motorcycle, causing serious injury. Sanford was later convicted under Arizona law.
- Shirk sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging the tribal officers were "deemed" Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) employees under 25 U.S.C. § 450f (note) ("§ 314") while carrying out federal agreements, making the U.S. liable for their negligence.
- The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; plaintiffs appealed. The parties disputed which federal-tribal agreement governed (a 1998 "638" ISDEAA contract, a 2003 self-governance Compact, and a 2007–2011 Multi-Year Funding Agreement (MYFA)).
- The Ninth Circuit framed § 314 as a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the challenged conduct was "carrying out" the federal contract/agreement (i.e., within the employment defined by the contract); and (2) whether, under state law, the conduct fell within the scope of that employment.
- Because the district court and the parties had not analyzed jurisdiction under this two-step test and the record left factual questions about which agreements were operative, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded for the district court to apply the two-step framework and make necessary factual findings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 314 makes tribal officers "deemed" federal employees for FTCA liability | Shirk: officers were carrying out federal agreements and thus the U.S. is liable for their negligence | U.S.: officers were not "carrying out" the federal contracts/agreements at the time, so § 314 does not apply | Remanded — court adopted a two-step test and required district court factfinding on whether officers were carrying out the agreements and whether their conduct was within state-law scope of employment |
| Proper interpretation of § 314’s phrase "acting within the scope of their employment in carrying out the contract or agreement" | Shirk: (implicitly) § 314 covers the officers here | U.S.: (implicitly) § 314 should be narrowly applied and does not cover these off‑reservation actions | Court: § 314 incorporates traditional scope-of-employment analysis under state law; "carrying out" limits the relevant employment to functions under the federal contract/agreement |
| Standard for resolving § 314 claims (choice of law/analysis) | Shirk: FTCA/§ 314 applies if covered by contract and scope-of-employment | U.S.: (implicitly) scope-of-employment must be construed narrowly; district court had treated 638 contract as controlling | Court: adopt consistent usage canon — interpret "scope of employment" by state law; two-step test required (contract coverage then state-law scope) |
| Whether appellate court should resolve § 314 coverage on existing record | Shirk: wants decision on merits | U.S. & GRIC: dispute which contract governed; factual questions exist | Court: decline to decide merits; remand for district court because record and state-law analysis were incomplete |
Key Cases Cited
- FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (sovereign immunity and FTCA waiver principles)
- Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (statutory use of "scope of employment" adopts common-law meaning)
- Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224 (similar text in statutes should be given same meaning)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (courts may choose order of prongs in multi-step analyses)
- Lyons v. Brown, 158 F.3d 605 (First Circuit on contract defining employment; then state law defines scope)
- Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (canon against superfluity and statutory interpretation)
- Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525 (scope-of-employment under state law applied in FTCA analysis)