Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775

Lopez, a student at Los Angeles City College, challenged the District's sexual harassment policy as overbroad and vague under the First Amendment.
The policy sections at issue are 15001 (general prohibition) and 15003(A) (definition of sexual harassment).
Lopez claimed the policy chilled his right to speak on religious topics in Speech 101 after incidents with a professor and university officials.
November 24, 2008: professor interrupted Lopez’s speech, called him a 'fascist bastard,' and offered an option to leave the classroom; no explicit threat of enforcing the policy was made.
December 2, 2008: Lopez received an assignment note implying he should follow the Student Code of Conduct; no direct reference to enforcing the policy against him.
December 4, 2008: a letter from a dean reported other students were offended by Lopez’s speech; the letter stated no action would be taken against students and highlighted that First Amendment rights would not be violated.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing to challenge policy pre-enforcement	Lopez argues he has injury in fact due to credible threat of enforcement.	Defendants contend Lopez lacks concrete injury since policy not applied to him.	Lopez lacks injury in fact; no credible threat of enforcement shown.
Whether Lopez's self-censorship creates standing	Lopez self-censors speech fearing enforcement, constituting injury in fact.	Self-censorship alone is insufficient to prove injury in fact.	Self-censorship does not establish standing here.
Risk of enforcement given policy's text	Policy arguably covers Lopez’s religious speech and could be enforced against him.	Policy does not on its face apply to Lopez’s past or intended future speech; no credible threat level found.	Policy does not reasonably apply to Lopez; no credible threat of enforcement.
Third-party overbreadth standing	Lopez can assert rights of others under overbreadth doctrine.	The injury-in-fact requirement cannot be satisfied to raise third-party rights.	Lopez cannot raise third-party rights; no standing for overbreadth.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (injury in fact is required for standing)
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979) (realistic danger of enforcement supports standing in pre-enforcement cases)
LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2000) (relaxed standing analysis for pre-enforcement challenges)
Bayless v. Ohio Right to Life Political Action Comm., 320 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2003) (standing established where conduct is affected by statute; concrete intent shown)
Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2006) (organization standing through pre-enforcement by altering expressive activities)
Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (require concrete plan to violate law for standing)
Getman v. City of New York, 328 F.3d 108 (9th Cir. 2003) (standing requires speech to fall within statute; concrete evidence of intent)
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (prohibition on speculative injury; need actual or imminent injury)
Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2006) (pre-enforcement standing for organization under broad statutes)
Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1994) (standing where statute applies only to others; no standing for individual)