Lonzo Stanley v. United States
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12182
| 7th Cir. | 2016Background
- Lonzo Stanley pleaded guilty to distributing crack cocaine and was sentenced in 2004 to 200 months after the district court treated him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. §4B1.1 based on three prior convictions (a drug offense, unlawful possession of a firearm, and aggravated battery of a peace officer).
- Stanley did not appeal or file a §2255 collateral attack within the one-year limitations period, but after Johnson v. United States he filed seeking relief under §2255(f)(3), which provides a new one-year window from a newly recognized Supreme Court right.
- The district court denied relief, concluding Johnson’s holding (invalidating the ACCA residual clause) did not affect Stanley’s sentence; Stanley appealed and the government waived timeliness defenses to reach the merits.
- The Seventh Circuit assumed, for purposes of the appeal, that Johnson’s reasoning could apply to the Sentencing Guidelines but analyzed each prior conviction to determine whether Johnson or other authorities altered their classification.
- The court held the drug conviction still qualified under the Guidelines; the firearm-possession conviction never qualified as a crime of violence under the Guidelines (per the Sentencing Commission’s application note) and thus should not have been counted; the aggravated-battery conviction properly qualified under the elements clause and Stanley produced no record evidence showing he was convicted under a non-violent theory.
- Because Stanley failed to show the aggravated-battery conviction was non-violent and the firearm conviction was categorically not a crime of violence, his sentence remained lawful; the judgment was affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson’s invalidation of the ACCA residual clause opens a new §2255(f)(3) window to challenge Stanley’s career-offender status | Johnson creates a new right that permits Stanley to attack prior convictions counted toward career-offender status | Johnson only invalidated the residual clause and does not affect convictions classified under the elements clause or those excluded by guideline application notes | Johnson does not grant a new §2255(f)(3) window for convictions unaffected by the residual clause; Stanley’s challenge is untimely as to those convictions |
| Whether Stanley’s unlawful-possession-of-a-firearm conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. §4B1.2 | Stanley seeks to reclassify the conviction as qualifying for career-offender treatment | The Sentencing Commission’s application note (Amendment 433) and precedent treat mere felon-in-possession where a non-felon could lawfully possess the gun as not a crime of violence | The firearm conviction never qualified and should not have been counted; its classification is unaffected by Johnson |
| Whether Stanley’s aggravated-battery conviction is a crime of violence under the elements clause | Stanley suggests he might have been convicted under a non-forceful subsection of the statute (insulting conduct) and thus not a crime of violence | The charged offense and record show a violent-battery theory; Hill v. Werlinger and Rodriguez-Gomez treat the Illinois aggravated-battery statute as divisible but prosecution charged a violent variant | The conviction qualifies under the elements clause; Stanley failed to produce evidence (charging papers, judgment notation, plea colloquy) to show he was convicted under a non-violent theory |
| Whether a silent or divisible record entitles Stanley to relief under modified categorical approach after Descamps/Shepard | Stanley argues ambiguity about which statutory theory he pleaded to undermines the classification | Courts require the movant to produce evidence from the record (charging documents, plea colloquy, judgment) showing the specific theory; a silent record favors the government | Absent affirmative record evidence from Stanley, the indictment and record stand and his conviction remains a qualifying predicate; relief denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Price v. United States, 795 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015) (held Johnson’s right is retroactive for collateral review)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (Supreme Court agreed Johnson is retroactive)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (explained divisible statutes and when modified categorical approach applies)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limited sources courts may consult when applying the modified categorical approach)
- Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993) (Sentencing Commission interpretations have controlling weight unless they violate the Constitution or a federal statute)
- Hill v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2012) (Illinois aggravated battery of a peace officer is a violent felony because use of force is an element)
- United States v. Rodriguez-Gomez, 608 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2010) (held Illinois aggravated-battery statute is divisible for categorical analysis)
- United States v. Ramirez, 606 F.3d 396 (7th Cir. 2010) (explained burden on defendant to produce record evidence when statute is divisible)