997 F. Supp. 2d 71
D. Mass.2014Background
- Burt and the Town of Southwick move to dismiss seven state-law claims in a civil action brought by Christina Lloyd, asserting MCRA, assault and battery, negligence, malicious prosecution, IIED, NIED against Burt, and negligence against Southwick.
- Plaintiff alleges Burt used force during a seizure to compel handover of a child to DCF, causing injury and triggering criminal proceedings.
- Plaintiff’s amended complaint contends DCF lacked authority to remove the child without a warrant; Lloyd suffered physical and emotional damages.
- The case was removed from state court to federal court; the court granted leave to amend and then denied the initial dismissal without prejudice, with Defendants renewing dismissal efforts.
- The court will evaluate the claims under Rule 12(b)(6) standards, addressing each count’s viability against Burt and Southwick.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| MCRA claim viability against Burt | Lloyd claims Burt used threats/coercion to seize the child. | Burt argues no threats/intimidation or direct rights violation. | MCRA claim survives to proceed. |
| Assault and battery against Burt | Force used was unlawful and not reasonable. | Any force was reasonable under the circumstances. | Assault and battery claim survives. |
| Negligence against Burt under ch. 258 | Burt acted within scope of employment; liability not barred. | Chapter 258 precludes state-law negligence claims against public employees. | Dismissed; exclusive remedy under ch. 258 applies. |
| Malicious prosecution against Burt | Burt initiated criminal proceedings with malice and without probable cause. | Complaint contains conclusory allegations not showing probable cause or malice. | Dismissed. |
| IIED against Burt | Allegations show extreme and outrageous conduct causing severe distress. | Conduct not extreme and outrageous as a matter of law. | Survives to be decided by a jury. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hatch v. Department for Children, 274 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2001) (limits parental rights; reasonable suspicion standard for removal matters)
- Longval v. Commissioner of Correction, 404 Mass. 325 (Mass. 1989) (direct rights violation not per se coercive under MCRA)
- Pheasant Ridge Assocs. Ltd. P’Ship v. Burlington, 399 Mass. 771 (Mass. 1987) (taking rights context; coercion analysis considerations)
- Spencer v. Roche, 755 F.Supp.2d 250 (D. Mass. 2010) (MCRA two-part liability sequence; threat, intimidation, coercion)
- Raiche v. Pietroski, 623 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2010) (assault and battery standard for police officers; objective reasonableness)
- Meehan v. Town of Plymouth, 167 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 1999) (false arrest vs. malicious prosecution interplay)
- Eason v. Alexis, 824 F.Supp.2d 236 (D. Mass. 2011) (extent of IIED in police conduct context)
- Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 400 Mass. 82 (Mass. 1987) (extreme and outrageous conduct standard; Restatement guidance)
- Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263 (1st Cir. 2009) (two-step qualified immunity analysis)
- Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (Supreme Court) (family privacy and liberty interests)