958 F.3d 775
9th Cir.2020Background
- Lezmond Mitchell was convicted in 2003 of multiple crimes (including murder and carjacking resulting in death) and sentenced to death; during voir dire jurors were questioned about attitudes toward Native Americans and each juror signed a certification that race did not affect their decision.
- In May 2009 Mitchell sought permission under District of Arizona Local Rule 39.2 to interview jurors about possible misconduct or racial/religious bias; the district court denied the request for failure to comply with the local rule and for lack of good cause, citing Rule 606(b).
- Mitchell raised the denial in a §2255 proceeding (Claim K), which the district court dismissed as not cognizable under §2255; the denial of the habeas petition was affirmed on appeal (Mitchell II).
- The Supreme Court decided Peña‑Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017), recognizing a narrow Sixth Amendment exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) for juror statements showing racial animus.
- In March 2018 Mitchell filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion seeking relief from the 2009 order on the theory that Peña‑Rodriguez created an extraordinary intervening change in law; the district court denied relief and Mitchell appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed: it held the Rule 60(b) motion was not an unauthorized successive §2255 petition, but Peña‑Rodriguez did not dismantle local juror‑access rules or constitute an extraordinary circumstance that would justify reopening Mitchell’s final judgment; Mitchell had not shown good cause or any evidence of juror racial bias.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mitchell’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion was an unauthorized second/successive §2255 motion | Mitchell: the motion merely sought relief from procedural denial to allow juror interviews (not a new merits habeas claim) | Gov't: the motion was a disguised attempt to develop and press a new habeas claim and thus is successive | Held: Motion was not a successive §2255; district court had jurisdiction to decide the Rule 60(b) motion |
| Whether Peña‑Rodriguez created an extraordinary intervening change in law justifying Rule 60(b)(6) relief | Mitchell: Peña‑Rodriguez’s racial‑bias exception to Rule 606(b) fundamentally changed law and required courts to allow juror interviews to obtain admissible evidence | Gov't: Peña‑Rodriguez did not alter juror‑access rules or displace local rules requiring good cause | Held: Peña‑Rodriguez did not constitute an extraordinary circumstance for reopening; it left local rules and district‑court discretion intact |
| Whether Peña‑Rodriguez required district courts to permit post‑verdict juror interviews despite local rules (e.g., Local Rule 39.2) | Mitchell: the decision made prior limits effectively an insurmountable barrier to discovering admissible racial‑bias evidence | Gov't: Peña‑Rodriguez reaffirmed limits on post‑trial juror contact and did not compel abrogation of local rules | Held: Peña‑Rodriguez does not override local rules; courts retain discretion and may enforce good‑cause requirements |
| Whether Mitchell showed good cause under Local Rule 39.2 to interview jurors | Mitchell: prosecutor’s comment about Mitchell’s turning his back on Navajo heritage and alleged publicity warranted juror interviews | Gov't: Mitchell offered only speculative allegations and no preliminary evidence of juror misconduct | Held: Mitchell failed to show good cause or any non‑speculative evidence of juror racial bias; denial of juror interviews was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Peña‑Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (recognized narrow Sixth Amendment exception to Rule 606(b) for juror statements showing racial animus)
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (Rule 60(b) in habeas context cannot be used to evade AEDPA second‑or‑successive restrictions)
- United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussed interplay between Rule 606(b) and juror testimony about racial bias)
- Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987) (declined Sixth Amendment exception to bar evidence of jurors’ drug/alcohol use; emphasized pre‑verdict safeguards)
- United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2007) (Mitchell I) (direct appeal addressing jury composition, prosecutorial comments, and death sentence)
- Mitchell v. United States, 790 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2015) (Mitchell II) (appeal of §2255 denial; procedural history of Mitchell’s postconviction claims)
- United States v. Eldred, 588 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding denial of postverdict juror interrogation absent showing of misconduct)
- United States v. Baker, 899 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2018) (post‑Peña‑Rodriguez: declined to read decision as requiring district courts to grant juror interviews without strong evidence of impropriety)