Lone Star Security & Video, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles
827 F.3d 1192
9th Cir.2016Background
- California amended its Vehicle Code (2010–2012) to authorize local bans on (1) portable, non-motorized wheeled vehicles whose primary purpose is advertising ("non-motorized mobile billboards") and (2) non-permanently affixed or oversize signs on motor vehicles.
- Los Angeles, Santa Clarita, Rancho Cucamonga, and Loma Linda enacted near-identical ordinances banning one or both forms and authorizing penalties and impoundment for violations.
- Lone Star Security operated towable trailer billboards; Sami Ammari attached non-permanent signs to parked motor vehicles. Both challenged the ordinances as facial First Amendment violations.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the cities, holding the ordinances were content neutral time, place, and manner restrictions narrowly tailored to significant governmental interests and leaving ample alternatives.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed, concluding the bans regulate manner/mode (mobility/affixation/size) not content, serve safety, aesthetics, and parking interests, and leave alternative channels for expression.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the mobile‑billboard ordinances are content‑based | The term "advertising" targets speech (commercial/political) and thus is content based | "Advertising" refers to the act/manner of displaying a message; ordinances regulate vehicles/affixation, not message | Content neutral — regulates manner/mode, not message |
| Whether content‑neutral restrictions are narrowly tailored to significant government interests | Bans are overbroad and restrict protected speech in all applications | Cities cite aesthetics, traffic safety, parking control as substantial interests; bans directly address those evils | Narrowly tailored — bans directly advance legitimate aesthetic, safety, and parking interests |
| Whether the ordinances leave open ample alternative channels for communication | Mobile billboards are a unique medium; banning them impairs ability to communicate effectively | Plaintiffs can use many other media (stationary billboards, decals, flyers, etc.) | Leaves open ample alternatives — plaintiffs' overall ability to communicate not threatened |
| Whether Reed v. Town of Gilbert requires treating the ordinances as content‑based | Plaintiffs rely on Reed to show any sign regulation distinguishing subject is content‑based | Cities and court contend ordinances do not single out subject matter or viewpoint; enforcement depends on physical attributes (mobility, affixation, size) | Reed does not change result — ordinances do not single out subject matter or viewpoint |
Key Cases Cited
- Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach, 574 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2009) (time, place, and manner analysis for public‑forum sign regulations)
- Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S.Ct. 2218 (2015) (content‑based restriction doctrine and strict scrutiny for laws that distinguish based on subject/viewpoint)
- Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (aesthetics can justify banning a category of visual advertising)
- Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (narrow tailoring in time, place, manner context — means not substantially broader than necessary)
- Clark v. Community for Creative Non‑Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (time, place, manner tests: content neutrality, narrow tailoring, ample alternatives)
- Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (municipal power to ban certain outdoor advertising to protect safety and aesthetics)
- Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (review city construction/implementation when assessing facial challenges)