Long 162838 v. Ryan, 2:14-cv-02655

Larry Bernard Long was convicted in Maricopa County (June 16, 2009) and sentenced to 28 years; direct appeal affirmed by Arizona Court of Appeals on January 18, 2011; conviction became final February 22, 2011.
Long filed a timely first PCR (post-conviction relief) proceeding in Feb. 2011; counsel submitted a notice of completion Aug. 1, 2011; trial court dismissed the PCR on March 1, 2012; Long did not seek appellate review of that dismissal.
Long filed a second, untimely/successive PCR notice in Aug. 2013 (based on the Fair Sentencing Act); it was dismissed as untimely and successive; court of appeals denied review March 12, 2015.
Long filed his federal habeas petition (§ 2254) originally Dec. 9, 2014 and an amended petition Feb. 24, 2015, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and a wrongful sentence.
The magistrate judge analyzed AEDPA timeliness: limitations began to run after direct review concluded (Feb. 22, 2011), was tolled during the first PCR up to the time to seek appellate review (began running April 6, 2012), and thus expired April 5, 2013 absent equitable tolling.
Court found the second PCR was untimely and did not toll AEDPA; Long’s equitable-tolling arguments (lockdown law-library restrictions, counsel abandonment) were rejected for lack of specific facts and diligence; petition held untimely and recommended denied with no COA.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When did AEDPA limitations period begin and expire?	Long implicitly contends his filings and tolling made his petition timely.	Limitations began on conclusion of direct review (Feb 22, 2011); expired April 5, 2013 after accounting for tolling for first PCR.	Court held conviction final Feb 22, 2011; limitations expired April 5, 2013 absent equitable tolling.
Does Long get statutory tolling for his state PCRs?	Long relies on state PCR filings to toll AEDPA.	First PCR tolled while pending; second PCR was untimely and did not toll.	First PCR tolled until the time to seek appellate review expired; second PCR did not toll.
Does equitable tolling apply due to limited law-library access or counsel abandonment?	Long asserts extraordinary circumstances: long segregation, limited access, and abandonment by PCR counsel.	Respondents argue ordinary prison restrictions and lack of specific, diligent efforts; counsel’s role does not justify tolling.	Court denied equitable tolling: petitioner failed to show extraordinary circumstances or reasonable diligence.
Did the amended petition relate back to the original pleading to avoid AEDPA bar?	Long’s amended petition should relate back or be treated as timely under relation-back rules.	Relation-back only applies if claims arise from same core facts; timing still renders petition untimely.	Court found relation-back/original filing date would not cure the one-year expiration; petition untimely by ~20 months.

Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2007) (direct appeal final when time for further review expires)
Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3 (2007) (untimely state collateral petition is not "properly filed" for AEDPA tolling)
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) (untimely state postconviction petition ends tolling inquiry)
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (equitable tolling available where diligence and extraordinary circumstances shown)
Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005) (relation-back for amended habeas claims requires common core of operative facts)
Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2002) (statutory tolling during properly filed state collateral review)
Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2009) (ordinary prison limitations on access do not warrant equitable tolling)
Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2011) (egregious attorney conduct can justify equitable tolling)
Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327 (2007) (lack of legal assistance in seeking postconviction relief generally not a basis for tolling)