Leyse v. Lifetime Entertainment Services, LLC, 679 F. App'x 44

Plaintiff Mark Leyse alleged Lifetime left a prerecorded robocall voicemail on his residential answering device in August 2009, violating the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B).
Leyse sought to certify a class of all persons whose residential lines received the same prerecorded message; he proposed identifying members via affidavits plus phone-bill evidence of residential service.
The district court denied class certification as unascertainable, concluding there was no reliable list of called numbers and proposed methods would require mini‑hearings and unverifiable memories/records.
After class denial, Lifetime deposited the full amount of Leyse’s individual TCPA damages and costs with the clerk; the court entered judgment for Leyse despite his not accepting the Rule 68 offer.
Leyse appealed denial of class certification and the entry of judgment; Lifetime cross‑appealed challenging standing and denial of summary judgment on merits.
The Second Circuit affirmed: (1) Leyse had standing based on receipt and listening to the voicemail; (2) class certification denial was not an abuse of discretion for ascertainability reasons; and (3) entry of judgment following deposit of full relief was permissible under controlling precedent.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing (injury in fact)	Leyse argued receipt and listening to the voicemail sufficed as a concrete injury under Article III	Lifetime argued statutory violation alone does not establish concrete injury	Court held Leyse had standing: receipt/listening to voicemail on his device is a concrete, particularized injury
Class ascertainability	Leyse argued class could be identified via affidavits plus subscribers’ phone records	Lifetime argued no list of called numbers existed and the proposed method was not administratively feasible and would require mini‑hearings	Court held denial of class certification was within discretion: proposed identification was unreliable and unascertainable
Entry of judgment after deposit of relief	Leyse argued the unaccepted Rule 68 offer should not allow entry of judgment in his favor	Lifetime relied on Second Circuit precedent permitting entry of judgment where defendant deposits full individual relief	Court held entry of judgment was proper; Campbell‑Ewald did not disturb precedents allowing judgment after deposit of full relief
Effect of Campbell‑Ewald	Leyse argued Campbell‑Ewald abrogated precedents permitting entry of judgment after deposit	Lifetime argued Campbell‑Ewald explicitly left open the deposit/entry scenario	Court held Campbell‑Ewald did not apply to the deposit/entry scenario and did not undermine controlling precedents

Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2016) (Article III injury‑in‑fact requires concrete, particularized injury)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires concrete and particularized, actual or imminent injury)
Brecher v. Republic of Argentina, 806 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2015) (ascertainability is an implied Rule 23 requirement)
Tanasi v. New Alliance Bank, 786 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2015) (unaccepted Rule 68 offer permitting entry of judgment when defendant deposits full relief)
Campbell‑Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016) (an unaccepted offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiff's case; did not decide deposit/entry scenario)
Golan v. Veritas Entertainment, LLC, 788 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2015) (receipt of unsolicited robocalls can suffice for standing under the TCPA)
In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Products Liability Litigation, 725 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2013) (an identifiable trifle can satisfy injury‑in‑fact)