970 F.3d 174
2d Cir.2020Background
- 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa prompted Connecticut Governor Malloy to declare a public‑health emergency and authorize the Public Health Commissioner to order quarantines.
- Connecticut officials ordered 21‑day home quarantines for two Yale Ph.D. candidates (Boyko and Skrip) and six members of the Mensah‑Sieh family; none were infected; police were used to enforce some quarantines; some quarantined persons received no written orders or timely procedural information.
- At the relevant time the CDC recommended active or self‑monitoring (no default quarantine) for asymptomatic travelers; Connecticut initially adopted stricter mandatory quarantines but revised policy (Oct. 27, 2014) to mandatory active monitoring with individualized risk assessments.
- Appellants sued in federal court seeking declaratory/injunctive relief (prospective) and damages (for Boyko and Mensah‑Sieh plaintiffs), alleging violations of substantive and procedural due process and the Fourth Amendment; state law tort claims were also pleaded.
- The district court dismissed prospective claims for lack of standing, granted qualified immunity to the Commissioner on damages, and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims; the Second Circuit affirmed standing and qualified immunity and remanded to clarify that state claims were dismissed without prejudice; Judge Chin concurred in part and dissented as to qualified immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to seek prospective/injunctive relief | Appellants face an imminent risk of future unlawful quarantines and present harms (chilled travel) so they have Article III standing | Revised Connecticut policy defaults to active monitoring and requires individualized assessments; risk of future quarantine is speculative | No standing: plaintiffs’ alleged future injuries were too conjectural; present harms insufficiently concrete |
| Substantive due process / damages | Quarantine is civil detention implicating fundamental liberty; least‑restrictive‑means/compelling interest test required | Civil‑commitment precedents are not controlling; quarantine/infectious‑disease law lacks a clear, robust consensus imposing a least‑restrictive rule | Qualified immunity: law was not clearly established that Commissioner violated substantive due process |
| Procedural due process / damages | Commissioner failed to provide individualized assessments, timely written notice of review rights, or prompt hearings | Procedural protections are context‑dependent (Mathews balance); no clearly established federal rule requiring the procedural measures plaintiffs demand | Qualified immunity: no clearly established federal procedural due‑process rules specific to quarantines here |
| Fourth Amendment (seizure) / damages | Quarantines were unreasonable seizures because they were medically unjustified given lack of exposure and negative tests | Courts have not clearly established that quarantining asymptomatic travelers for an incubation period is an unreasonable seizure | Qualified immunity: no controlling precedent showing the quarantines were clearly unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (standing requires concrete, particularized injury)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (three elements of Article III standing)
- Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (injury‑in‑fact and redressability in environmental/recurring harm context)
- City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (no injunction absent realistic threat of future harm)
- Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (speculative future injury insufficient; substantial risk standard)
- Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010) (standards for irreparable injury and injunction; discussion of imminent injury)
- Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (state police power to protect public health; limits where measures are arbitrary or unreasonable)
- District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (clearly established law requires decisive authority or consensus; do not define rights at high level of generality)
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (need for specificity in clearly established‑law inquiry)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (specificity requirement for clearly established Fourth Amendment rules)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity two‑step framework)
- Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983) (civil commitment precedent discussed — court found inapplicable as a clear rule for quarantine)
- Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1996) (discussed limits of confinement in medical/prison context)
- Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692 (2011) (courts should avoid deciding constitutional questions unnecessarily)