Libertarian Party of Erie County v. Cuomo, 970 F.3d 106

Background

Plaintiffs (Libertarian Party of Erie County and nine New York residents) sued New York officials and county judges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00 licensing scheme (including "good moral character," "proper cause," and "good cause" criteria) as violating the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
§ 400.00 generally prohibits handgun possession without a license and differentiates at-home licenses (require good moral character/no good cause for denial) and concealed‑carry licenses (additionally require proper cause).
The district court dismissed most plaintiffs for lack of standing or mootness, dismissed claims against non‑deciding officials for lack of traceability, and dismissed money damages claims against the two remaining judges on Eleventh Amendment and judicial‑immunity grounds.
The district court also held (as to the remaining claims) that the statutory phrases are not unconstitutionally vague and that the licensing regime, while implicating the core Second Amendment interest, does not substantially burden it and survives intermediate scrutiny as substantially related to public‑safety interests.
Developments: one plaintiff died (no successor), one later obtained a license, and one moved out of New York; the Second Circuit dismissed portions of the appeal as moot and otherwise affirmed the district court.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing / Mootness / Traceability	Plaintiffs argued they have concrete injuries or that application would be futile; claims should not be dismissed.	Defendants argued many plaintiffs never applied (no injury), some had licenses (no injury), others’ claims trace only to county judges, and some developments mooted claims.	Dismissals for lack of standing or mootness were proper; only Cuthbert and Murtari initially had injury, and their claims were traceable only to the judges who decided their applications.
Judicial Immunity (individual‑capacity)	Plaintiffs: licensing decisions are administrative, not judicial, so judges lack absolute immunity.	Defendants: judges deciding pistol‑permit applications perform adjudicative, case‑specific judicial acts and are entitled to absolute immunity.	Judges Boller and Kehoe were performing judicial acts and are entitled to absolute immunity for individual‑capacity claims.
Eleventh Amendment (official‑capacity damages)	Plaintiffs sought damages against judges in official capacity.	Defendants: official‑capacity damages claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.	Official‑capacity damages claims were properly dismissed as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Void‑for‑Vagueness ("good moral character", "proper cause", "good cause")	Plaintiffs: statutory phrases are too vague on their face to give fair notice or constrain licensing discretion.	Defendants: language has longstanding use, is comprehensible in context, and examples demonstrate valid, non‑vague applications.	Facial vagueness challenge fails; plaintiffs did not show no set of circumstances exists under which §400.00 would be valid.
Second Amendment / Level of Scrutiny	Plaintiffs: licensing requirements unduly burden the fundamental right to keep and bear arms and thus fail constitutional review.	Defendants: statute regulates but does not substantially burden law‑abiding citizens’ home self‑defense; intermediate scrutiny applies and the law is substantially related to public safety.	The licensing regime implicates the core but imposes only incremental burdens; intermediate scrutiny applies and §400.00 survives as substantially related to public safety.

Key Cases Cited

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess handguns for lawful purposes such as self‑defense)
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (Second Amendment applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment)
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015) (adopted two‑step Second Amendment analysis; facial‑challenge principles)
Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012) (upheld New York licensing regime under intermediate scrutiny)
United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2012) (standing requires applying to the challenged permit scheme absent a showing of futility)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (articulated injury‑in‑fact, causation, redressability standing requirements)
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (facial challenges require showing no set of circumstances exists under which the statute is valid)
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (absolute judicial immunity for judicial acts)
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) (distinction between judicial acts (absolute immunity) and administrative acts (no absolute immunity))
Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2009) (judge entitled to immunity for judicial acts; analysis of judicial function)