Lolar v. State of Oklahoma, The, 4:17-cv-00139

Background

Marcus E. Lolar, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleging false arrest/imprisonment, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress related to his Osage County convictions (CF-2012-360).
Defendants named were the State of Oklahoma and Burl Estes, a public defender with the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System.
Lolar sought monetary relief (up to $15,000,000) and other relief tied to alleged constitutional violations (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, due process).
The district court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2), applying the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standards and pro se liberal construction principles.
The court dismissed claims seeking relief that would invalidate Lolar’s conviction as barred by Heck v. Humphrey and related habeas principles, dismissed the State defendant under Eleventh Amendment immunity, and dismissed claims against public defender Estes because public defenders are not state actors under § 1983.
The dismissal was without prejudice, counted as a “prior occasion” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and Lolar remained obligated to pay the filing fee balance.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 1983 may be used to obtain relief that would invalidate convictions	Lolar contends his arrest/imprisonment and related process were unconstitutional and seeks damages/release	Defendants assert § 1983 relief is barred until conviction is invalidated	Court: Heck/related habeas rule bars § 1983 claims that would imply invalidity of conviction; dismiss without prejudice
Whether the State of Oklahoma can be sued in federal court under § 1983	Lolar sued the State for constitutional violations related to his prosecution/incarceration	State invokes Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity	Court: Eleventh Amendment bars suit against the State; dismiss without prejudice
Whether a public defender acts under color of state law for § 1983 liability	Lolar alleges Estes (public defender) violated his rights by failing to challenge defects and conspiring with prosecutors/judges	Estes (and doctrine) contend defense counsel performing traditional functions is not a state actor	Court: Public defender’s actions in representing client are not state action; § 1983 claim dismissed for failure to state a claim
Whether the pleading satisfied federal pleading standards for a pro se prisoner	Lolar provides factual assertions of conspiracy, defective warrant, and misconduct	Court evaluates under Twombly/Iqbal and gives liberal construction but requires plausible facts	Court: Complaint fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim for the reasons above; dismissal affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (§ 1983 claim barred if success would render conviction invalid unless conviction was previously invalidated)
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy to challenge the fact or duration of confinement)
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) (state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred if success would necessarily affect duration of confinement absent prior invalidation)
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (public defender does not act under color of state law when performing traditional lawyer functions)
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (defense counsel’s defective performance does not make them a state actor under § 1983)
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (§ 1983 does not abrogate state sovereign immunity)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must state a plausible claim for relief)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (Twombly standard applies to all civil actions; courts need not accept conclusory allegations)