Linda Pippen, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. State
2014 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 82
Iowa
2014

Background

  • Plaintiffs (a certified class of African‑American applicants/employees) sued the State of Iowa and its 37 executive‑branch departments under Title VII and the Iowa Civil Rights Act, alleging systemic disparate‑impact discrimination in hiring and promotion across the merit system.
  • Iowa’s merit system: DAS screens for minimum qualifications and refers eligible applications to departments; departments conduct further screening, interview selection, and hiring. Data is kept electronically in BrassRing and in paper hiring files at departments.
  • Plaintiffs’ evidence: statistical analyses by Killingsworth showing lower interview and hire rates for African Americans (analysis limited to applicants referred by DAS), social‑science testimony about implicit bias, anecdotal hiring‑file examples, and the CPS consultant report noting referral→interview and interview→hire reductions for minorities.
  • State’s evidence: departmental variation, defense expert Miller who found no systemwide statistically significant discrimination when analyzing steps separately and who testified files/databases could be analyzed by department/step.
  • District court (bench trial) found for the State: plaintiffs failed to (1) identify a particular employment practice or show the employer’s decisionmaking process was "not capable of separation for analysis" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‑2(k)(1)(B)(i), and (2) prove causation for disparate impact. Iowa Supreme Court affirmed.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether plaintiffs could proceed on a system‑wide disparate‑impact theory without identifying a particular employment practice (i.e., whether the State’s decisionmaking process was "not capable of separation for analysis"). The State’s recordkeeping is inadequate and its hiring practices are sufficiently subjective/intertwined (ripple effects) so plaintiffs cannot isolate particular practices; therefore the process should be analyzed as a whole. The State produced extensive electronic and paper records; departments use separable practices and steps that can be isolated and statistically analyzed; plaintiffs failed to prove incapability of separation. Affirmed: substantial evidence supports the district court that plaintiffs did not prove the decisionmaking process was incapable of separation for analysis.
Adequacy/reliability of plaintiffs’ statistical proof and causation for disparate impact. Aggregated statistics (and experts) show significant racial disparities in interview and hiring outcomes; causation can be inferred from pervasive disparities and lack of oversight. Plaintiffs’ statistics are incomplete or can be subdivided; defense expert showed disparities concentrated in some departments or steps; plaintiffs didn’t link disparities to particular practices. Affirmed (alternative basis): plaintiffs failed to carry causation burden under disparate‑impact framework.
Effect of employer recordkeeping deficiencies on plaintiffs’ burden to identify specific practices. Employer’s failure to keep consistent records (paper files incomplete; BrassRing tracks applications not individuals) justifies system‑wide challenge and excuses inability to identify particular practices. While some files are incomplete, the hiring files and DAS databases still permit focused analysis; plaintiffs didn’t attempt to mine available records for separable practices. Court: inadequate recordkeeping may, in some cases, justify whole‑system analysis, but here plaintiffs did not prove records precluded separation; district court’s contrary factual findings supported.
Whether Iowa Civil Rights Act requires a different separability standard than Title VII. Plaintiffs did not press a different state‑law standard; argument primarily followed federal framework. State urged application of federal standards; court can look to federal decisions for guidance. Court: applied federal framework but noted Iowa Act may be construed more broadly; nonetheless, on the existing record plaintiffs failed under both federal and state law.

Key Cases Cited

  • Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (established disparate‑impact liability for neutral practices that operate as a ‘‘built‑in headwind’’ against minorities)
  • Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (discussed application of disparate‑impact analysis to subjective decisionmaking; fractured Court on burdens)
  • Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (narrowed disparate‑impact approach; emphasized need to identify particular practices)
  • Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (addressed class certification and the challenges of proving company‑wide disparate impact from decentralized discretionary decisionmaking)
  • Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (discussed disparate treatment vs disparate impact focus on consequences)
  • Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (example where multiple criteria together produced significant impact)
  • McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (framework for disparate treatment claims referenced for context)
  • Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (remedies and purpose of Title VII in eradicating employment discrimination)
Read the full case