Long v. District of Columbia Housing Authority
166 F. Supp. 3d 16
D.D.C.2016Background
- Plaintiff William A. Long is a lifetime sex-offender registrant (convicted 1991; registered 2000) who was admitted to DCHA’s Housing Choice Voucher Program in 2002 and has been recertified periodically.
- DCHA attempted to terminate Long’s assistance in 2007 (relying on HUD regulation about denying admission to lifetime registrants); an informal hearing officer denied termination and DCHA did not appeal.
- In 2012 HUD issued Notice PIH 2012-28 urging PHAs to terminate erroneously admitted lifetime registrants; DCHA later promulgated 14 D.C.M.R. § 5804.1(b) (2013) expressly permitting termination if any household member is a lifetime registrant.
- In 2014 DCHA again sought to terminate Long under 14 D.C.M.R. § 5804.1(b); an informal hearing officer denied termination (citing ex post facto concerns and prior decision), but DCHA Executive Director Todman reversed and terminated assistance effective Jan 31, 2015.
- Long sued under § 1983 and related theories challenging the termination as inconsistent with federal statute/regulations, alleging procedural due process and statutory notice violations, and raising preclusion and D.C. regulatory claims. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on undisputed facts.
- The Court: granted summary judgment to defendants on Counts II–IV (procedural/due-process and preclusion claims), denied both sides’ summary judgment as to Count I (§ 1983 substantive challenge to termination under federal housing law) and Count V (violation of D.C. regs) without prejudice for further briefing; affirmed that Todman’s written reversal and the 2014 notice met minimal Goldberg/§ 982.555 requirements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Housing Act and HUD regs create a private right enforceable under § 1983 to challenge termination for being a lifetime registrant | Long: federal statutory/regulatory scheme does not authorize termination of already-admitted participants for lifetime-registration status; DCHA’s local rule conflicts with federal law, so Long can sue under § 1983 | DCHA: the Housing Act/regulations do not unambiguously create such a right; HUD provisions mostly address admission not termination; DCHA relied on its local regulation and HUD guidance | Court: unresolved at summary judgment — parties must brief whether the cited federal provisions create an individual right enforceable under § 1983; Count I denied without prejudice for further briefing |
| Whether Long received constitutionally and statutorily adequate process (Goldberg/§ 1437d(k) /24 C.F.R. § 982.555) | Long: Todman’s reversal was perfunctory and the 2014 termination notice failed to articulate a valid legal basis | DCHA: Long had informal hearing, counsel, opportunity to present evidence; Todman cited the D.C. regulation; notice quoted § 5804.1(b); decision and notice meet minimal Goldberg/§ 982.555 requirements | Court: defendants entitled to summary judgment on Counts II & III — written reversal and notice satisfied the bare minimum for due process and statutory hearing rules |
| Whether the 2007 informal hearing decision precludes termination in 2014 (res judicata/collateral estoppel) | Long: earlier hearing officer decision bars relitigation; DCHA already litigated the authority to terminate him | DCHA: 2014 termination rested on different legal authority (new D.C. regulation and HUD 2012 Notice) not decided in 2007 | Court: collateral estoppel and res judicata do not apply — 2007 issue was limited to HUD regulation about admission; § 5804.1(b) did not exist in 2007; summary judgment for defendants on Count IV |
| Whether DCHA violated 14 D.C.M.R. § 5804.4 by failing to prove a violation by preponderance | Long: DCHA failed to carry its burden at the administrative proceeding | DCHA: briefing inadequate on this point; contends termination was authorized by local regulation and HUD guidance | Court: denied summary judgment on Count V without prejudice — inadequate briefing and interdependence with Count I require fuller development |
Key Cases Cited
- Simmons v. Drew, 716 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1983) (describing Section 8 program structure and PHAs’ role)
- Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (U.S. 1997) (three-factor test for whether a federal statute confers rights enforceable under § 1983)
- Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (U.S. 2002) (statutory text must unambiguously confer individual rights to be enforced under § 1983)
- Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (U.S. 1987) (holding certain Housing Act provisions created enforceable rights pre-Gonzaga)
- Johnson v. Housing Auth. of Jefferson Parish, 442 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2006) (post-Gonzaga application finding a specific Housing Act provision enforceable under § 1983)
- Caswell v. City of Detroit Housing Comm’n, 418 F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 2005) (refusing to infer an individual § 1983 right where statute lacks clear right-creating language)
- Edwards v. District of Columbia, 821 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (narrow construction of rights under the Housing Act)
- Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1980) (§ 1983 may be used to enforce federal statutory rights)
- Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (U.S. 1970) (due process requirements for termination of government benefits)
- Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding § 1437d(k) creates procedural rights enforceable under § 1983)
- Moore v. Ross, 502 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (explaining purposes and minimal detail required in administrative decision to satisfy Goldberg)