This case comes before us following the district court’s entry of summary judgment adverse to plaintiff-appellant Richard H. Hatch, Jr., and the court’s concomitant refusal to grant leave to amend. On appeal, Hatch challenges only the latter ruling. Concluding, as we do, that amendment would be futile because the qualified immunity of the prospective defendant would render nugatory the proposed amended complaint, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
We divine the following account of the facts from the record below, drawing all reasonable inferences in the appellant’s favor.
In the spring of 1997, the appellant inquired about adopting a child. Two months later, he accepted an emergency placement of John Doe, then age seven, at the behest of the Rhode Island Department for Children, Youth and their Families (DCYF). While in the appellant’s custody, John exhibited serious behavioral and emotional problems stemming from past abuse' — -problems that the appellant alleges were known to DCYF at the time *17 of the placement. In particular, John tended to be deceitful and to fly into tantrums (often hurting himself during bouts of uncontrolled rage). Despite these problems, the appellant adopted John in August of 1998.
In the two years following his adoption, John’s demeanor improved, and the appellant attributes that improvement to his parenting skills. Then came a chain of events that culminated in John’s temporary removal from the appellant’s custody. That chain was forged when the appellant left John with a friend for seven weeks to participate in the television show “Surviv- or.” John gained weight during that interval and the appellant, upon his return, decided to institute a fitness regime.
The first step in this initiative occurred at 4:30 a.m. on April 27, 2000, when the appellant directed John to accompany him on a four-or-five-mile run. During this excursion, John began to complain. The appellant responded by declaring that the length of the run would be extended. John then threw a tantrum and the appellant pulled back his arms and jacket to keep him from harming himself. At some point, John fell to the ground and bumped his forehead. After things had quieted down, the appellant took John to school.
At the start of class, John’s teacher noticed the bump and questioned John about its origins. John replied that he had fallen on cement. The teacher sent John to the school nurse, who applied an ice pack and inquired about the bump. John repeated the same story. The nurse also observed red marks across John’s neck and asked about those as well; John told her that he had scraped himself during the run. Although the nurse doubted this account, she sent the lad back to the classroom with the ice pack and instructions that he report to her at recess.
Within the hour, John’s teacher also remarked the red marks on his neck. John told her that he had been scraped by branches during the run. The teacher and the nurse conferred later that morning, and the nurse indicated that she would telephone the appellant to secure his explanation of what had happened. For whatever reason, she did not make the call.
John returned to the nurse at noon with a very different version of the facts. He stated bluntly: “You saw all this stuff that happened to me, my father did it.” When asked to amplify, he claimed that, during the run, he could not continue and fell to the pavement as his father pulled him by the earlobe. John further claimed that his father compelled him to do pushups by manipulating his neck and pushing his head into the cement surface. He added that he had been hit in the past and that he was afraid to return home.
Alarmed by this account, the nurse took John to the principal’s office. John told the principal what he had told the nurse. The principal then sent John back to class, but telephoned DCYF and related the details of John’s statement.
DCYF assigned appellee Steven Brown, an investigator, to follow up on John’s allegations of abuse. Brown called the school shortly before 2:30 p.m. and spoke with the principal. She advised Brown that the school was closing soon and expressed fear that the appellant might come for his son before DCYF had a chance to interview the boy. Brown advised the principal to put matters in the hands of the local constabulary pending his (Brown’s) arrival.
The principal followed this advice and called the police. The officers responded immediately. John again related his tale of abuse and the officers transported him to the Middletown police station. Brown *18 arrived at the station at approximately 3:30 p.m. He intended to interview John there, but the boy complained of dizziness and headaches, so Brown arranged for him to be taken to Newport Hospital. John told the rescue personnel essentially the same story that he had told to the nurse, the principal, and the police. The appellant appeared at the police station at about the same time as Brown. He was unceremoniously arrested for felony child abuse.
Meanwhile, Brown had followed John to Newport Hospital. John was seen by an on-call physician, Dr. Altreuter, who found his injuries consistent with his tale of abuse. Dr. Altreuter placed John under a “physician’s hold” pending the institution of proceedings before the Family Court. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 40-ll-5(a) (granting to physicians who encounter injuries consistent with abuse the right, without parental consent, to place an injured child on a seventy-two hour hold pending an adjudicative hearing). The doctor then notified Brown of his action and gave Brown a copy of his report. Brown immediately placed the child under the protective custody of DCYF. 1
Brown proceeded to interview the boy, heard his account of abuse at first hand, and took photographs of his injuries. Brown also learned of the appellant’s involvement in “Survivor,” prompting him to call his supervisor, Mary McKee, to warn her that this might prove to be a “high-profile case.” He then attempted to interview the appellant — whether before or after he repaired to the courthouse is not clear — but the appellant refused to speak with him on advice of counsel. At the close of his investigation, Brown sought the aid of the Family Court, which issued an ex parte order of temporary custody.
John remained in DCYF’s custody pending a further adjudication. On May 24, 2000, the Family Court heard testimony and determined that there was no probable cause to believe that John had been abused. The court therefore concluded that returning home would not place John at risk, rescinded the order granting provisional custody to DCYF, and restored John to the appellant’s care.
The matter did not end there. On July 3, 2000, the appellant filed suit against DCYF in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. The complaint sought monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for, inter alia, DCYF’s alleged violation of the appellant’s constitutional rights to familial integrity and to freedom from undue interference in the care, custody, and control of his child. After the completion of pretrial discovery, DCYF moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment protects states (and, therefore, state agencies) from section 1983 liability. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,
The appellant sought to resuscitate his action by moving to amend his complaint, essentially by substituting Brown and McKee as parties defendant. The district court denied the motion to amend as futile, emphasizing that the doctrine of qualified immunity safeguarded the proposed defendants against liability for money damages. This timely appeal followed. In it, the appellant challenges only the district court’s denial of leave to file an amended complaint against Brown.
*19 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
As a general rule, we will reverse a district court’s decision granting or denying a motion to amend a complaint only for abuse of discretion.
See Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
Here, the district court cited the first of these rationales — futility—as the linchpin of its ruling. In the abstract, futility is fully sufficient to justify the denial of a motion to amend.
See CorrearMartinez,
Before addressing this question, we pause to identify the yardstick by which futility is to be measured. The appropriateness
vel non
of a district court decision denying a motion to amend on the ground of futility depends, in the first instance, on the posture of the case. If leave to amend is sought before discovery is complete and neither party has moved for summary judgment, the accuracy of the “futility” label is gauged by reference to the liberal criteria of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
See Glassman v. Computervision Corp.,
In the case at hand, discovery had closed and DCYF had moved for summary judgment before the appellant filed his motion for leave to amend the complaint. Since the appellant has had the full run of discovery and all the pertinent evidence is in the record — the appellant does not suggest that additional discovery would reveal new facts sufficient to put the case in a different light — we apply the more rigorous “substantial evidence” standard.
III. ANALYSIS
Persons acting under color of state law are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for infringing on the constitutional rights of private parties. But this liability is not absolute: the doctrine of qualified immunity provides a safe harbor for a wide range of mistaken judgments.
See Malley v. Briggs,
Determining whether qualified immunity is available to a particular defendant at a particular time requires a trifur-cated inquiry. We ask, first, whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a constitutional right. If so, we then ask whether the contours of the right were sufficiently established at the time of'the alleged violation. Finally, we ask whether an objectively reasonable official would have believed that the action taken or omitted violated that right.
Starlight Sugar, Inc. v. Soto,
A.
We start, as the Supreme Court has suggested, with the question of whether the appellant has alleged the violation of a constitutional right.
2
See Wilson v. Layne,
At a certain level of generality, this right is plainly of constitutional dimension. The interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is among the most venerable of the liberty interests embedded in the Constitution.
Troxel v. Granville,
In this vein, the law recognizes that the protection afforded to the parents’ interest must be balanced against other valid interests, particularly the best interests of the child and the interest of society in the maturation of children as future citizens.
See Frazier v. Bailey,
The appellant’s proposed amended complaint focuses on such a temporary custodial interruption: Brown’s decision to take John into state custody prior to obtaining a Family Court order. The Court has not had occasion to formulate the contours of the constitutional rule under which a state official lawfully may take temporary custody of a child during an investigation of abuse or neglect, nor has this court dealt definitively with the issue. Other courts have grappled with it, however, and most of them have concluded that a case worker — we use that term generically — may place a child in temporary custody when he has evidence giving rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the child has been abused or is in imminent peril of abuse.
See, e.g., Brokaw v. Mercer County,
The appellant argues that the Constitution imposes a higher standard on the state. He would have us adopt the minority view, espoused on the appellate level only by one court, which requires that prior to assuming temporary custody, a case worker have “reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury and that the scope of the intrusion is reasonably necessary to avert that specific injury.”
Wallis v. Spencer,
We think that this sets the bar too high, and that the majority rule better balances the competing interests of the child, the parents, and the state. Because the welfare of the child is paramount, an objectively reasonable suspicion of abuse justifies protective measures.
See Lossman v. Pekarske,
Moreover, the government has a compelling interest in safeguarding children that it suspects are victims of abuse and in acting quickly on their behalf. We live in an era in which case workers operate under enormous pressure, confronted with the necessity of making on-the-spot judgments on the basis of limited and often conflicting information. Circumstances frequently force them to make difficult choices without time for extensive investigation. When presented with evidence of apparent child abuse, a case worker must have a fair amount of leeway to act in the interest of an imperilled child — and it is better to err on the side of caution than to do nothing and await incontrovertible proof. Given these realities, the existence of a reasonable suspicion of child abuse warrants protecting the child by taking him or her into custody — subject, of course, to appropriate procedural safeguards,
see supra
note 3 — while investigating further.
See Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Russell,
That settles the matter. We reject the appellant’s view that a case worker, even after he has a reasonable suspicion of child abuse, must conduct a full-blown investigation and elevate that suspicion to the level of probable cause before assuming temporary custody. We hold instead that the Constitution allows a ease worker to take temporary custody of a child, without a hearing, when the case worker has a reasonable suspicion that child abuse has occurred (or, alternatively, that a threat of abuse is imminent). It follows, therefore, that a parent’s right to the care, custody, and control of a minor child is inviolate unless a case worker has such a suspicion. In this instance, the appellant’s complaint (though it unsuccessfully espouses a broader statement) sufficiently identifies this clearly established constitutional right. Thus, the appellant satisfies the first prong of the tripartite test.
B.
We now must determine whether the contours of the constitutional right that we have identified — a parent’s right to custody in the absence of a case worker’s reasonable suspicion of child abuse — were clearly established at the time of the critical events.
Buenrostro,
The critical inquiry here is whether the dimensions of the right were sufficiently well-defined that a reasonable official would have understood that his actions violated that right.
Anderson,
To determine the contours of a particular right at a given point in time, an inquiring court must look not only to Supreme Court precedent but to all available case law.
See United States v. Lanier,
In
Frazier,
we upheld a grant of qualified immunity to social workers who had played a role in a family dispute. In so doing, we stated that a father’s right to the care, custody, and control of his children “can rarely be considered ‘clearly established’ ... in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.”
Frazier,
Several years elapsed between the dates on which
Frazier
and
Watterson
were decided and the date on which Brown took temporary custody of the appellant’s son. During that interval, an emerging body of decisional law outside our own circuit has shed a brighter light on the contours of the constitutional right asserted by the appellant. Although our sister circuits have reached different conclusions on the constitutional standard to be applied when a state actor takes a child into temporary custody, those decisions share a common denominator: at an irreducible minimum, a case worker must have no less than a reasonable suspicion of child abuse (or imminent danger of abuse) before taking a child into custody prior to a hearing.
See Brokaw,
c.
While the first two steps in the qualified immunity pavane deal with abstract legal principles, the final step deals with the facts of the particular case. The question here is whether Brown had reliable information, sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion of abuse, when he removed John from his father’s custody.
In answering this question, it is important to understand the parameters of the qualified immunity defense. We have written that “the defense of qualified immunity offers sanctuary not only to government officials who act with impeccable propriety, but also to those who err but could not reasonably have understood that their actions infracted a prospective plaintiffs federally assured rights.”
Quintero de Quintero v. Aponte-Roque,
The appellant argues that Brown acted unreasonably because he did not investigate the matter fully (e.g., obtain the appellant’s side of the story, interview John’s babysitter, acquaint himself with John’s prior inconsistent statements, delve into John’s troubled past) before taking temporary custody of John. That argument will not wash. As we have said, if what Brown knew afforded him a reasonable basis for suspecting abuse, he was under no obligation to investigate further before removing the boy from an apparently dangerous situation.
See Robison v. Via,
The appellant next argues that Brown lacked a reasonable basis for his suspicions because he relied primarily on hearsay information — an account relayed by the principal (who merely parroted what she had heard that morning from John and the school nurse). Despite the hearsay nature of the principal’s statement, we think that Brown had a reasonable basis for suspecting child abuse. We explain briefly.
When he took custody, Brown knew, at the very least, that two responsible faculty members (the principal and the school nurse) took John’s claim of abuse seriously; that John had repeated that claim to the police; that he bore marks consistent with his claim; that the boy had expressed fear for his safety should he be forced to return home; that he was complaining of headaches and dizziness; and that a neutral physician, after examining John, had *25 reported that his injuries were consistent with abuse and had placed him under a “physician’s hold.” We believe that this was more than sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion of abuse (and, thus, to justify a temporary assumption of custody). 4
The fact that the principal’s statements were hearsay does not alter this result. Hearsay evidence, if cloaked with indicia of reliability, may establish a reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity in the preliminary stages of an investigation. The Supreme Court elaborated on this point a decade ago:
Reasonable suspicion ... is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both factors — quantity and quality — are considered in the “totality of the circumstances — the whole picture,” that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion. Thus, if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable.
Alabama v. White,
The hearsay at issue here passes this screen. After all, the principal herself had observed John’s injuries and had received material information from him and from the school nurse. Moreover, she provided DCYF with a detailed account of the eir-cumstances surrounding the supposed abuse and the child’s fear of reprisal. Given the authority of the principal and her proximity to the purported victim, the indications of reliability were very strong.
Even more compelling were the statements of Dr. Altreuter. The physician provided Brown with an expert medical opinion that the child had injuries consistent with abuse. (Indeed, the doctor felt constrained to place the child on a seventy-two hour “physician’s hold.”) Dr. Altreu-ter’s recent examination of John and his expert authority in medicine are powerful indicators of reliability, and his statements substantiated the conclusion that John had been abused that morning.
To say more would be to paint the lily. We hold that the information known to Brown when he took temporary custody of John met both the qualitative and quantitative requirements of the reasonable suspicion standard.
See Thomason,
IV. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. The record shows that Brown had a reasonable basis both for suspecting child abuse and for believing John to be in danger (and, therefore, that he acted justifiably in taking the boy into temporary custody). The fact that this suspicion proved, in the long run, to be unfounded does not strip Brown of his entitlement to qualified immunity in regard to a claim for damages.
See Malley,
Affirmed.
Notes
. The parties dispute the exact time that DCYF custody attached, but that dispute is not material to our decision. Consequently, we need not resolve it.
. Notwithstanding the Court’s sequencing of the relevant inquiries, some circuit courts have held that, under particular circumstances, a court may cut directly to the question of whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.
E.g., Kalka v. Hawk,
. Once the state takes temporary custody of a child, it must follow procedures adequate to justify that detention.
See Jordan v. Jackson,
. DCYF hardly can be faulted for retaining custody thereafter, inasmuch as the Family Court, acting on much the same information, issued an ex parte order ratifying John's separation from his father.